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United States Patent 5,271,061
Crandall December 14, 1993
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Method and apparatus for public key exchange in a cryptographic system
Abstract
The present invention is an elliptic curve cryptosystem that uses elliptic
curves defined over finite fields comprised of special classes of numbers.
Special fast classes of numbers are used to optimize the modulo arithmetic
required in the enciphering and deciphering process. The class of numbers used
in the present invention is generally described by the form 2.sup.q -C where C
is an odd number and is relatively small, for example, no longer than the
length of a computer word (16-32 bits). When a number is of this form, modulo
arithmetic can be accomplished using shifts and adds only, eliminating the need
for costly divisions. One subset of this fast class of numbers is known as
"Mersenne" primes, and are of the form 2.sup.q -1. Another class of numbers
that can be used with the present invention are known as "Fermat" numbers of
the form 2.sup.q +1. The present invention system whose level of security is
tunable. q acts as an encryption bit depth parameter, such that larger values
of q provide increased security. Inversion operations normally require an
elliptic curve algebra can be avoided by selecting an inversionless
parameterization of the elliptic curve. Fast Fourier transform for an FFT
multiply mod operations optimized for efficient Mersenne arithmetic, allow the
calculations of very large q to proceed more quickly than with other schemes.
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Inventors: Crandall; Richard E. (Portland, OR)
Assignee: NeXT Computer, Inc. (Redwood City, CA)
Appl. No.: 955479
Filed: October 2, 1992
Current U.S. Class: 380/28; 380/30
Intern'l Class: H04L 009/06
Field of Search: 380/28,30
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References Cited [Referenced By]
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U.S. Patent Documents
4200770 Apr., 1980 Hellman et al. 380/30.
4424414 Jan., 1984 Hellman et al. 380/30.
4567600 Jan., 1986 Massey et al. 380/30.
5010573 Apr., 1991 Musyck et al. 380/28.
5054066 Oct., 1991 Riek et al. 380/30.
5159632 Oct., 1992 Crandall 380/28.
Primary Examiner: Cangialosi; Salvatore
Attorney, Agent or Firm: Hecker & Harriman
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Parent Case Text
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This is a continuation of application Ser. No. 761,276, filed Sep. 17, 1991 now
U.S. Pat. No. 5,159,632.
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Claims
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I claim:
1. A method for electronically generating a secure key comprising the steps of:
providing a first private key source for providing a first private key;
providing a second private key source for providing a second private key;
generating a first public key in a public key source by performing an elliptic
multiplication of said first private key and a point on an elliptic curve;
generating a second public key in said public key source by performing an
elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said point;
generating an enciphering key in a first elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said first private key and said second
public key;
generating a deciphering key in a second elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said first
public key.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein said point is a point on an elliptic curve
over a finite field F.sub.p k, where p is one of a class of numbers such that
mod p arithmetic is performed in a processor using only shift and add
operations.
3. The method of claim 2 wherein p is given by 2.sup.q -C, where C is a binary
number having a length no greater than 32 bits.
4. The method of claim 2 wherein p is a Mersenne prime given by 2.sup.q -1.
5. The method of claim 2 wherein p is a Fermat number given by 2.sup.q +1 and q
is given by 2.sup.m.
6. The method of claim 1 wherein said point on said elliptic curve is (X.sub.1,
Y.sub.1).
7. The method of claim 1 wherein said point on said elliptic curve is (X.sub.1
/Z.sub.1, Y) where Z.sub.1 =1 and n.degree.(X.sub.m /Z.sub.m) is an elliptic
multiplication and denotes the coordinate (X.sub.n+m /Z.sub.n+m).
8. The method of claim 7 wherein Fast Fourier Transforms are used to compute
X.sub.n+m.
9. The method of claim 8 where X denotes the Fourier transform of the digits of
X, and, X.sub.n, X.sub.m, Z.sub.n, Z.sub.m, and Z.sub.n-m denote the Fourier
transforms of the digits of X.sub.n, X.sub.m, Z.sub.n, Z.sub.m, and Z.sub.n-m
respectively and;
X.sub.n+m =Z.sub.n-m (X.sub.n X.sub.m -Z.sub.n Z.sub.m).sup.2.
10. The method of claim 1 further including encrypting means coupled to said
elliptic multiplying means and receiving a plaintext message from a message
source, said encrypting means for generating a ciphertext message using said
enciphering key.
11. The method of claim 10 further including decrypting means coupled said
encrypting means and said second elliptic multiplying means, said decrypting
means for receiving said ciphertext message and decoding said plaintext message
using said deciphering key.
12. The method of claim 1 wherein said first public key is given by
(first private key).degree.(X.sub.1,Y.sub.1)=first public key
where
.degree. is an elliptic multiplication,
(X.sub.1, Y.sub.1) is a point on an elliptic curve over a finite field F.sub.p
k, and
p=2.sup.q -C.
13. The method of claim 12 wherein said second public key is given by:
(second private key).degree.(X.sub.1, Y.sub.1)=second public key.
14. A method for electronically generating a secure key comprising the step of:
providing a first private key source for providing a first private key;
providing a second private key source for providing a second private key;
generating a first public key in a public key source by performing an elliptic
multiplication of said first private key and a point, wherein said point is a
point on an elliptic curve over a finite field F.sub.p k and p is a Mersenne
prime given by 2.sup.q -1 and where mod p operations are performed using only
shift and add operations;
generating a second public key in said public key source by performing an
elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said point;
generating an enciphering key in a first elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said first private key and said second
public key;
generating a deciphering key in a second elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said private key and said first public
key.
15. The method of claim 14 wherein said mod p operations are accomplished by:
shifting q LSB's of a binary number and adding the shifted q LSB's to the
remaining q LSB's to generate a sum;
repeating the previous step on the sum until a sum is generated of q or fewer
bits.
16. A method for electronically generating a secure key comprising the steps
of:
providing a first private key source for providing a first private key;
providing a second private key source for providing a second private key;
generating a first public key in a public key source by performing an elliptic
multiplication of said first private key and a point, wherein said point is a
point on an elliptic curve over a finite field F.sub.p k and p is a Fermat
number given by 2.sup.q +1 and q is given by 2.sup.m and where mod p operations
are performed using only shift, multiply and add operations;
generating a second public key in said public key source by performing an
elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said point;
generating an enciphering key in a first elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said first private key and said second
public key;
generating a deciphering key in a second elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said first
public key.
17. The method of claim 16 wherein mod p operations are accomplished on a
binary number by shifting q bits and alternately subtracting and adding next
successive groups of q bits until the resultant has q or fewer bits.
