

Batch NFS

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago &  
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

Tanja Lange

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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In this talk  $\log L$  means

$(1 + o(1))(\log N)^{1/3}(\log \log N)^{2/3}$ .

$L$  is often written

“ $L_N(1/3)$ ” or “ $L_N(1/3)^{1+o(1)}$ ”.

Exponents of  $L$  in this talk

are limited to  $10^{-6}\mathbf{Z}$ .

Rigorously proven? Ha ha ha.

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Continuation of quote: "To despite huge efforts, no one broken a regular 1024-bit key. In fact, the best completed attack is estimated to be the equivalent of a 700-bit key. An attacker breaking a 1024-bit signing key would need to expend phenomenal amounts of networked computing power in a way that would not be detected in order to break a single key. Because of this, it is estimated that most zones can safely use 1024-bit keys for at least the next ten years."

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Best results: time  $L^1$  using chips. *AT* is  $L^1$ .

Our main result: a batch attack with time  $L^1$  using chips. *AT* per chip is  $L^1$ .

This paper is at  $L^{o(1)}$ , speedup  $L^{o(1)}$ . Results are a guess from

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*AT* is  $L^{1.976052}$ .

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using chip area  $L^1$   
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“RAM” metric (adding two 64-bit integers has same cost as accessing array of size  $2^{64}$ ) is not realistic; “*AT*” metric is realistic.

“Asymptotic”: We systematically suppress polynomial factors. Our speedups are superpolynomial.

Best result known for *one* key  
time  $L^{1.185632}$   
using chip area  $L^{0.790420}$ ;  
*AT* is  $L^{1.976052}$ .

Our main result for  
a batch of  $L^{0.5}$  keys:  
time  $L^{1.022400}$   
using chip area  $L^{1.181600}$ ;  
*AT* per key is  $L^{1.704000}$ .

This paper also looks more closely  
at  $L^{o(1)}$ , analyzing asymptotic  
speedup from early-abort ECM.  
Results are not what one would  
guess from 1982 Pomerance.

our paper:  
the *asymptotic* cost,  
ally *price-performance*  
breaking *many* RSA keys.

: e.g. millions.

performance ratio”:

**the product** for chips.

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g array of size  $2^{64}$ ) is not  
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can target

2. Primary  
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3. Attack  
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Eratosthenes for s

Sieving small integers using primes 2, 3, 5

1			
2	2		
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4	2 2		
5			5
6	2	3	
7			7
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12	2 2	3	
13			
14	2		7
15		3	5
16	2 2 2 2		
17			
18	2	3 3	
19			
20	2 2		5

etc.

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## Eratosthenes for smoothness

Sieving small integers  $i > 0$  using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
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12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
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11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.



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11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
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18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

## The Q s

Sieving a

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1				
2	2			
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5			5	
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7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

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1				
2	2			
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7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

## The Q sieve

Sieving  $i$  and 611  
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1					612	2
2	2				613	2
3		3			614	2
4	2 2				615	2
5			5		616	2
6	2	3			617	2
7				7	618	2
8	2 2 2				619	2
9		3 3			620	2
10	2		5		621	2
11					622	2
12	2 2	3			623	2
13					624	2
14	2			7	625	2
15		3	5		626	2
16	2 2 2 2				627	2
17					628	2
18	2	3 3			629	2
19					630	2
20	2 2		5		631	2

etc.

## Eratosthenes for smoothness

Sieving small integers  $i > 0$   
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

## The Q sieve

Sieving  $i$  and  $611 + i$  for sm  
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

612	2 2		3 3	
613				
614	2			
615			3	5
616	2 2 2			
617				
618	2		3	
619				
620	2 2			5
621			3 3 3	
622	2			
623				
624	2 2 2 2	3		
625				5
626	2			
627			3	
628	2 2			
629				
630	2		3 3	5
631				

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1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

## The Q sieve

Sieving  $i$  and  $611 + i$  for small  $i$   
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

612	2 2	3 3		
613				
614	2			
615		3	5	
616	2 2 2			7
617				
618	2	3		
619				
620	2 2		5	
621		3 3 3		
622	2			
623				7
624	2 2 2 2 3			
625			5 5 5 5	
626	2			
627		3		
628	2 2			
629				
630	2	3 3	5	7
631				

## Primes for smoothness

small integers  $i > 0$   
 times 2, 3, 5, 7:

5
7
3
5
7
5
3
5

## The Q sieve

Sieving  $i$  and  $611 + i$  for small  $i$   
 using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

612	2 2	3 3		
613				
614	2			
615		3	5	
616	2 2 2			7
617				
618	2	3		
619				
620	2 2		5	
621		3 3 3		
622	2			
623				7
624	2 2 2 2 3			
625			5 5 5 5	
626	2			
627		3		
628	2 2			
629				
630	2	3 3	5	7
631				

etc.

