

# Hyper-and-elliptic-curve cryptography

Daniel J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago &  
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven


Joint work with: Tanja Lange  
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

[cr.yp.to/papers.html#hyperand](http://cr.yp.to/papers.html#hyperand)  
(2014) + new examples (2015)

---

Rewind to 2012 Gaudry–Schost:  
“the computation took  
more than 1,000,000 CPU hours”.

# The Gaudry–Schost motivation:



Inputs: “squared  $\theta$  coordinates”

$(x_2 : y_2 : z_2 : t_2)$  for  $Q_2$ ,

$(x_3 : y_3 : z_3 : t_3)$  for  $Q_3$ ,

$(x_1 : y_1 : z_1 : t_1)$  for  $Q_1 = Q_3 - Q_2$ .

This diagram computes

$(x_4 : y_4 : z_4 : t_4)$  for  $Q_4 = 2Q_2$ ,

$(x_5 : y_5 : z_5 : t_5)$  for  $Q_5 = Q_3 + Q_2$ .

Inputs: “squared  $\theta$  coordinates”

$(x_2 : y_2 : z_2 : t_2)$  for  $Q_2$ ,

$(x_3 : y_3 : z_3 : t_3)$  for  $Q_3$ ,

$(x_1 : y_1 : z_1 : t_1)$  for  $Q_1 = Q_3 - Q_2$ .

This diagram computes

$(x_4 : y_4 : z_4 : t_4)$  for  $Q_4 = 2Q_2$ ,

$(x_5 : y_5 : z_5 : t_5)$  for  $Q_5 = Q_3 + Q_2$ .

Just 14 mults for  $Q_4$

(1986 Chudnovsky–Chudnovsky).

Huge speedup if constants

$(\frac{1}{a^2} : \frac{1}{b^2} : \frac{1}{c^2} : \frac{1}{d^2})$  etc. are small.

Inputs: “squared  $\theta$  coordinates”

$(x_2 : y_2 : z_2 : t_2)$  for  $Q_2$ ,

$(x_3 : y_3 : z_3 : t_3)$  for  $Q_3$ ,

$(x_1 : y_1 : z_1 : t_1)$  for  $Q_1 = Q_3 - Q_2$ .

This diagram computes

$(x_4 : y_4 : z_4 : t_4)$  for  $Q_4 = 2Q_2$ ,

$(x_5 : y_5 : z_5 : t_5)$  for  $Q_5 = Q_3 + Q_2$ .

Just 14 mults for  $Q_4$

(1986 Chudnovsky–Chudnovsky).

Huge speedup if constants

$(\frac{1}{a^2} : \frac{1}{b^2} : \frac{1}{c^2} : \frac{1}{d^2})$  etc. are small.

Just 25 mults for  $Q_4, Q_5$

(2006 Gaudry) after  $Q_1$  precomp.

$(x_i : y_i : z_i : t_i)$  are points on original Kummer surface  $K$  :

$$4E^2xyzt = ((x^2 + y^2 + z^2 + t^2) - F(xt + yz) - G(xz + yt) - H(xy + zt))^2$$

where

$$A^2 = a^2 + b^2 + c^2 + d^2,$$

$$B^2 = a^2 + b^2 - c^2 - d^2,$$

$$C^2 = a^2 - b^2 + c^2 - d^2,$$

$$D^2 = a^2 - b^2 - c^2 + d^2,$$

$$F = (a^4 - b^4 - c^4 + d^4) / (a^2 d^2 - b^2 c^2),$$

$$G = (a^4 - b^4 + c^4 - d^4) / (a^2 c^2 - b^2 d^2),$$

$$H = (a^4 + b^4 - c^4 - d^4) / (a^2 b^2 - c^2 d^2),$$

$$E^2 = F^2 + G^2 + H^2 + FGH - 4.$$

# Surface is from 1864 Kummer, *Über die Flächen vierten Grades mit sechzehn singulären Punkten:*

---

vom 18. April 1864.

