

The impact of security proofs: two troublesome case studies

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with security proof.

2004: XCBv1 is published.

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2010: IEEE standardizes XCBv2.

2014 Wikipedia: “GCM mode is used in the IEEE 802.1AE (MACsec) Ethernet security, IEEE 802.11ad (also known as WiGig), ANSI (INCITS) Fibre Channel Security Protocols (FC-SP), IEEE P1619.1 tape storage, IETF IPsec standards, SSH and TLS 1.2. AES-GCM is included into the NSA Suite B Cryptography. . . .

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XCB also widely used? Maybe.

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New **efficient attack** on XCBv2
for other message lengths.

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