

Two grumpy giants
and a baby

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago

Tanja Lange

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

Discrete-logarithm problems

Fix a prime ℓ .

Input: generator g
of group of order ℓ ;
element h of same group.

Output: integer $k \in \mathbf{Z}/\ell$
such that $h = g^k$, where
group is written multiplicatively.
“ $k = \log_g h$ ”.

How difficult is computation of k ?

Dependence on the group

Group \mathbf{Z}/ℓ under addition,
represented in the usual way:

DLP is very easy.

Divide h by g modulo ℓ ;

time $\exp(O(\log \log \ell))$.

Order- ℓ subgroup of $(\mathbf{Z}/p)^*$

assuming prime $p = 2\ell + 1$:

DLP is not so easy.

Best known attacks:

“index calculus” methods;

time $\exp((\log \ell)^{1/3+o(1)})$.

Order- ℓ subgroup of $(\mathbf{Z}/p)^*$

for much larger p :

DLP is much more difficult.

Best known attacks:

“generic” attacks,
the focus of this talk.

Time $\exp((1/2 + o(1)) \log \ell)$.

Order- ℓ subgroup of properly
chosen elliptic-curve group:

DLP is again difficult.

Best known attacks:

“negating” variants of
generic attacks.

(See Schwabe talk, last CWG.)

Real-world importance

Apple, “iOS Security”, 2012.05:

“Some files may need to be written while the device is locked. A good example of this is a mail attachment downloading in the background. This behavior is achieved by using asymmetric elliptic curve cryptography (ECDH over Curve25519).”

Also used for “iCloud Backup”.

More examples: DNSCrypt;
elliptic-curve signatures
in German electronic passports.

Generic algorithms

Will focus on algorithms that work for every group of order ℓ .

Allowed operations:
neutral element 1;
multiplication $a, b \mapsto ab$.

Will measure algorithm cost by counting $\#$ multiplications.

Success probability:
average over groups
and over algorithm randomness.

Each group element
computed by the algorithm
is trivially expressed as

$$h^x g^y \text{ for known } (x, y) \in (\mathbf{Z}/\ell)^2.$$

$$1 = h^x g^y \text{ for } (x, y) = (0, 0).$$

$$g = h^x g^y \text{ for } (x, y) = (0, 1).$$

$$h = h^x g^y \text{ for } (x, y) = (1, 0).$$

If algorithm multiplies

$$h^{x_1} g^{y_1} \text{ by } h^{x_2} g^{y_2}$$

then it obtains $h^x g^y$ where

$$(x, y) = (x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2).$$

Slopes

If $h^{x_1} g^{y_1} = h^{x_2} g^{y_2}$

and $(x_1, y_1) \neq (x_2, y_2)$

then $\log_g h$ is the negative

of the slope $(y_2 - y_1)/(x_2 - x_1)$.

(Impossible to have $x_1 = x_2$:

if $x_1 = x_2$ then $g^{y_1} = g^{y_2}$

so $y_1 = y_2$, contradiction.)

Algorithm immediately recognizes

collisions of group elements

by putting each $(h^x g^y, x, y)$

into, e.g., a red-black tree.

(Low memory? Parallel?

Distributed? Not in this talk.)

Baby-step-giant-step

(1971 Shanks)

Choose $n \geq 1$,
typically $n \approx \sqrt{\ell}$.

Points (x, y) :

$n + 1$ “baby steps”

$(0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), \dots, (0, n)$;

$n + 1$ “giant steps”

$(1, 0), (1, n), (1, 2n), \dots, (1, n^2)$.

Can use more giant steps.

Stop when $\log_g h$ is found.

Performance of BSGS

Slope $jn - i$ from $(0, i)$ to $(1, jn)$.

Covers slopes

$\{-n, \dots, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, n^2\}$,

using $2n - 1$ multiplications.

Finds all discrete logarithms

if $\ell \leq n^2 + n + 1$.

Worst case with $n \approx \sqrt{\ell}$:

$(2 + o(1))\sqrt{\ell}$ multiplications.

(In fact always $< 2\sqrt{\ell}$.)

Average case with $n \approx \sqrt{\ell}$:

$(1.5 + o(1))\sqrt{\ell}$ multiplications.

Interleaving (2000 Pollard)

Improve average case to

$(4/3 + o(1))\sqrt{\ell}$ multiplications:

$(0, 0), (1, 0),$

$(0, 1), (1, n),$

$(0, 2), (1, 2n),$

$(0, 3), (1, 3n),$

\vdots

$(0, n), (1, n^2).$

$4/3$ arises as $\int_0^1 (2x)^2 dx$.

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$4/3$ arises as $\int_0^1 (2x)^2 dx$.

Oops: Have to start with

$(0, n)$ as step towards $(1, n)$.

But this costs only $O(\log \ell)$.

Random self-reductions

Defender slows down BSGS
by choosing discrete logs
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Attacker compensates by applying a “worst-case-to-average-case reduction”:
compute $\log_g h$ as
 $\log_g(hg^r) - r$ for
uniform random $r \in \mathbf{Z}/\ell$.

Negligible extra cost.

Is BSGS optimal?

After m multiplications

have $m + 3$ points in $(\mathbf{Z}/\ell)^2$.

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different slopes in \mathbf{Z}/ℓ .

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1994 Nechaev, 1997 Shoup:

proof that generic algorithms

have success probability $O(m^2/\ell)$.

