Public-key cryptography
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Part II:
Factorization
15 August 2017

Sage scripts for some algorithms,
joint work with Heninger:
facthacks.cr.yp.to

Sieving small integers $i>0$ using primes $2,3,5,7$ :

etc.

Q sieve
Sieving $i$ and $611+i$ for small $i$ using primes $2,3,5,7$ :

|  | $\bigcirc$ | いい | $\stackrel{\text { ® }}{ }$ | N |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
| N |  | N |  | N |  | N |  | N |  |
|  |  | N |  |  |  | N |  |  |  |
|  |  | N |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | ${ }_{\omega}^{\omega}$ | $\omega$ |  | $\omega$ |  |  | $\omega$ |  |  |
| G |  | G |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |


etc.

Have complete factorization of the "congruences" $i(611+i)$ for some $i$ 's.
$14 \cdot 625=2^{1} 3^{0} 5^{4} 7^{1}$.
$64 \cdot 675=2^{6} 3^{3} 5^{2} 7^{0}$.
$75 \cdot 686=2^{1} 3^{1} 5^{2} 7^{3}$.
$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$
$=2^{8} 3^{4} 5^{8} 7^{4}=\left(2^{4} 3^{2} 5^{4} 7^{2}\right)^{2}$.
$\operatorname{gcd}\left\{611,14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75-2^{4} 3^{2} 5^{4} 7^{2}\right\}$
$=47$.
$611=47 \cdot 13$.

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$\operatorname{gcd}\{611$, random $\}=47$ ?

Why did this find a factor of 611? Was it just blind luck:
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No.
By construction 611 divides $s^{2}-t^{2}$ where $s=14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75$ and $t=2^{4} 3^{2} 5^{4} 7^{2}$.
So each prime $>7$ dividing 611 divides either $s-t$ or $s+t$.

Not terribly surprising
(but not guaranteed in advance!)
that one prime divided $s-t$ and the other divided $s+t$.

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Why did the first three completely factored congruences have square product?
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Yes. The exponent vectors
$(1,0,4,1),(6,3,2,0),(1,1,2,3)$
happened to have sum $0 \bmod 2$.
But we didn't need this luck!
Given long sequence of vectors,
easily find nonempty subsequence with sum $0 \bmod 2$.

This is linear algebra over $\mathbf{F}_{2}$.
Guaranteed to find subsequence if number of vectors exceeds length of each vector.
e.g. for $n=671$ :
$1(n+1)=2^{5} 3^{1} 5^{0} 7^{1}$;
$4(n+4)=2^{2} 3^{3} 5^{2} 7^{0}$;
$15(n+15)=2^{1} 3^{1} 5^{1} 7^{3}$;
$49(n+49)=2^{4} 3^{2} 5^{1} 7^{2}$;
$64(n+64)=2^{6} 3^{1} 5^{1} 7^{2}$.
$F_{2}$-kernel of exponent matrix is gen by ( 01011 ) and (1 0110 ); e.g., $1(n+1) 15(n+15) 49(n+49)$
is a square.

Plausible conjecture: $\mathbf{Q}$ sieve can separate the odd prime divisors of any $n$, not just 611.

Given $n$ and parameter $y$ :
Try to completely factor $i(n+i)$
for $i \in\left\{1,2,3, \ldots, y^{2}\right\}$ into products of primes $\leq y$.

Look for nonempty set $I$ of $i$ 's with $i(n+i)$ completely factored and with $\prod i(n+i)$ square. $i \in I$

Compute $\operatorname{gcd}\{n, s-t\}$ where $s=\prod_{i \in I} i$ and $t=\sqrt{\prod_{i \in I} i(n+i)}$.

How large does $y$ have to be for this to find a square?

Uniform random integer in $[1, n]$ has $n^{1 / u}$-smoothness chance roughly $u^{-u}$.

Plausible conjecture:
$\mathbf{Q}$ sieve succeeds
with $y=\left\lfloor n^{1 / u}\right\rfloor$
for all $n \geq u^{(1+o(1)) u^{2}}$;
here $o(1)$ is as $u \rightarrow \infty$.

