Lattice-based cryptography, day 1: simplicity

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
2000 Cohen cryptosystem


Public key: vector of integers $K = (K_1, ..., K_N) \in \{-X, ..., X\}^N$ Encryption:

1. Input message $m \in \{0, 1\}$. 2. Generate $r_1, \ldots, r_N \in \{0, 1\}$. i.e. $r = (r_1, \ldots, r_N) \in \{0, 1\}^N$. (Cohen says pick "half of the integers in the public key at

random": I guess this means $N \in 2\mathbb{Z}$ and $\sum r_i = N/2$.)

3. Compute and send ciphertext $C = (-1)^m (r_1 K_1 + \cdots + r_N K_N).$





Decryption: m = 0 if C mod $s \leq (s - 1)/2$; otherwise m = 1.

Key generation:
Generate
$$s \in \{1, \ldots, Y\}$$
;
 $u_1, \ldots, u_N \in \left\{0, \ldots, \left\lfloor \frac{s-1}{2N} \right\rfloor\right\}$;
 $K_i \in (u_i + s\mathbf{Z}) \cap \{-X, \ldots, X\}$.

Decryption: m = 0 if $C \mod s \le (s - 1)/2;$ otherwise m = 1.

Why this works: $K_i \mod s = u_i \leq (s-1)/2N$ so $r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_NK_N \mod s \leq \frac{s-1}{2}$.

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Why this works: $K_i \mod s = u_i \le (s-1)/2N$ so $r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_NK_N \mod s \le \frac{s-1}{2}$. (Be careful! What if all $r_i = 0$?) Let's try this on the computer.

Debian: apt install sagemath
Fedora: dnf install sagemath
Source: www.sagemath.org
Web (use print(X) to see X):
sagecell.sagemath.org

Sage is Python 3

- + many math libraries
- + a few syntax differences:

sage: 10^6 # power, not xor
1000000

sage: factor(314159265358979323)

317213509 * 990371647

For integers C, s with s > 0, Sage's "C%s" always produces outputs between 0 and s - 1.

Matches standard math definition: C mod $s = C - \lfloor C/s \rfloor s$. For integers C, s with s > 0, Sage's "C%s" always produces outputs between 0 and s - 1.

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Warning: Typically C < 0 produces C%s < 0 in lower-level languages, so nonzero output leaks input sign. For integers C, s with s > 0, Sage's "C%s" always produces outputs between 0 and s - 1.

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Warning: For polynomials C, Sage can make the same mistake.

sage: N=10
sage:

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- sage: Y=2^20
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1048576

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- sage:

sage: X=2^50 sage: Y=2^20 sage: Y 1048576 sage: s=randrange(1,Y+1) sage: s 359512 sage: u=[randrange((s-1)//(2*N)+1).: for i in range(N)] sage:

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sage: Y 1048576 sage: s=randrange(1,Y+1) sage: s 359512 sage: u=[randrange((s-1)//(2*N)+1)• • • • •: for i in range(N)] sage: u [14485, 7039, 6945, 15890, 10493, 17333, 1397, 8656, 8213, 6370]

- sage: Y=2^20
- sage: X=2^50

sage: N=10

sage:	K=[ui+s*randrange(
• • • • •	ceil(-(X+ui)/s),
•	<pre>floor((X-ui)/s)+1)</pre>
•	for ui in u]
sage:	

sage: K=[ui+s*randrange(ceil(-(X+ui)/s), • • • • • floor((X-ui)/s)+1) for ui in u] • • • • • sage: K [870056918917829, 822006576592695, -294765544345815, -669275100080982, 528958455221029, 426006001074157, -641940176080531, 501543495923784, -583064075392587, 46109390243834]

sage: [Ki%s for Ki in K]

- [14485, 7039, 6945, 15890,
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- 96821
- sage: sum(u)
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- sage: sum(u)
- 96821
- sage: s//2
- 179756
- sage:

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-202215856043576	

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-202215856043576		
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47024		
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Functionality problem:
 System can't encrypt messages
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Chosen-ciphertext attack against this system: Decrypt -C. Flip result.