18. A method for electronically generating a secure key comprising the steps
of:
providing a first private key source for providing a first private key;
providing a second private key source for providing a second private key;
generating a first public key in public key source by performing an elliptic
multiplication of said first private key and a point, wherein said point is a
point on an elliptic curve over a finite field F.sub.p k and p is given by
2.sup.q -C, where C is a binary number having a length no greater than 32 bits
and where mod p operations are performed using only shift, subtract and add
operations;
generating a second public key in said public key source by performing an
elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said point;
generating an enciphering key in a first elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said first private key and said second
public key;
generating a deciphering key in a second elliptic multiplying means by
performing an elliptic multiplication of said second private key and said first
public key.
19. The method of claim 18 wherein mod p operations are accomplished by:
(a) latching q bits of a binary number;
(b) multiplying the remainder of said binary number by C to generate a product;
(c) adding said product to said q bits to generate a sum;
(d) repeating steps (a)-(c) on said sum until q or fewer bits remain.
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Description
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BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT INVENTION
1. Field of the Invention
This invention relates to the field of cryptographic systems.
2. Background Art
A cryptographic system is a system for sending a message from a sender to a
receiver over a medium so that the message is "secure", that is, so that only
the intended receiver can recover the message. A cryptographic system converts
a message, referred to as "plaintext" into an encrypted format, known as
"ciphertext." The encryption is accomplished by manipulating or transforming
the message using a "cipher key" or keys. The receiver "decrypts" the message,
that is, converts it from ciphertext to plaintext, by reversing the
manipulation or transformation process using the cipher key or keys. So long as
only the sender and receiver have knowledge of the cipher key, such an
encrypted transmission is secure.
A "classical" cryptosystem is a cryptosystem in which the enciphering
information can be used to determine the deciphering information. To provide
security, a classical cryptosystem requires that the enciphering key be kept
secret and provided to users of the system over secure channels. Secure
channels, such as secret couriers, secure telephone transmission lines, or the
like, are often impractical and expensive.
A system that eliminates the difficulties of exchanging a secure enciphering
key is known as "public key encryption." By definition, a public key
cryptosystem has the property that someone who knows only how to encipher a
message cannot use the enciphering key to find the deciphering key without a
prohibitively lengthy computation. An enciphering function is chosen so that
once an enciphering key is known, the enciphering function is relatively easy
to compute. However, the inverse of the encrypting transformation function is
difficult, or computationally infeasible, to compute. Such a function is
referred to as a "one way function" or as a "trap door function." In a public
key cryptosystem, certain information relating to the keys is public. This
information can be, and often is, published or transmitted in a non-secure
manner. Also, certain information relating to the keys is private. This
information may be distributed over a secure channel to protect its privacy,
(or may be created by a local user to ensure privacy).
A block diagram of a typical public key cryptographic system is illustrated in
FIG. 1. A sender represented by the blocks within dashed line 100 sends a
plaintext message P to a receiver, represented by the blocks within dashed line
115. The plaintext message is encrypted into a ciphertext message C,
transmitted over some transmission medium and decoded by the receiver 115 to
recreate the plaintext message P.
The sender 100 includes a cryptographic device 101, a secure key generator 102
and a key source 103. The key source 103 is connected to the secure key
generator 102 through line 104. The secure key generator 102 is coupled to the
cryptographic device 101 through line 105. The cryptographic device provides a
ciphertext output C on line 106. The secure key generator 102 provides a key
output on line 107. This output is provided, along with the ciphertext message
106, to transmitter receiver 109. The transmitter receiver 109 may be, for
example, a computer transmitting device such as a modem or it may be a device
for transmitting radio frequency transmission signals. The transmitter receiver
109 outputs the secure key and the ciphertext message on an insecure channel
110 to the receiver's transmitter receiver 111.
The receiver 115 also includes a cryptographic device 116, a secure key
generator 117 and a key source 118. The key source 118 is coupled to the secure
key generator 117 on line 119. The secure key generator 117 is coupled to the
cryptographic device 116 on line 120. The cryptographic device 116 is coupled
to the transmitter receiver 111 through line 121. The secure key generator 117
is coupled to the transmitter receiver 111 on lines 122 and 123.
In operation, the sender 100 has a plaintext message P to send to the receiver
115. Both the sender 100 and the receiver 115 have cryptographic devices 101
and 116, respectively, that use the same encryption scheme. There are a number
of suitable cryptosystems that can be implemented in the cryptographic devices.
For example, they may implement the Data Encryption Standard (DES) or some
other suitable encryption scheme.
Sender and receiver also have secure key generators 102 and 117, respectively.
These secure key generators implement any one of several well known public key
exchange schemes. These schemes, which will be described in detail below,
include the Diffie-Hellman scheme, the RSA scheme, the Massey-Omura scheme, and
the ElGamal scheme.
The sender 100 uses key source 103, which may be a random number generator, to
generate a private key. The private key is provided to the secure key generator
102 and is used to generate an encryption key e.sub.K. The encryption key
e.sub.K is transmitted on lines 105 to the cryptographic device and is used to
encrypt the plaintext message P to generate a ciphertext message C provided on
line 106 to the transmitter receiver 109. The secure key generator 102 also
transmits the information used to convert to the secure key from key source 103
to the encryption key e.sub.K. This information can be transmitted over an
insecure channel, because it is impractical to recreate the encryption key from
this information without knowing the private key.
The receiver 115 uses key source 118 to generate a private and secure key 119.
This private key 119 is used in the secure key generator 117 along with the key
generating information provided by the sender 100 to generate a deciphering key
D.sub.K. This deciphering key D.sub.K is provided on line 120 to the
cryptographic device 116 where it is used to decrypt the ciphertext message and
reproduce the original plaintext message.
THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN SCHEME
A scheme for public key exchange is presented in Diffie and Hellman, "New
Directions in Cryptography," IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. IT-22, pp.
644-654, November 1976 (The "DH" scheme). The DH scheme describes a public key
system based on the discrete exponential and logarithmic functions. If "q" is a
prime number and "a" is a primitive element, then X and Y are in a 1:1
correspondence for 1.ltoreq.X, Y.ltoreq.(q-1) where Y=a.sup.X mod q, and X=
log.sub.a Y over the finite field. The first discrete exponential function is
easily evaluated for a given a and X, and is used to compute the public key Y.
The security of the Diffie-Hellman system relies on the fact that no general,
fast algorithms are known for solving the discrete logarithm function X=
log.sub.a Y given X and Y.
