Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

Let's look at crypto from the government perspective.

We're the government. We have a long history of trying hard to understand what people are saying and what people are thinking. ("We listen! We care!")

We've put serious time and money and effort into this goal. ("Collect it all.")

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