(Works whenever $C \neq 0$.)

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 Transform 1-bit encryption into multi-bit encryption by encrypting each bit separately.
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 Use new randomness for each bit.

B-bit input message $m = (m_1, \ldots, m_B) \in \{0, 1\}^B$. For each $i \in \{1, \ldots, B\}$: Generate $r_{i,1}, \ldots, r_{i,N} \in \{0, 1\}$.

Ciphertext C: $(-1)^{m_1}(r_{1,1}K_1 + \cdots + r_{1,N}K_N),$

. . . ,

 $(-1)^{m_B}(r_{B,1}K_1+\cdots+r_{B,N}K_N).$

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Derandomization: Generate ras cryptographic hash H(m), using standard hash function H. (Watch out: Is m guessable?) 2. Derandomize encryption, and reencrypt during decryption.

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Derandomization: Generate ras cryptographic hash H(m), using standard hash function H. (Watch out: Is m guessable?)

Decryption with reencryption:

- 1. Input C'. (Maybe $C' \neq C$.)
- 2. Decrypt to obtain m'.
- 3. Recompute r' = H(m').
- 4. Recompute C'' from m', r'.
- 5. Abort if $C'' \neq C'$.

Attacker searches all possibilities for (r_1, \ldots, r_N) , checks $r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_NK_N$ against $\pm C_1$.

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 — Also, can easily modify attack to find all bits of message. Modified attack: For each (r_1, \ldots, r_N) , look up $r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_NK_N$ in hash table containing $\pm C_1, \pm C_2, \ldots, \pm C_B$. Modified attack:

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Finding 1% of all bits in all messages, huge information leak: total 0.01 · 2^N operations.

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— Standard subset-sum attacks take only $2^{N/2}$ operations to find $(r_1, \ldots, r_N) \in \{0, 1\}^N$ with $r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_NK_N = C$. "We can stop attacks by taking N = 128, and changing keys every day, and applying all-or-nothing transform to each message."

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Make hash table containing $C - r_{N/2+1}K_{N/2+1} - \cdots - r_NK_N$ for all $(r_{N/2+1}, \ldots, r_N)$.

Look up $r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_{N/2}K_{N/2}$ in hash table for each $(r_1, \ldots, r_{N/2})$. These attacks exploit linear structure of problem to convert one target *C* into many targets.

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There are even more ways to exploit the linear structure.

1981 Schroeppel–Shamir: $2^{N/2}$ operations, space $2^{N/4}$.

2011 Becker–Coron–Joux: 2^{0.291} operations.

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Quantum attacks: various papers. Multi-target speedups: probably!

Variants of cryptosystem

2003 Regev: Cohen cryptosystem (without credit), but replace $(-1)^{m}(r_{1}K_{1} + \cdots + r_{N}K_{N})$ with $m(K_{1}/2) + r_{1}K_{1} + \cdots + r_{N}K_{N}.$

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2009 van Dijk-Gentry-Halevi-Vaikuntanathan: $K_i \in 2u_i + s\mathbf{Z}$; $C = m + r_1K_1 + \cdots + r_NK_N$; $m = (C \mod s) \mod 2$. Be careful to take $s \in 1 + 2\mathbf{Z}$.

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Take two ciphertexts:

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 $C + C' = m + m' + 2(\epsilon + \epsilon') + s(q + q')$. This decrypts to $m + m' \mod 2$ if $\epsilon + \epsilon'$ is small.