More generally, if $y \in$
$\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2 c}+o(1)\right) \log n \log \log n}$,
conjectured $y$-smoothness chance is $1 / y^{c+o(1)}$.

Find enough smooth congruences by changing the range of $i$ 's: replace $y^{2}$ with $y^{c+1+o(1)}=$
$\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{(c+1)^{2}+o(1)}{2 c}\right) \log n \log \log n \text {. }}$ Increasing c past 1 increases number of $i$ 's but reduces linear-algebra cost.
So linear algebra never dominates when $y$ is chosen properly.

## Improving smoothness chances

Smoothness chance of $i(n+i)$ degrades as $i$ grows.
Smaller for $i \approx y^{2}$ than for $i \approx y$.
Crude analysis: $i(n+i)$ grows. $\approx y n$ if $i \approx y$;
$\approx y^{2} n$ if $i \approx y^{2}$.
More careful analysis:
$n+i$ doesn't degrade, but
$i$ is always smooth for $i \leq y$,
only $30 \%$ chance for $i \approx y^{2}$.
Can we select congruences to avoid this degradation?

Choose $q$, square of large prime. Choose a " $q$-sublattice" of $i$ 's: arithmetic progression of $i$ 's where $q$ divides each $i(n+i)$. e.g. progression $q-(n \bmod q)$, $2 q-(n \bmod q), 3 q-(n \bmod q)$, etc.

Check smoothness of
generalized congruence $i(n+i) / q$ for i's in this sublattice.
e.g. check whether $i,(n+i) / q$ are smooth for $i=q-(n \bmod q)$ etc.

Try many large q's.
Rare for i's to overlap.
e.g. $n=314159265358979323$ :

Original $\mathbf{Q}$ sieve:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
i & n+i \\
1 & 314159265358979324 \\
2 & 314159265358979325 \\
3 & 314159265358979326
\end{array}
$$

Use $997^{2}$-sublattice,
$i \in 802458+994009 Z$ :

$$
\begin{array}{rl}
i & (n+i) / 997^{2} \\
802458 & 316052737309 \\
1796467 & 316052737310 \\
2790476 & 316052737311
\end{array}
$$

Crude analysis: Sublattices eliminate the growth problem. Have practically unlimited supply of generalized congruences
$(q-(n \bmod q)) \xrightarrow{n+q-(n \bmod q)}$
$q$
between 0 and $n$.
More careful analysis: Sublattices are even better than that!
For $q \approx n^{1 / 2}$ have
$i \approx(n+i) / q \approx n^{1 / 2} \approx y^{u / 2}$ so smoothness chance is roughly $(u / 2)^{-u / 2}(u / 2)^{-u / 2}=2^{u} / u^{u}$,
$2^{u}$ times larger than before.

## Even larger improvements

from changing polynomial $i(n+i)$.
"Quadratic sieve" (QS) uses
$i^{2}-n$ with $i \approx \sqrt{n}$;
have $i^{2}-n \approx n^{1 / 2+o(1)}$,
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"MPQS" improves o(1)
using sublattices: $\left(i^{2}-n\right) / q$.
But still $\approx n^{1 / 2}$.
"Number-field sieve" (NFS)
achieves $n^{o(1)}$.

## Generalizing beyond $\mathbf{Q}$

The $\mathbf{Q}$ sieve is a special case of the number-field sieve.

Recall how the $\mathbf{Q}$ sieve factors 611:

Form a square as product of $i(i+611 j)$
for several pairs $(i, j)$ :
14(625) • 64(675) • 75(686)
$=4410000^{2}$.
$\operatorname{gcd}\{611,14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75-4410000\}$
$=47$.