253

Endlich möge hier noch eine Formveränderung erwähnt werden, welche man mit der Gleichung dieser Flächen vornehmen kann. Wählt man die vier in der Form (4.) enthaltenen singulären Tangentialebenen

$$p = 0, q = 0, p' = 0, q' = 0$$

als die Fundamentebenen, also  $p, q, p', q'$ , als die vier homogenen Coordinaten, und bezeichnet demgemäß die beiden letzteren durch  $r$  und  $s$ , so erhält man folgende Form der Gleichung:

10., 
$$\phi^2 = 16 K p q r s,$$

wo

$$\phi = p^2 + q^2 + r^2 + s^2 + 2a(qr + ps) + 2b(rp + qs) + 2c(pq + rs)$$
$$K = a^2 + b^2 + c^2 - 2abc - 1.$$

in welcher die sieben Constanten  $a, b, c, d, e, f, k$  jener Form auf die richtige Anzahl von drei Constanten  $a, b, c$  eingeschränkt ist. Wählt man in dieser Form die Coefficienten der linearen Ausdrücke  $p, q, r, s$  real, und die drei Constanten  $a, b, c$  eben-

$Q_2, Q_3$  are points on  
Jacobian  $J$  of a related  
genus-2 hyperelliptic curve  $C$ .  
“Standard”  $X : J/\{\pm 1\} \hookrightarrow K$   
defines squared  $\theta$  coords on  $J$ .

$Q_2, Q_3$  are points on  
Jacobian  $J$  of a related  
genus-2 hyperelliptic curve  $C$ .  
“Standard”  $X : J/\{\pm 1\} \hookrightarrow K$   
defines squared  $\theta$  coords on  $J$ .

Use diagram  $k$  times to compute  
 $X(Q_1) \mapsto X(nQ_1), X((n+1)Q_1)$   
for any  $n \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ .

$Q_2, Q_3$  are points on  
Jacobian  $J$  of a related  
genus-2 hyperelliptic curve  $C$ .  
“Standard”  $X : J/\{\pm 1\} \hookrightarrow K$   
defines squared  $\theta$  coords on  $J$ .

Use diagram  $k$  times to compute  
 $X(Q_1) \mapsto X(nQ_1), X((n+1)Q_1)$   
for any  $n \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^k - 1\}$ .

Beware typos in the “standard”  
Rosenhain/Mumford/Kummer  
formulas in 2007 Gaudry, 2010  
Cosset, 2013 Bos–Costello–Hisil–  
Lauter. See our paper for simpler  
formulas as **Sage scripts**.

1966 Mumford, *On the equations defining Abelian varieties. I*:

“There are several thousand formulas in this paper which allow one *or more* ‘sign-like ambiguities’: i.e., alternate and symmetric but non-equivalent reformulations. These occur in definitions and theorems. I have made a superhuman effort to achieve consistency and even to make *correct* statements: but I still cannot guarantee the result.”

1966 Mumford, *On the equations defining Abelian varieties. I:*

“There are several thousand formulas in this paper which allow one *or more* ‘sign-like ambiguities’: i.e., alternate and symmetric but non-equivalent reformulations. These occur in definitions and theorems. I have made a superhuman effort to achieve consistency and even to make *correct* statements: but I still cannot guarantee the result.”

Sage is better than superhuman!

1975 Weil: “Kummer discovered that family of surfaces . . . entirely without the help of the powerful tool provided by theta-functions; actually, the connection with theta-functions was noticed only in 1877, by Cayley and by Borchardt . . . His example is of particular value at a time when it is again realized by algebraic geometers that the detailed study of well-chosen special varieties remains one major road to progress in their field.”

2012 Gaudry–Schost:

“We want to find a curve of genus 2 over a prime field that is suitable for building a public-key cryptosystem.”

2012 Gaudry–Schost:

“We want to find a curve of genus 2 over a prime field that is suitable for building a public-key cryptosystem.”

Obvious choice of field:

$\mathbf{F}_p$  where  $p = 2^{127} - 1$ . Fast.

$\#J(\mathbf{F}_p) \approx 2^{254}$ ; big enough.