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 $CC' = mm' + 2(\epsilon m' + \epsilon' m + 2\epsilon\epsilon') + s(\cdots)$. This decrypts to mm' if $\epsilon m' + \epsilon' m + 2\epsilon\epsilon'$ is small.

sage: N=10
sage:

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sage: E=2^10

sage:

- sage: N=10
 sage: E=2^10
- sage: Y=2^50
- sage:

- sage: N=10
 sage: E=2^10
 sage: Y=2^50
- sage: X=2^80

sage:

- sage: N=10
- sage: E=2^10
- sage: Y=2^50
- sage: X=2^80
- sage: s=1+2*randrange(Y/4,Y/2)
- sage: s
- 984887308997925

sage:

sage: X=2^80 sage: s=1+2*randrange(Y/4,Y/2) sage: s 984887308997925 sage: u=[randrange(E) for i in range(N)] • sage: u [247, 418, 365, 738, 123, 735, 772, 209, 673, 47] sage:

sage: N=10

sage: E=2^10

sage: Y=2^50

sage:

sage:	K=[2*ui+s*randrange(
•	ceil(-(X+2*ui)/s),
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sage:	

- sage: K [587473338058640662659869, -1111539179100720083770339, 794301459533783434896055, 68817802108374958901751, 742362470968200823035396, 1023345827831539515054795, -357168679398558876730006, 1121421619119964601051443, -1109674862276222495587129, -235628937785003770523381]

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....: for i in range(N))
sage: C
2094088748748247210016703
sage:

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sage:	m2=randr	ange((2)
sage:	r2=[rand	range	e(2)
•	for	i in	range(N)]
sage:			

sage: m2=randrange(2)
sage: r2=[randrange(2)
....: for i in range(N)]
sage: C2=m2+sum(r2[i]*K[i]
....: for i in range(N))
sage: C2
-51722353737982737270129
sage:

sage:	m2=randrange(2)
sage:	r2=[randrange(2)
• • • • •	<pre>for i in range(N)]</pre>
sage:	C2=m2+sum(r2[i]*K[i]
• • • • •	<pre>for i in range(N))</pre>
sage:	C2
-51722	2353737982737270129
sage:	C2%s
4971	
sage:	

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sage:	C2
-51722	2353737982737270129
sage:	C2%s
4971	
sage:	(C2%s)%2
1	
sage:	

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-51722353737982737270129		
sage:	C2%s	
4971		
sage:	(C2%s)%2	
1		
sage:	m2	
1		
sage:		

sage: (C+C2)%s

7674

sage: (C*C2)%s

13436613

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Because C mod s and C' mod s are small enough compared to s, have $C + C' \mod s = (C \mod s) + (C' \mod s)$ and $CC' \mod s = (C \mod s)(C' \mod s)$. sage: (C+C2)%s
7674
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13436613
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Refinements: add more noise to ciphertexts, bootstrap (2009 Gentry) to control noise, etc.

Lattices

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This is a lettuce:




<u>Lattices</u>

This is a lettuce:



This is a lattice:



Lattices, mathematically

Assume that $V_1, \ldots, V_D \in \mathbb{R}^N$ are \mathbb{R} -linearly independent, i.e., $\mathbb{R}V_1 + \cdots + \mathbb{R}V_D =$ $\{r_1V_1 + \cdots + r_DV_D : r_1, \ldots, r_D \in \mathbb{R}\}$ is a D-dimensional vector space.

Lattices, mathematically

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 $ZV_1 + \cdots + ZV_D =$ $\{r_1V_1 + \cdots + r_DV_D : r_1, \ldots, r_D \in Z\}$ is a rank-*D* length-*N* lattice.

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 V_1,\ldots,V_D

is a **basis** of this lattice.

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"SVP: shortest-vector problem": What is shortest nonzero vector?

1982 Lenstra–Lenstra–Lovász (LLL) algorithm runs in poly time, computes a nonzero vector in Lwith length at most $2^{D/2}$ times length of shortest nonzero vector. Typically $\approx 1.02^{D}$ instead of $2^{D/2}$.