The $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{14})$ sieve
factors 611 as follows:

## Form a square

as product of $(i+25 j)(i+\sqrt{14} j)$
for several pairs $(i, j)$ :
$(-11+3 \cdot 25)(-11+3 \sqrt{14})$

$$
\cdot(3+25)(3+\sqrt{14})
$$

$=(112-16 \sqrt{14})^{2}$.
Compute
$s=(-11+3 \cdot 25) \cdot(3+25)$,
$t=112-16 \cdot 25$,
$\operatorname{gcd}\{611, s-t\}=13$.

Why does this work?
Answer: Have ring morphism $\mathbf{Z}[\sqrt{14}] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z} / 611, \sqrt{14} \mapsto 25$, since $25^{2}=14$ in $\mathbf{Z} / 611$.

Apply ring morphism to square:
$(-11+3 \cdot 25)(-11+3 \cdot 25)$
$\cdot(3+25)(3+25)$
$=(112-16 \cdot 25)^{2}$ in $\mathbf{Z} / 611$.
ie. $s^{2}=t^{2}$ in $\mathbf{Z} / 611$.
Unsurprising to find factor.

Generalize from $\left(x^{2}-14,25\right)$ to $(f, m)$ with irred $f \in \mathbf{Z}[x]$, $m \in \mathbf{Z}, f(m) \in n \mathbf{Z}$.

Write $d=\operatorname{deg} f$,
$f=f_{d} x^{d}+\cdots+f_{1} x^{1}+f_{0} x^{0}$.
Can take $f_{d}=1$ for simplicity, but larger $f_{d}$ allows better parameter selection.

Pick $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$, root of $f$.
Then $f_{d} \alpha$ is a root of monic $g=f_{d}^{d-1} f\left(x / f_{d}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$.
$\mathbf{Q}(\alpha) \leftarrow \mathcal{O} \leftarrow \mathbf{Z}\left[f_{d} \alpha\right] \xrightarrow{f_{d} \alpha \mapsto f_{d} m} \mathbf{Z} / n$

Build square in $\mathbf{Q}(\alpha)$ from congruences $(i-j m)(i-j \alpha)$ with $i \mathbf{Z}+j \mathbf{Z}=\mathbf{Z}$ and $j>0$.

Could replace $i-j x$ by higher-deg erred in $\mathbf{Z}[x]$; quadratics seem fairly small for some number fields. But let's not bother.

Say we have a square

$$
\prod_{(i, j) \in S}(i-j m)(i-j \alpha)
$$

in $\mathbf{Q}(\alpha)$; now what?
$\prod(i-j m)(i-j \alpha) f_{d}^{2}$
is a square in $\mathcal{O}$,
ring of integers of $\mathbf{Q}(\alpha)$.
Multiply by $g^{\prime}\left(f_{d} \alpha\right)^{2}$, putting square root into $\mathbf{Z}\left[f_{d} \alpha\right]$ : compute $r$ with $r^{2}=g^{\prime}\left(f_{d} \alpha\right)^{2}$. $\prod(i-j m)(i-j \alpha) f_{d}^{2}$.

Then apply the ring morphism $\varphi: \mathbf{Z}\left[f_{d} \alpha\right] \rightarrow \mathbf{Z} / n$ taking $f_{d} \alpha$ to $f_{d} m$. Compute $\operatorname{gcd}\{n$, $\left.\varphi(r)-g^{\prime}\left(f_{d} m\right) \prod(i-j m) f_{d}\right\}$. In $\mathbf{Z} / n$ have $\varphi(r)^{2}=$
$g^{\prime}\left(f_{d} m\right)^{2} \prod(i-j m)^{2} f_{d}^{2}$.

How to find square product of congruences $(i-j m)(i-j \alpha)$ ?

Start with congruences for,
e.g., $y^{2}$ pairs $(i, j)$.

Look for $y$-smooth congruences:
$y$-smooth $i-j m$ and
$y$-smooth $f_{d}$ norm $(i-j \alpha)=$
$f_{d} i^{d}+\cdots+f_{0} j^{d}=j^{d} f(i / j)$.
Here " $y$-smooth" means
"has no prime divisor > y."
Find enough smooth congruences.
Perform linear algebra on exponent vectors mod 2.