2012 Gaudry–Schost:

“We want to find a curve of genus 2 over a prime field that is suitable for building a public-key cryptosystem.”

Obvious choice of field:

$\mathbf{F}_p$  where  $p = 2^{127} - 1$ . Fast.

$\#J(\mathbf{F}_p) \approx 2^{254}$ ; big enough.

1000000 CPU hours found

$(a^2, b^2, c^2, d^2) = (-11, 22, 19, 3)$ ,

primes  $\#J(\mathbf{F}_p)/16, \#J'(\mathbf{F}_p)/16$ .

Here  $J'$  is Jacobian of nontrivial quadratic twist of curve  $C$ .

Is this faster than a similar-  
security elliptic curve over  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$   
or a similar-size prime field?

Is this faster than a similar-security elliptic curve over  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$  or a similar-size prime field?

Counting ops suggests: Yes, especially with small  $a^2$  etc.

Is this faster than a similar-security elliptic curve over  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$  or a similar-size prime field?

Counting ops suggests: Yes, especially with small  $a^2$  etc.

Implementations (2006 Bernstein, 2013 Bos–Costello–Hisil–Lauter, 2014 Bernstein–Chuengsatiansup–Lange–Schwabe): Yes.

Is this faster than a similar-security elliptic curve over  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$  or a similar-size prime field?

Counting ops suggests: Yes, especially with small  $a^2$  etc.

Implementations (2006 Bernstein, 2013 Bos–Costello–Hisil–Lauter, 2014 Bernstein–Chuengsatiansup–Lange–Schwabe): Yes.

2015 Costello–Longa  $E$  with  $\sqrt{-10}$  CM, 2-isogeny to  $\overline{E}$ : faster on some CPUs but not others, not compressed, not twist-secure.

Summary: Gaudry–Schost  $J$   
holds speed records for  
high-security  $n, Q \mapsto nQ$ .

Summary: Gaudry–Schost  $J$   
holds speed records for  
high-security  $n, Q \mapsto nQ$ .

But what about  $P, Q \mapsto P + Q$ ?

$n \mapsto nP$ ?  $m, n, P, Q \mapsto mP + nQ$ ?

Summary: Gaudry–Schost  $J$   
holds speed records for  
high-security  $n, Q \mapsto nQ$ .

But what about  $P, Q \mapsto P + Q$ ?  
 $n \mapsto nP$ ?  $m, n, P, Q \mapsto mP + nQ$ ?

Fastest known addition formulas  
are faster for  $E$  than for  $J$ .

So  $J$  isn't competitive for  
key generation, signing, etc.

Summary: Gaudry–Schost  $J$   
holds speed records for  
high-security  $n, Q \mapsto nQ$ .

But what about  $P, Q \mapsto P + Q$ ?  
 $n \mapsto nP$ ?  $m, n, P, Q \mapsto mP + nQ$ ?

Fastest known addition formulas  
are faster for  $E$  than for  $J$ .

So  $J$  isn't competitive for  
key generation, signing, etc.

## **Hyper-and-elliptic curve**

**cryptography:** Build *one* group  
supporting the fastest formulas  
from genus 1 *and* genus 2.

Group is  $E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) = W(\mathbf{F}_p)$ .

$E$  is an  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ -complete Edwards curve;  $W$  is Weil restriction.

Note: 2 parameters for  $W$ .

Group is  $E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) = W(\mathbf{F}_p)$ .

$E$  is an  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ -complete Edwards curve;  $W$  is Weil restriction.

Note: 2 parameters for  $W$ .

Map  $W(\mathbf{F}_p) \rightarrow K(\mathbf{F}_p)$  using fast isogeny  $W \rightarrow J = \text{Jac } H$  for some  $H$ , and fast  $X : J \rightarrow K$ .

Note: 3 parameters for  $K$ .

Group is  $E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) = W(\mathbf{F}_p)$ .

$E$  is an  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ -complete Edwards curve;  $W$  is Weil restriction.

Note: 2 parameters for  $W$ .