Proof actually gives

$$\leq ((m + 3)(m + 2)/2 + 1)/\ell.$$

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BSGS: at best $\approx m^2/4$ slopes,

taking $n \approx m/2$.

Factor of 2 away from the bound.

The rho method

(1978 Pollard, $r = 3$ “mixed”;
many subsequent variants)

Initial computation:

r uniform random “steps”

$(s_1, t_1), \dots, (s_r, t_r) \in (\mathbf{Z}/\ell)^2$.

$O(r \log \ell)$ multiplications;

negligible if r is small.


The “walk”: Starting from


$(x_i, y_i) \in (\mathbf{Z}/\ell)^2$ compute


$(x_{i+1}, y_{i+1}) = (x_i, y_i) + (s_j, t_j)$


where $j \in \{1, \dots, r\}$


is a hash of $h^{x_i} g^{y_i}$.
















































































Performance of rho

Model walk as truly random.

Using m multiplications:

$\approx m$ points (x_i, y_i) ;

$\approx m^2/2$ pairs of points;

slope λ is missed

with chance $\approx (1 - 1/\ell)^{m^2/2}$

$\approx \exp(-m^2/(2\ell))$.

Average # multiplications

$$\approx \sum_0^\infty \exp(-m^2/(2\ell))$$

$$\approx \int_0^\infty \exp(-m^2/(2\ell)) dm$$

$$= \sqrt{\pi/4} \sqrt{2\ell} = (1.25 \dots) \sqrt{\ell}.$$

Better than $(4/3 + o(1)) \sqrt{\ell}$.

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Don't ask about the worst case.

Anti-collisions

Bad news:

The walk is worse than random.

Very often have

$$(\mathbf{x}_{i+1}, \mathbf{y}_{i+1}) = (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i) + (\mathbf{s}_j, \mathbf{t}_j)$$

followed later by

$$(\mathbf{x}_{k+1}, \mathbf{y}_{k+1}) = (\mathbf{x}_k, \mathbf{y}_k) + (\mathbf{s}_j, \mathbf{t}_j).$$

Slope from

$$(\mathbf{x}_{k+1}, \mathbf{y}_{k+1}) \text{ to } (\mathbf{x}_{i+1}, \mathbf{y}_{i+1})$$

is not new: same as slope from

$$(\mathbf{x}_k, \mathbf{y}_k) \text{ to } (\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i).$$

Repeated slope: “anti-collision”.

$m^2/2$ was too optimistic.

About $(1/r)m^2/2$ pairs

use same step, so only

$(1 - 1/r)m^2/2$ chances.

This replacement model \Rightarrow

$(\sqrt{\pi/2}/\sqrt{1 - 1/r} + o(1))\sqrt{\ell}$.

Can derive $\sqrt{1 - 1/r}$

from more complicated 1981

Brent–Pollard \sqrt{V} heuristic.

1998 Blackburn–Murphy:

explicit $\sqrt{1 - 1/r}$.

2009 Bernstein–Lange:

simplified heuristic;

generalized $\sqrt{1 - \sum_j p_j^2}$.

Higher-degree anti-collisions

Actually, rho is even worse!

Often have

$$(x_{i+1}, y_{i+1}) = (x_i, y_i) + (s_j, t_j)$$

$$(x_{i+2}, y_{i+2}) = (x_{i+1}, y_{i+1}) + (s_h, t_h)$$

followed later by

$$(x_{k+1}, y_{k+1}) = (x_k, y_k) + (s_h, t_h)$$

$$(x_{k+2}, y_{k+2}) = (x_{k+1}, y_{k+1}) + (s_j, t_j)$$

so slope from

$$(x_{k+2}, y_{k+2}) \text{ to } (x_{i+2}, y_{i+2})$$

is not new.

“Degree-2 local anti-collisions”:

$$1/\sqrt{1 - 1/r - 1/r^2 + 1/r^3}.$$

See paper for more.

Is rho optimal?

Allow r to grow slowly with ℓ .
(Not quickly: remember
cost of initial computation.)

$$\sqrt{1 - 1/r} \rightarrow 1.$$

$$\sqrt{1 - 1/r - 1/r^2 + 1/r^3} \rightarrow 1.$$

Experimental evidence \Rightarrow
average $(\sqrt{\pi/2} + o(1))\sqrt{\ell}$.

But still have many
global anti-collisions:
slopes appearing repeatedly.

Two grumpy giants and a baby

$$B: (0, 0) + \{0, \dots, n\}(0, 1).$$

$$G1: (1, 0) + \{0, \dots, n\}(0, n).$$

$$G2: (2, 0) - \{0, \dots, n\}(0, n+1).$$

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$$\text{Minor initial cost: } (0, -(n+1)).$$

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As before can interleave:

$$(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0),$$

$$(0, 1), (1, n), (2, -(n+1)),$$

$$(0, 2), (1, 2n), (2, -2(n+1)),$$

$$(0, 3), (1, 3n), (2, -3(n+1)),$$

⋮

$$(0, n), (1, n^2), (2, -n(n+1)).$$

Grumpy performance

For $(1.5 + o(1))\sqrt{\ell}$ mults:

BSGS, with $n \approx 0.75\sqrt{\ell}$

or interleaved with $n \approx \sqrt{\ell}$,

finds $(0.5625 + o(1))\ell$ slopes.

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Two grumpy giants and a baby,

with $n \approx 0.5\sqrt{\ell}$,

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Also better average case than rho.