## Asymptotic cost exponents

Number of bit operations
in number-field sieve,
with theorists' parameters,
is $L^{1.90 \ldots+o(1)}$ where $L=$
$\exp \left((\log n)^{1 / 3}(\log \log n)^{2 / 3}\right)$.
What are theorists' parameters?
Choose degree $d$ with
$d /(\log n)^{1 / 3}(\log \log n)^{-1 / 3}$
$\in 1.40 \ldots+o(1)$.

Choose integer $m \approx n^{1 / d}$.
Write $n$ as
$m^{d}+f_{d-1} m^{d-1}+\cdots+f_{1} m+f_{0}$
with each $f_{k}$ below $n^{(1+o(1)) / d}$.
Choose $f$ with some randomness
in case there are bad $f$ 's.
Test smoothness of $i-j m$
for all coprime pairs $(i, j)$
with $1 \leq i, j \leq L^{0.95 \ldots+o(1), ~}$ using primes $\leq L^{0.95 \ldots+o(1)}$.
$L^{1.90 \ldots+o(1)}$ pairs.
Conjecturally $L^{1.65 \ldots+o(1)}$
smooth values of $i-j m$.

Use $L^{0.12 \ldots+o(1)}$ number fields.
For each $(i, j)$
with smooth $i-j m$,
test smoothness of $i-j \alpha$ and $i-j \beta$ and so on, using primes $\leq L^{0.82 \ldots+o(1)}$.
$L^{1.77 \ldots+o(1)}$ tests.
Each $\left|j^{d} f(i / j)\right| \leq m^{2.86 \ldots+o(1)}$.
Conjecturally $L^{0.95 \ldots+o(1)}$
smooth congruences.
$L^{0.95 \ldots+o(1)}$ components
in the exponent vectors.

Three sizes of numbers here:
$(\log n)^{1 / 3}(\log \log n)^{2 / 3}$ bits:
$y, i, j$.
$(\log n)^{2 / 3}(\log \log n)^{1 / 3}$ bits:
$m, i-j m, j^{d} f(i / j)$.
$\log n$ bits: $n$.
Unavoidably $1 / 3$ in exponent:
usual smoothness optimization
forces $(\log y)^{2} \approx \log m$;
balancing norms with $m$
forces $d \log y \approx \log m$;
and $d \log m \approx \log n$.

## Batch NFS

The number-field sieve used $L^{1.90 \ldots+o(1)}$ bit operations
finding smooth $i-j m$; only $L^{1.77 \ldots+o(1)}$ bit operations finding smooth $j^{d} f(i / j)$.

Many n's can share one $m$; $L^{1.90 \ldots+o(1)}$ bit operations to find squares for all $n$ 's.

Oops, linear algebra hurts; fix by reducing $y$.
But still end up factoring batch in much less time than factoring each $n$ separately.

## Asymptotic batch-NFS

parameters:
$d /(\log n)^{1 / 3}(\log \log n)^{-1 / 3}$
$\in 1.10 \ldots+o(1)$.
Primes $\leq L^{0.82 \ldots+o(1)}$.
$1 \leq i, j \leq L^{1.00 \ldots+o(1)}$.
Computation independent of $n$ finds $L^{1.64 \ldots+o(1)}$
smooth values $i-j m$.
$L^{1.64 \ldots+o(1)}$ operations
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$L^{1.64 \ldots+o(1)}$ operations
for each target $n$.
Wait: how do we recognize smooth integers so quickly?

## The rho method

Define $\rho_{0}=0, \rho_{k+1}=\rho_{k}^{2}+11$.
Every prime $\leq 2^{20}$ divides $S=$
$\left(\rho_{1}-\rho_{2}\right)\left(\rho_{2}-\rho_{4}\right)\left(\rho_{3}-\rho_{6}\right)$
$\cdots\left(\rho_{3575}-\rho_{7150}\right)$.
Also many larger primes.
Can compute $\operatorname{gcd}\{c, S\}$ using $\approx 2^{14}$ multiplications mod $c$, very little memory.