In a Diffie-Hellman system, a directory of public keys is published or
otherwise made available to the public. A given public key is dependent on its
associated private key, known only to a user. However, it is not feasible to
determine the private key from the public key. For example, a sender has a
public key, referred to as "ourPub". A receiver has a public key, referred to
here as "theirPub". The sender also has a private key, referred to here as
"myPri". Similarly, the receiver has a private key, referred to here as
"theirPri".
There are a number of elements that are publicly known in a public key system.
In the case of the Diffie-Hellman system, these elements include a prime number
p and a primitive element g. p and g are both publicly known. Public keys are
then generated by raising g to the private key power (mod p). For example, a
sender's public key myPub is generated by the following equation:
myPub=g.sup.myPri (mod p) Equation (1)
Similarly, the receiver's public key is generated by the equation:
theirPub=g.sup.theirPri (mod p) Equation (2)
Public keys are easily created using exponentiation and modulo arithmetic. As
noted previously, public keys are easily obtainable by the public. They are
published and distributed. They may also be transmitted over non-secure
channels. Even though the public keys are known, it is very difficult to
calculate the private keys by the inverse function because of the difficulty in
solving the discrete log problem.
FIG. 2 illustrates a flow chart that is an example of a key exchange using a
Diffie-Hellman type system. At step 201, a prime number p is chosen. This prime
number p is public. Next, at step 202, a primitive root g is chosen. This
number g is also publicly known. At step 203 an enciphering key e.sub.K is
generated, the receiver's public key (theirPub) is raised to the power of the
sender's private key (myPri). That is:
(theirPub).sup.myPri (mod p) Equation (3)
We have already defined theirPub equal to g.sup.theirPri (mod p). Therefore
Equation 3 can be given by:
(g.sup.theirPri).sup.myPri (mod p) Equation (4)
This value is the enciphering key e.sub.K that is used to encipher the
plaintext message and create a ciphertext message. The particular method for
enciphering or encrypting the message may be any one of several well known
methods. Whichever encrypting message is used, the cipher key is the value
calculated in Equation 4. The ciphertext message is then sent to the receiver
at step 204.
At step 205, the receiver generates a deciphering key d.sub.K by raising the
public key of the sender (myPri) to the private key of the receiver (theirPri)
as follows:
d.sub.K =(myPub).sup.theirPri (mod p) Equation (5)
From Equation 1, myPub is equal to g.sup.myPri (mod p). Therefore:
d.sub.K =(g.sup.myPri).sup.theirPri (mod p) Equation (6)
Since (g.sup.A).sup.B is equal to (g.sup.B).sup.A, the encipher key e.sub.K and
the deciphering key d.sub.K are the same key. These keys are referred to as a
"one-time pad." A one-time pad is a key used in enciphering and deciphering a
message.
The receiver simply executes the inverse of the transformation algorithm or
encryption scheme using the deciphering key to recover the plaintext message at
step 206. Because both the sender and receiver must use their private keys for
generating the enciphering key, no other users are able to read or decipher the
ciphertext message. Note that step 205 can be performed prior to or
contemporaneously with any of steps 201-204.
RSA
Another public key cryptosystem is proposed in Rivest, Shamir and Adelman, "On
Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems," Commun. Ass. Comput. Mach.,
vol. 21, pp. 120-126, February 1978 (The "RSA" scheme). The RSA scheme is based
on the fact that it is easy to generate two very large prime numbers and
multiply them together, but it is much more difficult to factor the result,
that is, to determine the very large prime numbers from their product. The
product can therefore be made public as part of the enciphering key without
comprising the prime numbers that effectively constitute the deciphering key.
In the RSA scheme a key generation algorithm is used to select two large prime
numbers p and q and multiply them to obtain n=pq. The numbers p and q can be
hundreds of decimal digits in length. Then Euler's function is computed as
.phi.(n)=(p-1)(q-1). (.phi.(n) is the number of integers between 1 and n that
have no common factor with n). .phi.(n) has the property that for any integer a
between 0 and n-1 and any integer k, a.sup.k.phi.(n)+1 =a mod n.
A random number E is then chosen between 1 and .phi.(n)-1 and which has no
common factors with .phi.(n). The random number E is the enciphering key and is
public. This then allows D=E.sup.-1 mod .phi.(n) to be calculated easily using
an extended version of Euclid's algorithm for computing the greatest common
divisor of two numbers. D is the deciphering key and is kept secret.
The information (E, n) is made public as the enciphering key and is used to
transform unenciphered, plaintext messages into ciphertext messages as follows:
a message is first represented as a sequence of integers each between 0 and
n-1. Let P denote such an integer. Then the corresponding ciphertext integer is
given by the relation C=P.sup.E mod n. The information (D, n) is used as the
deciphering key to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext via P=C.sup.D mod
n. These are inverse transformations because C.sup.D =P.sup.ED =P.sup.k.phi.(n)
+1 =P.
MASSEY-OMURA
The Massey-Omura cryptosystem is described in U.S. Pat. No. 4,567,600. In the
Massey cryptosystem, a finite field F.sub.q is selected. The field F.sub.q is
fixed and is a publicly known field. A sender and a receiver each select a
random integer e between 0 and q-1 so that the greatest common denominator
G.C.D. (e, q-1)=1. The user then computes its inverse D=e.sup.-1 mod q-1 using
the euclidian algorithm. Therefore, De=1 mod q-1.
The Massey-Omura cryptosystem requires that three messages be sent to achieve a
secure transmission. Sender A sends message P to receiver B. Sender A
calculates random number e.sub.A and receiver B calculates random number
e.sub.B. The sender first sends the receiver the element P.sup.e.sub.A. The
receiver is unable to recover P since the receiver does not know e.sub.A.
Instead, the receiver raises the element to his own private key e.sub.B and
sends a second message P.sup.e.sub.A.sup.e.sub.B back to the sender. The sender
then removes the effect of e.sub.A by raising the element to the D.sub.A-th
power and returns P.sub.eB to the receiver B. The receiver B can read this
message by raising the element to the D.sub.B-th power.
ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM
The ElGamal public key cryptosystem utilizes a publicly known finite field
F.sub.q and an element g of F*.sub.q. Each user randomly chooses an integer a=
to a.sub.A in the range 0>a>q-1. The integer a is the private deciphering key.
The public enciphering key is the element g.sup.a F.sub.q. To send a message
represented by P to a user A, an integer K is randomly chosen. A pair of
elements of F.sub.q, namely (g.sup.K, Pg.sup.aK) are sent to A. The plaintext
message P is encrypted with the key g.sup.aK. The value g.sup.K is a "clue" to
the receiver for determining the plaintext message P. However, this clue can
only be used by someone who knows the secure deciphering key "a". The receiver
A, who knows "a", recovers the message P from this pair by raising the first
element gK.sup.ath and dividing the result into the second element.