Map  $W(\mathbf{F}_p) \rightarrow K(\mathbf{F}_p)$  using fast isogeny  $W \rightarrow J = \text{Jac } H$  for some  $H$ , and fast  $X : J \rightarrow K$ .

Note: 3 parameters for  $K$ .

Surprise: We have examples where  $a^2, b^2, c^2, d^2$  are small!

This allows fastest  $n, P \mapsto nP$ .

Explanation: Can lift from

$\mathbf{F}_{p^2}/\mathbf{F}_p$  to  $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})/\mathbf{Q}$ .

Another virtue of these groups:  
genus-1 point-counting is fast.  
(Use Magma; Sage needs  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .)

History of using  $W \rightarrow J$   
for genus-2 point-counting  
via genus-1 point-counting:

2002 Gaudry–Hess–Smart

in char 2; odd char is “hard”.

2001 Galbraith: “rather difficult”.

2003 Diem, 2003 Diem–Scholten,

2003 Scholten, 2003 Thériault,

2004 Diem–Scholten, 2009 Satoh,

2011 Freeman–Satoh: various

odd-char constructions.

# Scholten curves

(2003 Scholten + simplifications)

Assume: odd prime  $p$ ;

$r, s, \beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ;  $\beta \notin \mathbf{F}_p$ ;

minor additional hypotheses.

Write  $\bar{r} = r^p$ ,  $\bar{s} = s^p$ ,  $\bar{\beta} = \beta^p$ .

# Scholten curves

(2003 Scholten + simplifications)

Assume: odd prime  $p$ ;

$r, s, \beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ;  $\beta \notin \mathbf{F}_p$ ;

minor additional hypotheses.

Write  $\bar{r} = r^p$ ,  $\bar{s} = s^p$ ,  $\bar{\beta} = \beta^p$ .

Define  $g \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}[z]$  as

$$\frac{rv^6 + sv^4u^2 + \bar{s}v^2u^4 + \bar{r}u^6}{r\bar{\beta}^6 + s\bar{\beta}^4\beta^2 + \bar{s}\bar{\beta}^2\beta^4 + \bar{r}\beta^6}$$

where  $u = 1 - \beta z$ ,  $v = 1 - \bar{\beta} z$ .

# Scholten curves

(2003 Scholten + simplifications)

Assume: odd prime  $p$ ;

$r, s, \beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ;  $\beta \notin \mathbf{F}_p$ ;

minor additional hypotheses.

Write  $\bar{r} = r^p$ ,  $\bar{s} = s^p$ ,  $\bar{\beta} = \beta^p$ .

Define  $g \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}[z]$  as

$$\frac{rv^6 + sv^4u^2 + \bar{s}v^2u^4 + \bar{r}u^6}{r\bar{\beta}^6 + s\bar{\beta}^4\beta^2 + \bar{s}\bar{\beta}^2\beta^4 + \bar{r}\beta^6}$$

where  $u = 1 - \beta z$ ,  $v = 1 - \bar{\beta} z$ .

Note that  $g \in \mathbf{F}_p[z]$ .

# Scholten curves

(2003 Scholten + simplifications)

Assume: odd prime  $p$ ;

$r, s, \beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ;  $\beta \notin \mathbf{F}_p$ ;

minor additional hypotheses.

Write  $\bar{r} = r^p$ ,  $\bar{s} = s^p$ ,  $\bar{\beta} = \beta^p$ .

Define  $g \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}[z]$  as

$$\frac{rv^6 + sv^4u^2 + \bar{s}v^2u^4 + \bar{r}u^6}{r\bar{\beta}^6 + s\bar{\beta}^4\beta^2 + \bar{s}\bar{\beta}^2\beta^4 + \bar{r}\beta^6}$$

where  $u = 1 - \beta z$ ,  $v = 1 - \bar{\beta} z$ .

Note that  $g \in \mathbf{F}_p[z]$ .

Scholten curve  $H : y^2 = g(z)$ .

Denominator of  $g$  is in  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Choose square root  $\omega \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ .

Denominator of  $g$  is in  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Choose square root  $\omega \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ .

Define  $E$  as the elliptic curve  
$$y^2 = rx^3 + sx^2 + \bar{s}x + \bar{r}.$$

Denominator of  $g$  is in  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Choose square root  $\omega \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ .

Define  $E$  as the elliptic curve  
$$y^2 = rx^3 + sx^2 + \bar{s}x + \bar{r}.$$

Define  $\phi : H \rightarrow E$  as

$(z, y) \mapsto (v^2/u^2, \omega y/u^3).$

Denominator of  $g$  is in  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Choose square root  $\omega \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ .

Define  $E$  as the elliptic curve  
$$y^2 = rx^3 + sx^2 + \bar{s}x + \bar{r}.$$

Define  $\phi : H \rightarrow E$  as

$$(z, y) \mapsto (v^2/u^2, \omega y/u^3).$$

Choose an  $\mathbf{F}_p$ -basis for  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ,

hence a Weil restriction  $W$  of  $E$ .

Denominator of  $g$  is in  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Choose square root  $\omega \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ .

Define  $E$  as the elliptic curve  
$$y^2 = rx^3 + sx^2 + \bar{s}x + \bar{r}.$$

Define  $\phi : H \rightarrow E$  as

$$(z, y) \mapsto (v^2/u^2, \omega y/u^3).$$

Choose an  $\mathbf{F}_p$ -basis for  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ,

hence a Weil restriction  $W$  of  $E$ .

$\phi$  induces  $H \rightarrow W$ , which induces

$\iota' : J \rightarrow W$  where  $J = \text{Jac } H$ .

Denominator of  $g$  is in  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Choose square root  $\omega \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ .

Define  $E$  as the elliptic curve  
 $y^2 = rx^3 + sx^2 + \bar{s}x + \bar{r}$ .

Define  $\phi : H \rightarrow E$  as

$$(z, y) \mapsto (v^2/u^2, \omega y/u^3).$$

Choose an  $\mathbf{F}_p$ -basis for  $\mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ ,

hence a Weil restriction  $W$  of  $E$ .

$\phi$  induces  $H \rightarrow W$ , which induces

$\iota' : J \rightarrow W$  where  $J = \text{Jac } H$ .

Concretely:  $\iota'(P_1 + P_2) =$

$W$  coords of  $\phi(P_1) + \phi(P_2)$ .

Our paper interpolates to  
obtain low-degree formulas for  $\iota'$   
on Mumford coordinates for  $J$ .

Our paper interpolates to  
obtain low-degree formulas for  $\iota'$   
on Mumford coordinates for  $J$ .  
Also low-degree formulas for  $\iota$  :  
 $W \rightarrow J$  with  $\iota'(\iota(P)) = 2P$ .

Our paper interpolates to obtain low-degree formulas for  $\iota'$  on Mumford coordinates for  $J$ .  
Also low-degree formulas for  $\iota : W \rightarrow J$  with  $\iota'(\iota(P)) = 2P$ .  
All formulas are defined over  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

Our paper interpolates to obtain low-degree formulas for  $\iota'$  on Mumford coordinates for  $J$ . Also low-degree formulas for  $\iota : W \rightarrow J$  with  $\iota'(\iota(P)) = 2P$ . All formulas are defined over  $\mathbf{F}_p$ .

(Can show:  $\iota(P)$  is trace of sum of  $\phi$ -preimages of  $P$ ; “norm-conorm” map used in, e.g., 2002 Gaudry–Hess–Smart, 2003 Diem, 2004 Arita–Matsuo–Nagao–Shimura. But this doesn’t give a very fast algorithm.)

## Scholten with fast Kummer?

Given Scholten curve,  
compute corresponding  
original Kummer surface  $K$ :

Factor  $g$  into linear factors.

## Scholten with fast Kummer?

Given Scholten curve,  
compute corresponding  
original Kummer surface  $K$ :

Factor  $g$  into linear factors.

By linear-fractional transformation  
move to twisted Rosenhain form

$$\delta y^2 = x(x-1)(x-\lambda)(x-\mu)(x-\nu).$$

## Scholten with fast Kummer?

Given Scholten curve,  
compute corresponding  
original Kummer surface  $K$ :

Factor  $g$  into linear factors.