Compare to $\approx 2^{16}$ divisions for trial division up to $2^{20}$.

More generally: Choose z.
Compute $\operatorname{gcd}\{c, S\}$ where $S=$
$\left(\rho_{1}-\rho_{2}\right)\left(\rho_{2}-\rho_{4}\right) \cdots\left(\rho_{z}-\rho_{2 z}\right)$.
How big does $z$ have to be
for all primes $\leq y$ to divide $S$ ?
Plausible conjecture: $y^{1 / 2+o(1)}$; so $y^{1 / 2+o(1)}$ milts mod $c$.

Reason: Consider first collision in $\rho_{1} \bmod p, \rho_{2} \bmod p, \ldots$
If $\rho_{i} \bmod p=\rho_{j} \bmod p$
then $\rho_{k} \bmod p=\rho_{2 k} \bmod p$
for $k \in(j-i) \mathbf{Z} \cap[i, \infty] \cap[j, \infty]$.

## The $p-1$ method

$S_{1}=2^{232792560}-1$
has prime divisors
$3,5,7,11,13,17,19,23,29,31$,
$37,41,43,53,61,67,71,73,79$,
89, 97, 103, 109, 113, 127, 131,
$137,151,157,181,191,199$ etc.
These divisors include
70 of the 168 primes $\leq 10^{3}$;
156 of the 1229 primes $\leq 10^{4}$; 296 of the 9592 primes $\leq 10^{5}$; 470 of the 78498 primes $\leq 10^{6}$; etc.

# An odd prime $p$ 

divides $2^{232792560}-1$
iff order of 2 in the multiplicative group $\mathbf{F}_{p}^{*}$ divides $s=232792560$.

Many ways for this to happen:
232792560 has 960 divisors.
Why so many?
Answer: $s=232792560$
$=\operatorname{lcm}\{1,2,3,4, \ldots, 20\}$
$=2^{4} \cdot 3^{2} \cdot 5 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 19$.

Can compute $2^{232792560}-1$ using 41 ring operations.
(Side note: 41 is not minimal.)
Ring operation: $0,1,+,-,$.
This computation: $1 ; 2=1+1$;
$2^{2}=2 \cdot 2 ; 2^{3}=2^{2} \cdot 2 ; 2^{6}=2^{3} \cdot 2^{3}$; $2^{12}=2^{6} \cdot 2^{6} ; 2^{13}=2^{12} \cdot 2 ; 2^{26} ; 2^{27} ; 2^{54}$; $2^{55} ; 2^{110} ; 2^{111} ; 2^{222} ; 2^{444} ; 2^{888} ; 2^{1776}$; $2^{3552} ; 2^{7104} ; 2^{14208} ; 2^{28416} ; 2^{28417}$; $2^{56834} ; 2^{113668} ; 2^{227336} ; 2^{454672} ; 2^{909344}$; $2^{909345} ; 2^{1818690} ; 2^{1818691} ; 2^{3637382}$; $2^{3637383} ; 2^{7274766} ; 2^{7274767} ; 2^{14549534}$; $2^{14549535} ; 2^{29099070} ; 2^{58198140}$; $2^{116396280} ; 2^{232792560} ; 2^{232792560}-1$.

Given positive integer $n$, can compute $2^{232792560}-1 \bmod n$ using 41 operations in $\mathbf{Z} / n$. Notation: $a \bmod b=a-b\lfloor a / b\rfloor$. e.g. $n=8597231219$ :
$2^{27} \bmod n=134217728$;
$2^{54} \bmod n=134217728^{2} \bmod n$

$$
=935663516
$$

$2^{55} \bmod n=1871327032 ;$
$2^{110} \bmod n=1871327032^{2} \bmod n$

$$
=1458876811 ; \ldots ;
$$

$2^{232792560}-1 \bmod n=5626089344$.