ELLIPTIC CURVES
Another form of public key cryptosystem is referred to as an "elliptic curve"
cryptosystem. An elliptic curve cryptosystem is based on points on an elliptic
curve E defined over a finite field F. Elliptic curve cryptosystems rely for
security on the difficulty in solving the discrete logarithm problem. An
advantage of an elliptic curve cryptosystem is there is more flexibility in
choosing an elliptic curve than in choosing a finite field. Nevertheless,
elliptic curve cryptosystems have not been widely used in computer-based public
key exchange systems due to their computational intensiveness. Computer-based
elliptic curve cryptosystems are slow compared to other computer public key
exchange systems. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are described in "A Course in
Number Theory and Cryptography" (Koblitz, 1987, Springer-Verlag, New York).
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The present invention is an elliptic curve cryptosystem that uses elliptic
curves defined over finite fields comprised of special classes of prime
numbers. Special fast classes of numbers are used to optimize the modulo
arithmetic required in the enciphering and deciphering process. The class of
numbers used in the present invention is generally described by the form
2.sup.q -C where C is an odd number and is relatively small, (for example, no
longer than the length of a computer word (16-32 bits)).
When a number is of this form, modulo arithmetic can be accomplished using
shifts and adds only, eliminating the need for costly divisions. One subset of
this fast class of numbers is known as "Mersenne" primes, and are of the form
2.sup.q -1. To perform an n mod p operation where p is a Mersenne prime of the
form 2.sup.q -1, the q LSB's are latched and the remaining bits are added to
these q bits. The first q bits of this sum are latched and the remaining bits
are added to them. This process continues until the sum has q or fewer bits.
This sum is the solution.
Another class of numbers that can be used with the present invention are known
as "Fermat" numbers of the form 2.sup.q +1, where q is equal to 2.sup.m and m
is an integer. Modulo arithmetic using a Fermat number involves shifting q bits
and alternately subtracting and adding next successive groups of q bits until
the resultant has q or fewer bits.
The present invention provides a system that has tunable levels of security,
that is the level of security desired is adjustable. q acts as an encryption
bit depth parameter, such that larger values of q provide increased security.
By using a fast class of numbers, only shifts and adds are required for modulo
arithmetic. Inversion operations normally require an elliptic curve algebra can
be avoided by selecting an inversionless parameterization of the elliptic
curve. Fast Fourier transform (FFT) multiply mod operations, optimized for
efficient Mersenne arithmetic, allow the calculations of very large q to
proceed more quickly than with other schemes.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a prior art public key exchange system.
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram of a prior art public key exchange transaction.
FIG. 3 is a flow diagram illustrating the key exchange of the present
invention.
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a computer system on which the present invention
may be implemented.
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating the shift and add operations for performing
mod p arithmetic using Mersenne primes.
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating the operations for performing mod p arithmetic
using Fermat numbers.
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating the operations for performing mod p arithmetic
using fast class numbers.
FIG. 8 is a block diagram of the present invention.
FIG. 9 is a flow diagram illustrating the operation of one embodiment of the
present invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
An elliptic curve encryption scheme is described. In the following description,
numerous specific details, such as number of bits, execution time, etc., are
set forth in detail to provide a more thorough description of the present
invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art, that the
present invention may be practiced without these specific details. In other
instances, well known features have not been described in detail so as not to
obscure the present invention.
A disadvantage of prior art computer-implemented elliptic curve encryption
schemes is they are unsatisfactorily slow compared to other prior art
computer-implemented encryption schemes. The modulo arithmetic and elliptical
algebra operations required in a prior art elliptic curve cryptosystem require
that divisions be performed. Divisions increase computer CPU (central
processing unit) computational overhead. CPU's can perform addition and
multiplication operations more quickly, and in fewer processing steps, than
division operations. Therefore, prior art elliptic curve cryptosystems have not
been previously practical or desirable as compared to other prior art
cryptosystems, such as Diffie-Hellman and RSA schemes.
The present invention provides methods and apparatus for implementing an
elliptic curve cryptosystem for public key exchange that does not require
explicit division operations. The advantages of the preferred embodiment of the
present invention are achieved by implementing fast classes of numbers,
inversionless parameterization, and FFT multiply mod operations.
ELLIPTIC CURVE ALGEBRA
The elliptic curve used with the present invention is comprised of points (x,y)
.epsilon. F.sub.p k X F.sub.p k satisfying:
b y.sup.2 =x.sup.3 +a x.sup.2 +x Equation (7)
together with a "point at infinity" a.
Sender ("our") and recipient ("their") private keys are assumed to be integers,
denoted:
ourPri, theirPri .epsilon. Z
Next, parameters are established for both sender and recipient. The parameters
are:
q, so that p=2q-C is a fast class number (q is the "bit-depth"). The value q is
a publicly known value.
k, so that F.sub.p k will be the field, and where k is publicly known.
(x.sub.1, y.sub.1) .epsilon. F.sub.p k, the initial x-coordinate, which is
publicly known.
a .epsilon. F.sub.p k, the curve-defining parameter (b is not needed). The
value a is also publicly known.
The present invention uses an operation referred to as "elliptic
multiplication" and represented by the symbol ".degree.". The operation of
elliptic multiplication can be described as follows:
An initial point (X.sub.1, Y.sub.1) on the curve of Equation 7 is defined. For
the set of integers n, expression n.degree.(X.sub.1, Y.sub.1) denotes the point
(X.sub.n, Y.sub.n) obtained via the following relations, known as adding and
doubling rules.
X.sub.n+1 =((Y.sub.n -Y.sub.1)/(X.sub.n -X.sub.1)).sup.2 -X.sub.1
-X.sub.nEquation (8)
Y.sub.n+1 =-Y.sub.1 +((Y.sub.n -Y.sub.1)/(X.sub.n -X.sub.1))(X.sub.1
-X.sub.n+1) Equation (9)
When (X.sub.1, Y.sub.1)=(X.sub.n, Y.sub.n), the doubling relations to be used
are:
X.sub.n+1 =((3X.sub.1.sup.2 +a)/2Y.sub.1).sup.2 -2X.sub.1 ;Equation (10)
Y.sub.n+1 =-Y.sub.1 +((3X.sub.1.sup.2 +a)/2Y.sub.1)(X.sub.1 -X.sub.n+1)Equation
(11)
Because arithmetic is performed over the field F.sub.p k, all operations are to
be performed mod p. In particular, the division operation in equations 8 to 11
involve inversions mod p.
