

Lattice-based cryptography:

Episode V:

the ring strikes back

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[Crypto 1999 Nguyen](#): “At Crypto '97, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on the closest vector problem in a lattice, which is known to be NP-hard. We show that . . . the problem of decrypting ciphertexts can be

reduced to a special closest vector problem which is much easier than the general problem. As an application, we solved four out of the five numerical challenges proposed on the Internet by the authors of the cryptosystem.

At least two of those four challenges were conjectured to be intractable. We discuss ways to prevent the flaw, but conclude that, even modified, the scheme cannot provide sufficient security without being impractical.”

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Compare to 1978 McEliece code-based cryptosystem: much more stable security story through dozens of attack papers.

Typical parameters: 1MB key for $>2^{128}$ *post-quantum* security.

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2016.07: Google rolls out

large-scale experiment with

post-quantum crypto between

Chrome and some Google sites.

Uses lattice-based crypto.

Google sent only a few KB for public keys, ciphertexts.

How can lattice-based crypto work within a few KB?

Combine two ingredients:

1. Do *not* take key sizes large enough for theorems to connect to “**well-studied**” SVP_γ .

See, e.g., [2016 Chatterjee–Koblitz–Menezes–Sarkar](#).

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2. **Use ideal lattices.**

Hope that the extra structure doesn't damage security.

1996–1998 Hoffstein–Pipher–Silverman “NTRU”:

Define R as the ring
 $\mathbf{Z}[x]/(x^{503} - 1)$.

Elements of R are polynomials
 $c_0 + c_1x + c_2x^2 + \cdots + c_{502}x^{502}$
 with integer coefficients c_j .

To multiply in R :

multiply polynomials;

replace x^{503} with 1;

replace x^{504} with x ; etc.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{e.g.: } & (x^{100} + x^{300})(x^{200} + 7x^{400}) \\ &= x^{300} + 8x^{500} + 7x^{700} \\ &= 7x^{197} + x^{300} + 8x^{500} \text{ in } R. \end{aligned}$$

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Alice's public key: $A \in R$ with coefficients in $\{0, 1, \dots, q - 1\}$.

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Bob sends $Ab + c \bmod q$.

This is also 5533 bits.

“Quotient NTRU” (new name),
used in original NTRU design:

Alice generated $A = 3a/d$ in R/q

for small random a, d

(with suitable invertibility):

i.e., $dA - 3a \bmod q = 0$.

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Alice reconstructs $3ab + dc$,

using smallness of a, b, d, c .

Alice computes dc ,

deduces c , deduces b .

“Product NTRU” (new name),
2010 Lyubashevsky–Peikert–Regev:

Everyone knows random $G \in R$.

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Bob sends $B = Gb + e \bmod q$

and $C = m + Ab + c \bmod q$

where b, c, e are small and each
coefficient of m is 0 or $q/2$.

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Alice computes $C - aB \pmod q$,

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Lattice view: Define L as the set of pairs $(v, w) \in R \times R$ such that $vG - w \bmod q = 0$.

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Try to find close lattice point.

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Try to exploit reuse of b for faster Product NTRU attack. (“Ring-LWE” : arbitrary reuse.)

Try to exploit $A = 3a/d$ structure for faster Quotient NTRU attack.

2013 Lyubashevsky–Peikert–

Regev: “All of the algebraic and algorithmic tools (including quantum computation) that we employ . . . can also be brought to bear against SVP and other problems on ideal lattices. Yet **despite considerable effort**, no significant progress in attacking these problems has been made. The best-known algorithms for ideal lattices perform essentially no better than their generic counterparts, both in theory and in practice.”

Many more NTRU variants
(often not crediting NTRU).

Fully homomorphic encryption:
STOC 2009 Gentry

“Fully homomorphic encryption
using ideal lattices” .

PKC 2010 Smart–Vercauteren.

Eurocrypt 2011 Gentry–Halevi.
etc.

Multilinear maps: e.g.,

Eurocrypt 2013 Garg–Gentry–
Halevi “Candidate multilinear
maps from ideal lattices” .

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First stage in attack:

SODA 2016 Biasse–Song

fast quantum algorithm to

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Older pre-quantum algorithms take subexponential time.

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These attacks exploit structure of cyclotomic rings. Rescue system by switching to another ring?

2014.02 Bernstein: pre-quantum attack strategy; subexponential time for many choices of ring.

Eurocrypt 2017 Bauch–Bernstein–de Valence–Lange–van Vredendaal: quasipolynomial-time pre-quantum attack for “multiquadratic rings” .

2016 Bernstein–Chuengsatiansup–Lange–van Vredendaal “NTRU Prime”: use prime degree, large Galois group, inert modulus; reduce attack surface at low cost.