Have co  
 the cong  
 for some

$$14 \cdot 625$$

$$64 \cdot 675$$

$$75 \cdot 686$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot$$

$$= 2^8 3^4 5$$

$$\gcd\{611$$

$$= 47.$$

$$611 = 47$$

smoothness

egers  $i > 0$

5, 7:

## The Q sieve

Sieving  $i$  and  $611 + i$  for small  $i$   
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				612	2 2	3 3		
2	2			613				
3			3	614	2			
4	2 2			615		3	5	
5				616	2 2 2			7
6	2		3	617				
7				618	2	3		
8	2 2 2			619				
9			3 3	620	2 2		5	
10	2			621		3 3 3		
11				622	2			
12	2 2		3	623				7
13				624	2 2 2 2 3			
14	2			625			5 5 5 5	
15			3 5	626	2			
16	2 2 2 2			627		3		
17				628	2 2			
18	2		3 3	629				
19				630	2	3 3	5	7
20	2 2		5	631				

etc.

Have complete fac

the congruences  $i$   
for some  $i$ 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 6$$

$$= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4$$

$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot$$

$$= 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$







ieve

$i$  and  $611 + i$  for small  $i$   
imes 2, 3, 5, 7:

	612	2 2	3 3		
	613				
	614	2			
	615		3	5	
5	616	2 2 2			7
	617				
7	618	2	3		
	619				
3	620	2 2		5	
5	621		3 3 3		
	622	2			
	623				7
	624	2 2 2 2 3			
7	625			5 5 5 5	
5	626	2			
	627		3		
	628	2 2			
3	629				
	630	2	3 3	5	7
5	631				

Have complete factorization of  
the congruences  $i \equiv 611 + i$   
for some  $i$ 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686 \\ = 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The num

Generaliz

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a$$

$$\rightarrow a - b$$

for root

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Optimal

$$(\mu + o(1))$$

$+ i$  for small  $i$   
5, 7:

2	3 3			
2 2	3	5		7
	3			
2	3 3 3	5		
2 2 2 3				7
		5 5 5 5		
2	3			
	3 3	5		7

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$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The number-field

Generalize  $i \equiv i +$   
 $\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN$  ( $N$  is  
 $\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b$   
for root  $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$   
of nonzero integer

For any  $m$  can find  
so that factoring  $m$   
produces factorization

Optimal choice of  
 $(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^2$

small  $i$

Have complete factorization of the congruences  $i \equiv 611 + i$  for some  $i$ 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

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$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

## The number-field sieve

Generalize  $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m}$$

for root  $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any  $m$  can find  $\alpha$

so that factoring  $m - \alpha$

produces factorization of  $N$ .

Optimal choice of  $\log m$  is

$$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)$$

7

7

5 5 5

7

Have complete factorization of the congruences  $i \equiv 611 + i$  for some  $i$ 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

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## The number-field sieve

Generalize  $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$$

for root  $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any  $m$  can find  $\alpha$  so that factoring  $m - \alpha$  produces factorization of  $N$ .

Optimal choice of  $\log m$  is  $(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}$ .

complete factorization of

congruences  $i \equiv 611 + i$

the  $i$ 's.

$$= 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$= 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$= 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$$

$$87^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$\{14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\}$$

$$7 \cdot 13.$$

## The number-field sieve

Generalize  $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

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Sieve  $L^1$

Find  $L^0$ .

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Factorization of

$$\equiv 611 + i$$

$$7^1.$$

$$7^0.$$

$$7^3.$$

$$575 \cdot 686$$

$$(3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2 \}$$

## The number-field sieve

Generalize  $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$$

for root  $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

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For any  $m$  can find  $\alpha$

so that factoring  $m - \alpha$

produces factorization of  $N$ .

Optimal choice of  $\log m$  is

$$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}.$$

## RAM cost analysis

1993 Buhler–Lenstra

Smoothness bound

Sieve  $L^{1.923000}$  pairs

Find  $L^{0.961500}$  pairs

with  $a - bm$  and  $c$

Total RAM time  $L$

1993 Coppersmith

Total RAM time  $L$

using multiple numbers

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don't seem to compare

with  $AT$ , factory,  $c$

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## The number-field sieve

Generalize  $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$

$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$

for root  $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any  $m$  can find  $\alpha$

so that factoring  $m - \alpha$

produces factorization of  $N$ .

Optimal choice of  $\log m$  is

$$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}.$$

$5^4 7^2$

## RAM cost analysis

1993 Buhler–Lenstra–Pomer

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(2001 Bernstein)

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RAM time  $L^{1.923000}$ .