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$2^{232792560}-1 \bmod n=5626089344$.
Easy extra computation (Euclid): $\operatorname{gcd}\{5626089344, n\}=991$.

This $p-1$ method (1974 Pollard) quickly factored $n=8597231219$.
Main work: 27 squarings mod $n$.
Could instead have checked $n$ 's divisibility by $2,3,5, \ldots$
The 167th trial division would have found divisor 991.

Not clear which method is better. Dividing by small $p$ is faster than squaring $\bmod n$. The $p-1$ method finds only 70 of the primes $\leq 1000$; trial division finds all 168 primes.

Scale up to larger exponent $s=\operatorname{lcm}\{1,2,3,4, \ldots, 100\}:$
using 136 squarings mod $n$ find 2317 of the primes $\leq 10^{5}$.

Is a squaring mod $n$
faster than 17 trial divisions?
Or $s=\operatorname{lcm}\{1,2,3,4, \ldots, 1000\}:$
using 1438 squarings mod $n$ find 180121 of the primes $\leq 10^{7}$.

Is a squaring mod $n$
faster than 125 trial divisions?
Extra benefit:
no need to store the primes.

Plausible conjecture: if $K$ is
$\exp \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2}+o(1)\right) \log H \log \log H}$
then $p-1$ divides $\operatorname{Icm}\{1,2, \ldots, K\}$ for $H / K^{1+o(1)}$ primes $p \leq H$.
Same if $p-1$ is replaced by order of 2 in $\mathbf{F}_{p}^{*}$.

So uniform random prime $p \leq H$ divides $2^{\operatorname{lcm}\{1,2, \ldots, K\}}-1$ with probability $1 / K^{1+o(1)}$.
$(1.4 \ldots+o(1)) K$ squarings mod $n$ produce $2^{\mathrm{lcm}\{1,2, \ldots, K\}}-1 \bmod n$.

Similar time spent on trial division finds far fewer primes for large $H$.

## The $p+1$ factorization method

## (1982 Williams)

Define $(X, Y) \in \mathbf{Q} \times \mathbf{Q}$ as the
232792560th multiple of
$(3 / 5,4 / 5)$ in the group $\operatorname{Clock}(\mathbf{Q})$.
The integer $S_{2}=5^{232792560} X$ is divisible by
82 of the primes $\leq 10^{3}$; 223 of the primes $\leq 10^{4}$; 455 of the primes $\leq 10^{5}$;
720 of the primes $\leq 10^{6}$; etc.

Given an integer $n$,
compute $5^{232792560} X \bmod n$
and compute ged with $n$, hoping to factor $n$.

Many $p$ 's not found by $\mathbf{F}_{p}^{*}$ are found by $\operatorname{Clock}\left(\mathbf{F}_{p}\right)$.

If -1 is not a square $\bmod p$ and $p+1$ divides 232792560 then $5^{232792560} X \bmod p=0$.

Proof: $p \equiv 3(\bmod 4)$,
so $(4 / 5+3 i / 5)^{p}=4 / 5-3 i / 5$,
so $(p+1)(3 / 5,4 / 5)=(0,1)$
in the group $\operatorname{Clock}\left(\mathbf{F}_{p}\right)$,
so $232792560(3 / 5,4 / 5)=(0,1)$.

## The elliptic-curve method

Replace clock group with a random elliptic curve.

Order of elliptic-curve group
$\in[p+1-2 \sqrt{p}, p+1+2 \sqrt{p}]$.
If a curve fails, try another.
Good news (for the attacker):
All primes $\leq H$
seem to be found after a reasonable number of curves.
Time subexponential in $H$.

## More reading

eecm.cr.yp.to
cr.yp.to/papers.html\#batchnfs
smartfacts.cr.yp.to
"Factoring RSA keys from
certified smart cards:
Coppersmith in the wild"
eprint.iacr.org/2016/961
"A kilobit hidden SNFS discrete logarithm computation"
eprint.iacr.org/2017/142
"Computing generator ... and
application to cryptanalysis of a
[lattice-based] FHE scheme"

