

A one-time single-bit fault
leaks all previous
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to a chosen-ciphertext attack

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago;
Ruhr University Bochum

cr.yp.to/papers.html#ntrw

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Modified proposal **removes
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Defense 4, implicit rejection (from
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An attack against NTRU-HP

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 Often stored bits are corrupted
 Google statistics $\Rightarrow 10^9$ users
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