ELLIPTIC CURVE PUBLIC KEY EXCHANGE
It is necessary that both sender and recipient use the same set of such
parameters. Both sender and recipient generate a mutual one-time pad, as a
particular x-coordinate on the elliptic curve.
In the following description, the terms "our" and "our end" refer to the
sender. The terms "their" and "their end" refer to the receiver. This
convention is used because the key exchange of the present invention may be
accomplished between one or more senders and one or more receivers. Thus, "our"
and "our end" and "their" and "their end" refers to one or more senders and
receivers, respectively.
The public key exchange of the elliptic curve cryptosystem of the present
invention is illustrated in the flow diagram of FIG. 3.
Step 301--At our end, a public key is computed: ourPub .epsilon. F.sub.p k
ourPub=(ourPri).degree.(x.sub.1,y.sub.1) Equation (12)
Step 302--At their end, a public key is computed: theirPub .epsilon. F.sub.p k
theirPub=(theirPri).degree.(x.sub.1,y.sub.1) Equation (13)
Step 303--The two public keys ourPub and theirPub are published, and therefore
known to all users.
Step 304--A one-time pad is computed at our end: ourPad .epsilon. F.sub.p k
ourPad=(ourPri).degree.(theirPub)=(ourPri).degree.(theirPri).degree.(x.sub.
1,y.sub.1) Equation (14)
Step 305--A one-time pad is computed at their end: theirPad .epsilon. F.sub.p k
theirPad=(theirPri).degree.(ourPub)=(theirPri).degree.(ourPri).degree.(x.su
b.1,y.sub.1) Equation (15)
The elements (theirPri) .degree.(ourPri) .degree.(x.sub.1, y.sub.1) being part
of a finite field, form an abelian group. Therefore, the order of operation of
equations 14 and 15 can be changed without affecting the result of the
equations. Therefore:
ourPad=(ourPri).degree.(theirPri).degree.(x.sub.1,y.sub.1)=(theirPri).degre e.
(ourPri).degree.(x.sub.1,y.sub.1)=theirPad Equation (16)
Since both the sender and receiver use the same one time pad, the message
encrypted by the sender can be decrypted by the recipient, using the one time
pad. (Note that step 305 can be executed prior to or contemporaneously with any
of steps 301-304).
At step 306, the sender encrypts plaintext message P using ourPad, and
transmits ciphertext message C to the receiver. At step 307, the receiver
decrypts ciphertext message C to recover plaintext message P, using theirPad.
FAST CLASS NUMBERS
Elliptic curve cryptosystems make use of modulo arithmetic to determine certain
parameters, such as public keys, one time pads, etc. The use of modulo
arithmetic serves the dual purpose of limiting the number of bits in the
results of equations to some fixed number, and providing security. The discrete
log problem is asymmetrical in part because of the use of modulo arithmetic. A
disadvantage of modulo arithmetic is the need to perform division operations.
The solution to a modulo operation is the remainder when a number is divided by
a fixed number. For example, 12 mod 5 is equal to 2. (5 divides into 12 twice
with a remainder of 2, the remainder 2 is the solution). Therefore, modulo
arithmetic requires division operations.
Special fast classes of numbers are used in the present invention to optimize
the modulo arithmetic required in the enciphering and deciphering process by
eliminating the need for division operations. The class of numbers used in the
present invention is generally described by the form 2.sup.q -C where C is an
odd number and is relatively small, (e.g. no longer than the length of a
computer word.
When a number is of this form, modulo arithmetic can be accomplished using
shifts and adds only, eliminating the need for divisions. One subset of this
fast class is known as "Mersenne" primes, and are of the form 2.sup.q -1.
Another class that can be used with the present invention are known as "Fermat"
numbers of the form 2.sup.q +1, where q is equal to 2.sup.m. Fermat numbers may
be prime or not prime in the present invention.
The present invention utilizes elliptic curve algebra over a finite field
F.sub.p k where p=2.sup.q -C and p is a fast class number. Note that the
equation 2.sup.q -C does not result in a prime number for all values of q. and
C. For example, when q is equal to 4, and C is equal to 1, 2.sup.q -C is equal
to 15, not a prime. However, when q has a value of 2, 3, or 5, and C=1 the
equation 2.sup.q -C generates the prime numbers 3, 7, and 31.
The present invention implements elliptic curves over a finite field F.sub.p k
where p is 2q-C is an element of a fast class of numbers. When practiced on a
computer using binary representations of data, the use of fast class numbers
allows the mod p operations to be accomplished using only shifts and adds. By
contrast, the use of "slow" numbers requires that time consuming division
operations be executed to perform mod p arithmetic. The following examples
illustrate the advantage of fast class number mod p arithmetic.
EXAMPLE 1
Base 10 mod p division
Consider the 32 bit digital number n, where n=11101101111010111100011100110101
(In base 10 this number is 3,991,652,149).
Now consider n mod p where p is equal to 127. The expression n mod 127 can be
calculated by division as follows: ##STR1##
The remainder 112 is the solution to n mod 127.
EXAMPLE 2
Mersenne Prime mod p Arithmetic
In the present invention, when p is a Mersenne prime where p=2.sup.q -1, the
mod p arithmetic can be accomplished using only shifts and adds, with no
division required. Consider again n mod p where n is 3,991,652,149 and p is
127. When p is 127, q is equal to 7, from p=2.sup.q -1; 127=2.sup.7 -1=128-1=
127.
The mod p arithmetic can be accomplished by using the binary form of n, namely
11101101111010111100011100110101. Referring to FIG. 5, the shifts and adds are
accomplished by first latching the q least significant bits (LSB's) 501 of n,
namely 0110101. The q LSB's 502 of the remaining digits, namely 0001110, are
then added to q digits 501, resulting in sum 503 (1000011). The next q LSB's
504 of n, (0101111), are added to sum 503, generating sum 505, (1110010). Bits
506 of n (1101111) are added to sum 505, to result in sum 507, (11100001).
The remaining bits 508 (1110), even though fewer in number than q bits, are
added to sum 507 to generate sum 509 (11101111). This sum has greater than q
bits. Therefore, the first q bits 510 (1101111) are summed with the next q bits
511 (in this case, the single bit 1), to generate sum 512 (1110000). This sum,
having q or fewer bits, is the solution to n mod p. 1110000=2.sup.6 +2.sup.5
+2.sup.4 =64+32+16=112.
Thus, the solution 112 to n mod 127 is determined using only shifts and adds
when an elliptic curve over a field of Mersenne primes is used. The use of
Mersenne primes in conjunction with elliptic curve cryptosystems eliminates
explicit divisions.
