

Signature sizes:  
a call to action

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago &  
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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are much smaller:

$3n$  bits for security  $2^n$ .

Often misquoted as  $4n$  bits;

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Warinschi claims to improve

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3. Need to raise awareness  
of MQ capabilities.  
e.g. add Quartz to eBATS.  
<http://bench.cr.yp.to>