By linear-fractional transformation  
move to twisted Rosenhain form

$$\delta y^2 = x(x-1)(x-\lambda)(x-\mu)(x-\nu).$$

Compute

$$b^2 = \sqrt{\frac{\mu(\mu-1)(\lambda-\nu)}{\nu(\nu-1)(\lambda-\mu)}},$$

$$c^2 = \sqrt{\frac{\lambda\mu}{\nu}}, \quad a^2 = \frac{b^2 c^2 \nu}{\mu}, \quad d^2 = 1.$$

Take  $s_1, s_2, s_3 \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ , norm 1,  
with  $s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2$  distinct.

$-s_1^2 s_2^2 s_3^2$  has norm 1.

Write it as  $\bar{r}/r$  with  $r \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}^*$ .

Take  $s_1, s_2, s_3 \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ , norm 1,  
with  $s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2$  distinct.

$-s_1^2 s_2^2 s_3^2$  has norm 1.

Write it as  $\bar{r}/r$  with  $r \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}^*$ .

Define  $s = -r(s_1 + s_2 + s_3)$ .

Take any  $\beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2} - \mathbf{F}_p$   
with  $(\bar{\beta}/\beta)^2 \notin \{s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2\}$ .

Then  $g$  has 6 distinct roots  
 $(1 \pm s_j)/(\bar{\beta} \pm \beta s_j) \in \mathbf{F}_p$ .

Take  $s_1, s_2, s_3 \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ , norm 1,  
with  $s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2$  distinct.

$-s_1^2 s_2^2 s_3^2$  has norm 1.

Write it as  $\bar{r}/r$  with  $r \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}^*$ .

Define  $s = -r(s_1 + s_2 + s_3)$ .

Take any  $\beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2} - \mathbf{F}_p$   
with  $(\bar{\beta}/\beta)^2 \notin \{s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2\}$ .

Then  $g$  has 6 distinct roots  
 $(1 \pm s_j)/(\bar{\beta} \pm \beta s_j) \in \mathbf{F}_p$ .

Hope that  $a^2, b^2, c^2, d^2 \in \mathbf{F}_p$ ;

i.e.,  $\sqrt{\frac{\lambda\mu}{\nu}}, \sqrt{\dots} \in \mathbf{F}_p$ .

Take  $s_1, s_2, s_3 \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}$ , norm 1,  
with  $s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2$  distinct.

$-s_1^2 s_2^2 s_3^2$  has norm 1.

Write it as  $\bar{r}/r$  with  $r \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2}^*$ .

Define  $s = -r(s_1 + s_2 + s_3)$ .

Take any  $\beta \in \mathbf{F}_{p^2} - \mathbf{F}_p$   
with  $(\bar{\beta}/\beta)^2 \notin \{s_1^2, s_2^2, s_3^2\}$ .

Then  $g$  has 6 distinct roots  
 $(1 \pm s_j)/(\bar{\beta} \pm \beta s_j) \in \mathbf{F}_p$ .

Hope that  $a^2, b^2, c^2, d^2 \in \mathbf{F}_p$ ;

i.e.,  $\sqrt{\frac{\lambda\mu}{\nu}}, \sqrt{\dots} \in \mathbf{F}_p$ .

Pray for small height.

Lifting to  $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})/\mathbf{Q}$

$\mathbf{F}_{p^2} = \mathbf{F}_p(\sqrt{\Delta})$  for many  
**small** squarefree integers  $\Delta$ .

## Lifting to $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})/\mathbf{Q}$

$\mathbf{F}_{p^2} = \mathbf{F}_p(\sqrt{\Delta})$  for many **small** squarefree integers  $\Delta$ .

Take, say,  $\beta = \sqrt{\Delta}$ .

Take **small** norm-1 elements

$s_1, s_2, s_3 \in \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})$ .

As before define  $r, s \in \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})$ ;

$g \in \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})[z]$ ; and  $\lambda, \mu, \nu \in \mathbf{Q}$ .