EXAMPLE 3
Fermat Number mod p Arithmetic
In the present invention, when p is a Fermat number where p=2.sup.q +1, the mod
p arithmetic can be accomplished using only shifts, adds, and subtracts (a
negative add), with no division required. Consider again n mod p where n is
3,991,652,149 and where p is now 257. When p is 257, q is equal to 8, from p=
2.sup.q +1; 257=2.sup.8 +1=256+1=257.
The mod p arithmetic can be accomplished by using the binary form of n, namely
11101101111010111100011100110101. Referring to FIG. 6, the shifts and adds are
accomplished by first latching the q (8) least significant bits (LSB's) 601
(00110101). The next q LSB's 602 of the remaining digits, namely 11000111, are
to be subtracted from q digits 601. To accomplish this, the 1's complement of
bits 602 is generated and a 1 is added to the MSB side to indicate a negative
number, resulting in bits 602' (100111000). This negative number 602' is added
to bits 601 to generate result 603 (101101101). The next q LSB's 604 of n,
(11101011), are added to sum 603, generating result 605, (1001011000). Bits 606
of n (11101101) are to be subtracted from result 605. Therefore, the 1's
complement of bits 606 is generated and a negative sign bit of one is added on
the MSB side to generate bits 606' (100010010). Bits 606' is added to result
605, to generate sum 607, (1101101010).
Sum 607 has more than q bits so the q LSB's are latched as bits 608 (01101010).
The next q bits (in this case, only two bits, 11) are added to bits 608,
generating sum 610 (01101101). This sum, having q or fewer bits, is the
solution to n mod p. 01101101=2.sup.6 +2.sup.5 +2.sup.3 +2.sup.2 +2.sup.0 =
64+32+8+4+1=109.
EXAMPLE 4
Fast Class mod Arithmetic
In the present invention, when p is a number of the class p=2.sup.q -C, where C
is and odd number and is relatively small, (e.g. no greater than the length of
a digital word), the mod p arithmetic can be accomplished using only shifts and
adds, with no division required. Consider again n mod p where n is 685 and
where p is 13. When p is 13, q is equal to 4 and C is equal to 3, from p=
2.sup.q -C; 13=2.sup.4 -3=16-3=13.
The mod p arithmetic can be accomplished by using the binary form of n, namely
1010101101. Referring to FIG. 7, the shifts and adds are accomplished by first
latching the q (4) least significant bits (LSB's) 701 of n, namely 1101. The
remaining bits 702 (101010) are multiplied by C (3) to generate product 703
(1111110). Product 703 is added to bits 701 to generate sum 704 (10001011). The
q least significant bits 705 (1011) of sum 704 are latched. The remaining bits
706 (1000) are multiplied by C to generate product 707 (11000). Product 707 is
added to bits 705 to generate sum 708 (100011). The q least significant bits
709 (0011) of sum 708 are latched. The remaining bits 710 (10) are multiplied
by C to generate product 711 (110). Product 711 is added to bits 709 to
generate sum 712 (1001). Sum 712, having q or fewer bits, is the solution to n
mod p. 1001=2.sup.3 +2.sup.0 =8+1= 9. 685 divided by 13 results in a remainder
of 9. The fast class arithmetic provides the solution using only shifts, adds,
and multiplies.
SHIFT AND ADD IMPLEMENTATION
Fast Mersenne mod operations can be effected via a well known shift procedure.
For p=2.sup.q -1 we can use:
x=(x&p)+(x>>q) Equation (17)
a few times in order to reduce a positive x to the appropriate residue value in
the interval 0 through p-1 inclusive. This procedure involves shifts and add
operations only. Alternatively, we can represent any number x (mod p) by:
x=a+b2.sup.(q+1)/2 =(a,b) Equation (18)
If another integer y be represented as (c, d), we have:
xy(mod p)=(ac+2bd,ad+bc) Equation (19)
after which some trivial shift-add operations may be required to produce the
correct reduced residue of xy.
To compute an inverse (mod p), there are at least two ways to proceed. One is
to use a binary form of the classical extended-GCD procedure. Another is to use
a relational reduction scheme. The relational scheme works as follows:
Given p=2.sup.q -1, x.noteq.0 (mod p),
to return x.sup.-1 (mod p):
1) Set (a,b)=(1, 0) and (y, z)=(x, p);
2) If (y==0) return(z);
3) Find e such that 2.sup.e .parallel.y;
4) Set a=2.sup.q-e a (mod p);
5) If(y==1) return(a);
6) Set (a, b)=(a+b, a-b) and (y, z)=(y+z, y-z);
7) Go to (2).
The binary extended-GCD procedure can be performed without explicit division
via the operation [a/b].sub.2, defined as the greatest power of 2 not exceeding
a/b:
Given p, and x.noteq.0 (mod p),
to return x.sup.-1 (mod p):
1) If (x==1) return(1);
2) Set (x, v0)=(0, 1) and (u.sub.1, v.sub.1)=(p, x);
3) Set u.sub.0 =[u.sub.1 /v.sub.1 ].sub.2 ;
4) Set (x, v.sub.0)=(v.sub.0, x-u.sub.0 v.sub.0) and (u.sub.1, v.sub.1)=
(v.sub.1, u.sub.1 -u.sub.0 v.sub.1);
5) If (v.sub.1 ==0) return(x); else go to (3).
The present invention may be implemented on any conventional or general purpose
computer system. An example of one embodiment of a computer system for
implementing this invention is illustrated in FIG. 4. A keyboard 410 and mouse
411 are coupled to a bi-directional system bus 419. The keyboard and mouse are
for introducing user input to the computer system and communicating that user
input to CPU 413. The computer system of FIG. 4 also includes a video memory
414, main memory 415 and mass storage 412, all coupled to bi-directional system
bus 419 along with keyboard 410, mouse 411 and CPU 413. The mass storage 412
may include both fixed and removable media, such as magnetic, optical or
magnetic optical storage systems or any other available mass storage
technology. The mass storage may be shared on a network, or it may be dedicated
mass storage. Bus 419 may contain, for example, 32 address lines for addressing
video memory 414 or main memory 415. The system bus 419 also includes, for
example, a 32-bit data bus for transferring data between and among the
components, such as CPU 413, main memory 415, video memory 414 and mass storage
412. Alternatively, multiplex data/address lines may be used instead of
separate data and address lines.
In the preferred embodiment of this invention, the CPU 413 is a 32-bit
microprocessor manufactured by Motorola, such as the 68030 or 68040. However,
any other suitable microprocessor or microcomputer may be utilized. The
Motorola microprocessor and its instruction set, bus structure and control
lines are described in MC68030 User's Manual, and MC68040 User's Manual,
published by Motorola Inc. of Phoenix, Ariz.
