

# Crypto and the United States Constitution

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Let's look at crypto  
from the government perspective.

We're the government.

We have a long history  
of trying hard to understand  
what people are saying and  
what people are thinking.

( "We listen! We care!" )

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How should we respond?

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3. Demand translations of *some* communications.

e.g. UK RIP Act, Part III, lets police demand decryption keys.

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This talk: some examples of the barriers we're facing—constitutional court decisions inconsistent with our policies.

## Bill of Rights (excerpts)

First Amendment:

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

## Fourth Amendment:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

## Fifth Amendment:

“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

Bill of Rights is a limitation on federal government. Was (mostly) extended to states after Civil War.

Fourteenth Amendment: "... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ..."



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*Freedman v. Maryland*, 380 U.S.  
51 (1965): Prior restraint must  
have procedural protections:

- (1) *judge* deciding whether  
the content is protected speech;
- (2) burden of proof on censor;
- (3) adversarial proceedings;
- (4) brief time limits.

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protected speech (instructions).

No procedural safeguards.

⇒ Unconstitutional.

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Lesson #2: We should have  
eliminated approval procedure,  
simply banned everything.

## Warrants for searches

*Katz v. U.S.*, 389 U.S. 347

(1967) (internal quotes omitted):

Eavesdropping requires warrant.

Fourth Amendment “requires adherence to judicial processes . . . searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”

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The exceptions are narrow: occasionally useful for us but clearly not enough.

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*But see Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. \_\_\_\_ (2014): “These two cases raise a common question: whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. . . . Our answer [is] simple—get a warrant.”

## Privacy of association

*NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S. 449 (1958): “State scrutiny of membership lists” of NAACP violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

*Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board*, 382 U.S. 70 (1965): Compelled registration of members of any “Communist action organization” violates the Fifth Amendment.

## Anonymity

*Talley v. California*, 362 U.S.

60 (1960): Prohibition on distribution of anonymous leaflets violates the First Amendment.

“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.

Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”

## The way forward

We need to undermine these court decisions.

Strategy: Accuse communicators of being child pornographers, drug dealers, terrorists, etc.

Clearly any incomprehensible communication is something *bad*: obscenity; copyright violation; fraud; false advertising; libel; conspiracy; aiding the enemy; advocacy of unlawful conduct; plotting a revolution; etc.

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Someone that FBI+NSA spied on for activism, war opposition, association with Communists (picture credit: Wikipedia):