## Lifting to $\mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})/\mathbf{Q}$

$\mathbf{F}_{p^2} = \mathbf{F}_p(\sqrt{\Delta})$  for many **small** squarefree integers  $\Delta$ .

Take, say,  $\beta = \sqrt{\Delta}$ .

Take **small** norm-1 elements  $s_1, s_2, s_3 \in \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})$ .

As before define  $r, s \in \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})$ ;  
 $g \in \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta})[z]$ ; and  $\lambda, \mu, \nu \in \mathbf{Q}$ .

$\lambda, \mu, \nu$  are small.

Maybe the square roots exist,  
giving small  $a^2, b^2, c^2, d^2 \in \mathbf{Q}$ .

Or maybe there's an obstruction.

For each small quadratic field:

We tried all small  $s_1, s_2, s_3$ .

For each small quadratic field:

We tried all small  $s_1, s_2, s_3$ .

For, e.g.,  $\Delta = -67$  found that

$$s_1 = (-17143 + 96\sqrt{\Delta})/17161,$$

$$s_2 = (189 + 32\sqrt{\Delta})/323,$$

$$s_3 = (333 - 40\sqrt{\Delta})/467$$

produced Scholten curve

$$y^2 = (x - 16/3)(x + 3/1072)$$

$$(x - 1/16)(x + 16/67)$$

$$(x + 1/20)(x - 20/67)$$

with Kummer surface

$$a^2 = 194769, b^2 = 126939,$$

$$c^2 = 64009, d^2 = 126939.$$

Found many more examples  
for various choices of  $\Delta$   
 $\Rightarrow$  thousands of different  
 $\#E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2})$  for  $p = 2^{127} - 1$ .

Found many more examples  
for various choices of  $\Delta$

$\Rightarrow$  thousands of different

$\#E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2})$  for  $p = 2^{127} - 1$ .

A good example for crypto:

$$y^2 = (z + 3)(z + 1/9)$$

$$(z - 1/7)(z - 7/3)$$

$$(z - 8/7)(z - 7/24).$$

$$\begin{aligned} \#J(\mathbf{F}_p) &= \#J'(\mathbf{F}_p) = \#E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) \\ &= 32\ell \text{ for a prime } \ell \approx 2^{249}. \end{aligned}$$

$$\#E'(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) = 12 \cdot \text{prime.}$$

$$a^2 = -46893, b^2 = 20020,$$

$$c^2 = 20020, d^2 = 5800.$$

Another good example:

$$y^2 = (z - 1)(z + 1/11)$$

$$(z - 1/4)(z + 4/11)$$

$$(z + 5/7)(z - 7/55).$$

Another good example:

$$y^2 = (z - 1)(z + 1/11)$$
$$(z - 1/4)(z + 4/11)$$
$$(z + 5/7)(z - 7/55).$$

Slightly lower security level:

$$\#J(\mathbf{F}_p) = \#J'(\mathbf{F}_p) = \#E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2})$$
$$= 720\ell \text{ for a prime } \ell \approx 2^{244.5}.$$

$$\#E'(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) = 260 \cdot \text{prime}.$$

Another good example:

$$\begin{aligned}y^2 &= (z - 1)(z + 1/11) \\ &\quad (z - 1/4)(z + 4/11) \\ &\quad (z + 5/7)(z - 7/55).\end{aligned}$$

Slightly lower security level:

$$\begin{aligned}\#J(\mathbf{F}_p) &= \#J'(\mathbf{F}_p) = \#E(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) \\ &= 720\ell \text{ for a prime } \ell \approx 2^{244.5}.\end{aligned}$$

$$\#E'(\mathbf{F}_{p^2}) = 260 \cdot \text{prime}.$$

Particularly nice arithmetic:

$$(a^2 : b^2 : c^2 : d^2) = (20 : 12 : 12 : 5);$$

$$(A^2 : \dots) = (49 : 15 : 15 : 1);$$

$$\left(\frac{1}{a^2} : \dots\right) = (3 : 5 : 5 : 12);$$

$$\left(\frac{1}{A^2} : \dots\right) = (15 : 49 : 49 : 735).$$