Subset-sum lattices

One way to find (r_1, \ldots, r_N) where $C = r_1 K_1 + \cdots + r_N K_N$:

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Choose λ . Define $V_0 = (-C, 0, 0, ..., 0),$ $V_1 = (K_1, \lambda, 0, ..., 0),$ $V_2 = (K_2, 0, \lambda, ..., 0),$

$$V_{N} = (K_{N}, 0, 0, \ldots, \lambda).$$

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Define $L = \mathbf{Z}V_0 + \cdots + \mathbf{Z}V_N$. L contains the short vector $V_0 + r_1V_1 + \cdots + r_NV_N =$ $(0, r_1\lambda, \ldots, r_N\lambda).$

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Is this true? Open: What's the exponent of this algorithm?

Lattice attacks on DGHV keys

Recall $K_i = 2u_i + sq_i \approx sq_i$. Each u_i is small: $u_i < E$. Note $q_j K_i - q_i K_j = 2q_j u_i - 2q_i u_j$.

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Define

$$V_1 = (E, K_2, K_3, \dots, K_N);$$

 $V_2 = (0, -K_1, 0, \dots, 0);$
 $V_3 = (0, 0, -K_1, \dots, 0);$
...;

 $V_{N} = (0, 0, 0, \ldots, -K_{1}).$

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Define $L = \mathbf{Z}V_1 + \dots + \mathbf{Z}V_N$. L contains $q_1V_1 + \dots + q_NV_N =$ $(q_1E, q_1K_2 - q_2K_1, \dots) =$ $(q_1E, 2q_1u_2 - 2q_2u_1, \dots).$ sage: V=matrix.identity(N)
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31

- 596487875
- sage: q0
- sage: q0=V.LLL()[0][0]/E
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(1024,-1111539179100720083770339, 794301459533783434896055, 68817802108374958901751, 742362470968200823035396, 1023345827831539515054795, -357168679398558876730006, 1121421619119964601051443, -1109674862276222495587129, -235628937785003770523381)sage:

sage: V[0]

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)

sage: V[1]

-235628937785003770523381)

(0, -587473338058640662659869,

-1109674862276222495587129,

1121421619119964601051443,

-357168679398558876730006,

1023345827831539515054795,

742362470968200823035396,

68817802108374958901751,

794301459533783434896055,

-1111539179100720083770339,

(1024,

sage: V[0]

sage: V.LLL()[0] (610803584000, 1056189937254, 37030242384, 845898454698, -225618319442, 363547143644, 1100126026284, -313150978512, 1359463649048, 174256676348) sage: 33

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33

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sage: q[0] * K[9] - q[9] * K[0]

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sage: q[0]*E

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e.g. all attacks take $\ge 2^{72}$ cycles with public keys only 802MB.

2012 Chen–Nguyen: faster attack. Need bigger DGHV/CMNT keys.

Big attack surfaces are dangerous

1991 Chaum–van Heijst– Pfitzmann: choose p sensibly; define $C(x, y) = 4^{x}9^{y} \mod p$ for suitable ranges of x and y.

Simple, beautiful, structured. Very easy security reduction: finding *C* collision implies computing a discrete logarithm.

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Simple, beautiful, structured. Very easy security reduction: finding *C* collision implies computing a discrete logarithm.

Typical exaggerations: *C* is "provably secure"; *C* is "cryptographically collision-free"; "security follows from rigorous mathematical proofs". Security losses in C include 1922 Kraitchik (index calculus); 1986 Coppersmith-Odlyzko-Schroeppel (NFS predecessor); 1993 Gordon (general DL NFS); 1993 Schirokauer (faster NFS); 1994 Shor (quantum poly time); many subsequent attack speedups from people who care about pre-quantum security.

C is very bad cryptography. No matter what user's cost limit is, obtain better security with "unstructured" compressionfunction designs such as BLAKE. For public-key encryption: Some mathematical structure seems to be unavoidable, but pursuing simple structures often leads to security disasters. For public-key encryption: Some mathematical structure seems to be unavoidable, but pursuing simple structures often leads to security disasters.

