Implementing "Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography"

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symmetric cryptography”
(Faust, Pietrzak, Schipper)
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Will an implementor
doing what this paper says
actually end up with a
side-channel-protected cipher?

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My view: Carefully evaluating
side-channel security
requires an implementation.
$\Rightarrow$ Let’s implement the cipher.

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My best guesses:
$k = 128$; $\ell = 127$;
$F_K(p) = \text{AES}_K(0p)\,\text{AES}_K(1p)$.

First-level cipher Γ:

Input: 128-bit key K;
standard random 32639-bit string
$p = (p_0, p_1, \ldots, p_{255}, p_{256})$;
256-bit nonce
$n = (n_0, n_1, \ldots, n_{255})$.

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Compute
$X_0 = K$,
$X_1 = \text{AES}_{X_0}(n_0 p_0)$,
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Output: 256-bit string
$\mathrm{AES}_{X_{256}}(p_{256} 0)\, \mathrm{AES}_{X_{256}}(p_{256} 1)$.

The final cipher:

Input:

384-bit key K_0, K_1, K_2;

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$(a_2, b_2) = (a_1 \oplus \Gamma_{K_1}(b_1), b_1)$;

$(a_3, b_3) = (a_2, b_2 \oplus \Gamma_{K_2}(a_2))$.

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Output:

512-bit ciphertext (a_3, b_3).

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I used C's `random()`.
I'm going to hell.

“Code availability?”

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cr.yp.to/aesgonewild.html

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“Security?” Unclear!
Try hyperthreading, DPA, etc.
Maybe chosen-n templates
will discover secret n?

Don’t let slow ciphers
evade security evaluation.