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## The factorization

1993 Coppersmith  
There *exists* an algorithm  
that factors any integer  
with same #bits as  $N$   
in RAM time  $L^{1.63}$

Smoothness bound  
Smaller than before  
so need more  $(a, b)$

Algorithm *knows* a  
such that  $a - bm$

Note: one  $m$  work  
Algorithm uses ECM  
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## The factorization factory

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There *exists* an algorithm  
that factors any integer  
with same #bits as  $N$   
in RAM time  $L^{1.638587}$ .

Smoothness bound  $L^{0.819290}$

Smaller than before,  
so need more  $(a, b)$ .

Algorithm *knows* all  $(a, b)$   
such that  $a - bm$  is smooth

Note: one  $m$  works for all  $N$

Algorithm uses ECM to check

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Need to precompute

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RAM time  $L^{2.0068}$

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*Finding* this algorithm is slower than running it. Need to precompute all  $(a, b)$  such that  $a - bm$  is smooth. RAM time  $L^{2.006853}$ .

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Standard conversion of precomputation into batching: if there are enough targets, more than  $L^{0.368266}$ , then precomputation cost becomes negligible.



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Huge *AT* cost; useless in reality.

## Factorization factory

Coppersmith:

exists an algorithm

finds any integer

of size  $\leq N$

with time  $L^{1.638587}$ .

improves bound  $L^{0.819290}$ .

better than before,

finds more  $(a, b)$ .

algorithm knows all  $(a, b)$

such that  $a - bm$  is smooth.

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## Batch N

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Batch NFS

Goal: Optimize  $AT$

1. Generate  $(a, b)$

Test  $a - bm$  for smooth

2. Make many copies

close to each  $(a, b)$

When smooth  $a -$

test each  $a - b\alpha_N$

3. After all smooth

reorganize: for each

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## Batch NFS

Goal: Optimize  $AT$  asymptotically

1. Generate  $(a, b)$  in parallel

Test  $a - bm$  for smoothness

2. Make many copies of each

close to each  $(a, b)$  generator

When smooth  $a - bm$  is found

test each  $a - b\alpha_N$  for smoothness

3. After all smooths are found

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Generate  $(a, b)$

Is  $a - bm$   
smooth?

If so, store.

Repeat.

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Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	
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Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	
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4. Linear algebra.

Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

FS

optimize  $AT$  asymptotics.

generate  $(a, b)$  in parallel.

$a - bm$  for smoothness.

use many copies of each  $N$ ,

each  $(a, b)$  generator.

smooth  $a - bm$  is found,  
then  $a - b\alpha_N$  for smoothness.

all smooths are found,

size: for each  $N$ , bring

$(a, b)$  close together.

in algebra.

Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.

$T$  asymptotics.

in parallel.

smoothness.

copies of each  $N$ ,  
) generator.

$-bm$  is found,  
for smoothness.

hs are found,

ch  $N$ , bring  
se together.

Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.

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Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.

Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .	Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}$

Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate $(a, b)$ . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.

$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2$ $N_5, N_6$ $N_9, N_{10},$ $N_{13}, N_{14}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2$ $N_5, N_6$ $N_9, N_{10},$ $N_{13}, N_{14}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2$ $N_5, N_6$ $N_9, N_{10},$ $N_{13}, N_{14}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2$ $N_5, N_6$ $N_9, N_{10},$ $N_{13}, N_{14}$

Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .
Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .
Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .
Repeat.
Generate $(a, b)$ .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .
Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$	Is $a - b\alpha_2$	Is $a - b\alpha_3$	Is $a - b\alpha_4$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$	Is $a - b\alpha_6$	Is $a - b\alpha_7$	Is $a - b\alpha_8$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .	Send $(a, b)$ .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}$



Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth? If so, store. Send $(a, b)$ . left. Repeat.

$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$ $N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$ $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$











$N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for $N_1$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	L
Linear algebra for $N_5$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	L
Linear algebra for $N_9$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	L
Linear algebra for $N_{13}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	L

$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for $N_1$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_5$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_9$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_{13}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$



$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$	$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$	$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for $N_1$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_2$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_3$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_5$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_6$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_7$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_9$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{10}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{11}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_{13}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{14}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{15}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$

$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
$N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4$
$N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8$
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for $N_1$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_2$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_3$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_5$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_6$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_7$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_9$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{10}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{11}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_{13}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{14}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{15}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$

$/4$
$/8$
$V_{12}$
$N_{16}$
$/4$
$/8$
$V_{12}$
$N_{16}$
$/4$
$/8$
$V_{12}$
$N_{16}$
$/4$
$/8$
$V_{12}$
$N_{16}$

Linear algebra for $N_1$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_2$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_3$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_4$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_5$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_6$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_7$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_8$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_9$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{10}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{11}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{12}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$
Linear algebra for $N_{13}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{14}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{15}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$	Linear algebra for $N_{16}$ using congruences $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$ $(a, b)$