Pre-quantum example: DH is simpler than ECDH, but DH has suffered many more security losses than ECDH. State-of-the-art DH attacks are very complicated. For public-key encryption: Some mathematical structure seems to be unavoidable, but pursuing simple structures often leads to security disasters.

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2013 Barbulescu–Gaudry–Joux– Thomé: pre-quantum quasi-poly break of small-characteristic DH. The state-of-the-art attacks against Cohen's cryptosystem are much more complicated than the cryptosystem is. Scary! The state-of-the-art attacks against Cohen's cryptosystem are much more complicated than the cryptosystem is. Scary!

Lattice-based cryptosystems are advertised as "algorithmically simple", consisting mainly of "linear operations on vectors". Attacks exploit this structure! The state-of-the-art attacks against Cohen's cryptosystem are much more complicated than the cryptosystem is. Scary!

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For efficiency, lattice-based cryptosystems usually have features that expand the attack surface even more: e.g., rings and decryption failures.

NISTPQC

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Round 3 starting soon. My guesses: NIST will announce short list of planned standards + short backup list; and will overemphasize speed. Lattice-based signature submissions:

40

- Dilithium: round 2.
- DRS: **broken**; eliminated.
- FALCON*: round 2.
- pqNTRUSign*: eliminated.
- qTESLA: mistaken security "theorems"; round 2; some parameters broken.

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Submitter claims patent on this submission. Warning: even without 2, submission could be covered by other patents! Lattice-based encryption submissions in round 2: Frodo, Kyber, LAC, NewHope, NTRU, NTRU Prime, Round5**☆**, SABER, ThreeBears (≈lattice). 41

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Other round-1 lattice-based encryption submissions: Compact LWE (broken), Ding *****, EMBLEM, KINDI, LIMA, Lizard *, LOTUS, Mersenne (\approx lattice, big keys), Odd Manhattan (big keys), OKCN/AKCN/CNKE/KCL*, Ramstake (\approx lattice, big keys), Titanium.

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Mistaken security "theorems" have been identified for Frodo, Kyber, NewHope, Round5.

All lattice submissions have suffered security losses.

Examples of attack improvements after beginning of round 1:

2018 Laarhoven–Mariano: saves "between a factor 20 to 40" in sieving, asymptotically fastest SVP attack known.

2018 Bai–Stehlé–Wen: new BKZ variant, "bases of better quality" for the "same cost" of SVP.

2018 Aono–Nguyen–Shen: quantum enumeration. For cryptographic sizes, costs less than sieving in some cost metrics. 2018 Anvers–Vercauteren– Verbauwhede: "an attacker can significantly reduce the security of (Ring/Module)-LWE/LWR based schemes that have a relatively high failure rate".

Frodo, Kyber, LAC, NewHope, Round5, SABER, ThreeBears have nonzero failure rates.

For LAC-128, "the failure rate is 2⁴⁸ times bigger than estimated". Failure rate is also what broke first version of Round5. 2019 Albrecht–Ducas–Herold– Kirshanova–Postlethwaite– Stevens: "Our solution for the SVP-151 challenge was found 400 times faster than the time reported for the SVP-150 challenge, the previous record."

2019 Pellet-Mary–Hanrot–Stehlé broke claimed half-exponential approximation-factor barrier for number-theoretic attacks against Ideal-SVP. (These attacks broke cyclotomic STOC 2009 Gentry FHE in quantum poly time.) 2019 Guo–Johansson–Yang: faster attacks against some systems that use error correction to reduce decryption failures. (Violates security claims for LAC.) 2020 Dachman-Soled–Ducas–

Gong–Rossi: slightly faster attacks against constant-sum secrets (LAC, NTRU, Round5).

2020 Albrecht–Bai–Fouque– Kirchner–Stehlé–Wen: better exponent for enumeration and quantum enumeration.

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