# Error-prone cryptographic designs

Daniel J. Bernstein
University of Illinois at Chicago &
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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"*The poor user is*
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—1992 Rivest,
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(1991 proposal by NIST,
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

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

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

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

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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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Then it's safe for reviewers
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