Main memory 415 is comprised of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) and in the
preferred embodiment of this invention, comprises 8 megabytes of memory. More
or less memory may be used without departing from the scope of this invention.
Video memory 414 is a dual-ported video random access memory, and this
invention consists, for example, of 256 kbytes of memory. However, more or less
video memory may be provided as well.
One port of the video memory 414 is coupled to video multiplexer and shifter
416, which in turn is coupled to video amplifier 417. The video amplifier 417
is used to drive the cathode ray tube (CRT) raster monitor 418. Video
multiplexing shifter circuitry 416 and video amplifier 417 are well known in
the art and may be implemented by any suitable means. This circuitry converts
pixel data stored in video memory 414 to a raster signal suitable for use by
monitor 418. Monitor 418 is a type of monitor suitable for displaying graphic
images, and in the preferred embodiment of this invention, has a resolution of
approximately 1020.times.832. Other resolution monitors may be utilized in this
invention.
The computer system described above is for purposes of example only. The
present invention may be implemented in any type of computer system or
programming or processing environment.
BLOCK DIAGRAM
FIG. 8 is a block diagram of the present invention. A sender, represented by
the components within dashed line 801, encrypts a plaintext message P to a
ciphertext message C. This message C is sent to a receiver, represented by the
components within dashed line 802. The receiver 802 decrypts the ciphertext
message C to recover the plaintext message P.
The sender 801 comprises an encryption/decryption means 803, an elliptic
multiplier 805, and a private key source 807. The encryption/decryption means
803 is coupled to the elliptic multiplier 805 through line 809. The elliptic
multiplier 805 is coupled to the private key source 807 through line 811.
The encryption/decryption means 804 of receiver 802 is coupled to elliptic
multiplier 806 through line 810. The elliptic multiplier 806 is coupled to the
private key source 808 through line 812.
The private key source 807 of the sender 801 contains the secure private
password of the sender, "ourPri". Private key source 807 may be a storage
register in a computer system, a password supplied by the sender to the
cryptosystem when a message is sent, or even a coded, physical key that is read
by the cryptosystem of FIG. 8 when a message is sent or received. Similarly,
the private key source 808 of receiver 802 contains the secure private password
of the receiver, namely, "theirPri".
A separate source 813 stores publicly known information, such as the public
keys "ourPub" and "theirPub" of sender 801 and receiver 802, the initial point
(x.sub.1, y.sub.1), the field F.sub.p K, and curve parameter "a". This source
of information may be a published directory, an on-line source for use by
computer systems, or it may transmitted between sender and receiver over a
non-secure transmission medium. The public source 813 is shown symbolically
connected to sender 801 through line 815 and to receiver 802 through line 814.
In operation, the sender and receiver generate a common one time pad for use as
an enciphering and deciphering key in a secure transmission. The private key of
the sender, ourPri, is provided to the elliptic multiplier 805, along with the
sender's public key, theirPub. The elliptic multiplier 805 computes an
enciphering key e.sub.k from (ourPri) .degree. (theirPub) mod p. The
enciphering key is provided to the encryption/decryption means 803, along with
the plaintext message P. The enciphering key is used with an encrypting scheme,
such as the DES scheme or the elliptic curve scheme of the present invention,
to generate a ciphertext message C. The ciphertext message is transmitted to
the receiver 802 over a nonsecure channel 816.
The receiver 802 generates a deciphering key d.sub.k using the receiver's
private key, theirPri. TheirPri is provided from the private key source 808 to
the elliptic multiplier 804, along with sender's public key, ourPub, (from the
public source 813). Deciphering key d.sub.k is generated from (theirPri)
.degree. (ourPub) mod p. The deciphering key d.sub.k is equal to the
enciphering key e.sub.k due to the abelian nature of the elliptic
multiplication function. Therefore, the receiver 802 reverses the encryption
scheme, using the deciphering key d.sub.k, to recover the plaintext message P
from the ciphertext message C.
The encryption/decryption means and elliptic multiplier of the sender 801 and
receiver 802 can be implemented as program steps to be executed on a
microprocessor.
INVERSIONLESS PARAMETERIZATION
The use of fast class numbers eliminates division operations in mod p
arithmetic operations. However, as illustrated by equations 13-16 above, the
elliptic multiply operation ".degree." requires a number of division operations
to be performed. The present invention reduces the number of divisions required
for elliptic multiply operations by selecting the initial parameterization to
be inversionless. This is accomplished by selecting the initial point so that
the "Y" terms are not needed.
In the present invention, both sender and recipient generate a mutual one-time
pad, as a particular x-coordinate on the elliptic curve. By choosing the
initial point (X.sub.1, Y.sub.1) appropriately, divisions in the process of
establishing multiples n.degree. (X1, Y1) are eliminated. In the steps that
follow, the form
n.degree.(X.sub.m /Z.sub.m) Equation (20)
for integers n, denotes the coordinate (X.sub.n+m /Z.sub.n+m). For x=X/Z the
x-coordinate of the multiple n(x, y) as X.sub.n /Z.sub.n, is calculated using a
"binary ladder" method in accordance with the adding-doubling rules, which
involve multiply mod operations:
If i.noteq.j:
X.sub.i+j =Z.sub.i-j (X.sub.i X.sub.j -Z.sub.i Z.sub.j).sup.2Equation (21)
Z.sub.i+j =X.sub.i-j (X.sub.i Z.sub.j -Z.sub.i X.sub.j).sup.2Equation (22)
Otherwise, if i=j:
X.sub.2i =(X.sub.i.sup.2 -Z.sub.i.sup.2).sup.2 Equation (23)
Z.sub.2i =4X.sub.i Z.sub.i (X.sub.i.sup.2 +aX.sub.i Z.sub.i +Z.sub.i.sup.2)
Equation (24)
These equations do not require divisions, simplifying the calculations when the
present invention is implemented in the present preferred embodiment. This is
referred to as "Montgomery parameterization" or "inversionless
parameterization" (due to the absence of division operations), and is described
in "Speeding the Pollard and Elliptic Curve Methods of Factorization"
Montgomery, P. 1987 Math. Comp., 48 (243-264). When the field is simply F.sub.p
this scheme enables us to compute multiples nx via multiplication, addition,
and (rapid) Mersenne mod operations. This also holds when the field is F.sub.p
2. Because p=3 (mod 4) for any Mersenne prime p, we may represent any X.sub.i
or Z.sub.i as a complex integer, proceeding with complex arithmetic for which
both real and imaginary post-multiply components can be reduced rapidly (mod
p). We also choose Z.sub.1 =1, so that the initial point on the curve is
(X.sub.1 /1, y) where y will not be needed.
Using both fast class numbers and inversionless parameterization, a public key
exchange using the method of the present invention can proceed as follows. In
the following example, the prime is a Mersenne prime. However, any of the fast
class numbers described herein may be substituted.
1) At "our" end, use parameter a, to compute a public key: ourPub .epsilon.
F.sub.p k
(X/Z)=ourPri.degree.(X.sub.1 /1)
ourPub=XZ.sup.-1
2) At "their" end, use parameter a, to compute a public key: theirPub .epsilon.
F.sub.p k
(X/Z)=theirPri.degree.(X.sub.1 /1)
theirPub=XZ.sup.-1
3) The two public keys ourPub and theirPub are published, and therefore are
known.
4) Compute a one-time pad: ourPad .epsilon. F.sub.p k
(X/Z)=ourPri.degree.(theirPub/1)
ourPad=XZ.sup.-1
5) Compute a one-time pad: theirPad .epsilon. F.sub.p k
(X/Z)=theirPri.degree.(ourPub/1)
theirPad=XZ.sup.-1
The usual key exchange has been completed, with
ourPad=theirPad
Message encryption/decryption between "our" end and "their" end may proceed
according to this mutual pad.
FFT MULTIPLY
For very large exponents, such as q>5000, it is advantageous to perform
multiplication by taking Fourier transforms of streams of digits. FFT multiply
works accurately, for example on a 68040-based NeXTstation, for general
operations xy (mod p) where p=2.sup.q -1 has no more than q=2.sup.20 (about one
million) bits. Furthermore, for Mersenne p there are further savings when one
observes that order-q cyclic convolution of binary bits is equivalent to
multiplication (mod 2.sup.q -1). The use of FFT multiply techniques results in
the ability to perform multiply-mod in a time roughly proportional to q log q,
rather than q.sup.2.
Elliptic curve algebra can be sped up intrinsically with FFT techniques. Let X
denote generally the Fourier transform of the digits of X, this transform being
the same one used in FFT multiplication. Then we can compute coordinates from
equations 21-24. To compute X.sub.i+j for example, we can use five appropriate
transforms, (X.sub.i, X.sub.j, Z.sub.i, Z.sub.j, and Z.sub.i-j) (some of which
can have been stored previously) to create the transform:
X.sub.i+j =Z.sub.i-j (X.sub.i X.sub.j -Z.sub.i Z.sub.j).sup.2
In this way the answer X.sub.i+j can be obtained via 7 FFT's. (Note that the
usual practice of using 2 FFT's for squaring and 3 FFT's for multiplication
results in 11 FFT's for the "standard" FFT approach). The ratio 7/11 indicates
a significant savings for the intrinsic method. In certain cases, such as when
p is a Mersenne prime and one also has an errorless number-theoretic transform
available, one can save spectra from the past and stay in spectral space for
the duration of long calculations; in this way reducing times even further.
A flow diagram illustrating the operation of the present invention when using
fast class numbers, inversionless parameterization and FFT multiply operations
is illustrated in FIG. 9. At step 901, a fast class number p is chosen where p=
2.sup.q -C. The term q is the bit depth of the encryption scheme. The greater
the number of bits, the greater the security. For large values of q, FFT
multiply operations are used to calculate p. The term p is made publicly
available.
At step 902, the element k for the field F.sub.p k is chosen and made public.
At step 903, an initial point (X.sub.1 /Z) on the elliptic curve is selected.
By selecting the initial point to be inversionless, costly divides are avoided.
The initial point is made public. The curve parameter a is chosen at step 904
and made public.
At step 905, the sender computes X.sub.1 /Z=ourPri.degree.(X.sub.1 /1) using
inversionless parameterization. The sender's public key is generated ourPub=
(XZ.sup.-1)(mod p). The receiver's public key theirPub=(XZ.sup.-1)(mod p), is
generated at step 906.
A one time pad for the sender, ourPad, is generated at step 907. X/Z=
(ourPri).degree.(theirPub/1). ourPad=XZ.sup.-1 (mod p). At step 908, a one time
pad for the receiver, theirPad, is generated. X/Z=(theirPri).degree.(ourPub/1).
theirPad=XZ.sup.-1 (mod p). The calculation of ourPad and theirPad utilizes FFT
multiplies to eliminate the need to calculate the inversion Z.sup.-1. At step
909, the sender converts a plaintext message P to a ciphertext message C using
ourPad. The ciphertext message C is transmitted to the receiver. At step 910,
the receiver recovers the plaintext message P by deciphering the ciphertext
message C using theirPad.
FEE SECURITY
The algebraic factor M.sub.89 =2.sup.89 -1, which is a Mersenne prime, occurs
with "natural" statistics when the elliptic curve method (ECM) was employed.
This was shown in attempts to complete the factorization of M.sub.445 =
2.sup.445 -1 (this entry in the Cunningham Table remains unresolved as of this
writing). In other words, for random parameters a the occurrence k(X.sub.1 /1)=
O for elliptic curves over F.sub.p with p=M.sub.89 was statistically consistent
with the asymptotic estimate that the time to find the factor M.sub.89 of
M.sub.445 be O(exp(.sqroot.(2 log p log log p))). These observations in turn
suggested that finding the group order over F.sub.p is not "accidentally"
easier for Mersenne primes p, given the assumption of random a parameters.
Secondly, to check that the discrete logarithm problem attendant to FEE is not
accidentally trivial, it can be verified, for particular a parameters, that for
some bounded set of integers N
(p.sup.N -1)(X.sub.1 /1).noteq.O
The inequality avoids the trivial reduction of the discrete logarithm
evaluation to the equivalent evaluation over a corresponding finite field.
Failures of the inequality are extremely rare, in fact no non-trivial instances
are known at this time for q>89.
The present invention provides a number of advantages over prior art schemes,
particularly factoring schemes such as the RSA scheme. The present invention
can provide the same security with fewer bits, increasing speed of operation.
Alternatively, for the same number of bits, the system of the present invention
provides greater security.
Another advantage of the present cryptosystem over prior art cryptosystems is
the distribution of private keys. In prior art schemes such as RSA, large prime
numbers must be generated to create private keys. The present invention does
not require that the private key be a prime number. Therefore, users can
generate their own private keys, so long as a public key is generated and
published using correct and publicly available parameters p, F.sub.p k,
(X.sub.1 /Z) and "a". A user cannot generate its own private key in the RSA
system.
The present invention can be implemented in the programming language C. The
following are examples of programmatic interfaces (.h files) and test programs
(.c files) suitable for implementing the present invention. ##SPC1##
* * * * *
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