
### Failures of secret-key cryptography

### D. J. BernsteinUniversity of Illinois at Chicago &Technische Universiteit Eindhoven



http://xkcd.com/538/

2011 Grigg—Gutmann: In the past 15 years "no one ever lost money to an attack on a properly designed cryptosystem (meaning one that didn't use homebrew crypto or toy keys) in the Internet or commercial worlds".

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2002 Shamir: "Cryptography is usually bypassed. I am not aware of any major world-class security system employing cryptography in which the hackers penetrated the system by actually going through the cryptanalysis."

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Or are they simply wrong: real-world crypto is breakable; is in fact being broken; is one of many ongoing disaster areas in security?

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Let's look at some examples.

#### Windows code signatures

Flame broke into computers, spied on audio, keystrokes, etc.

#### 2012.06.03 Microsoft:

"We recently became aware of a complex piece of targeted malware known as 'Flame' and immediately began examining the issue. . . . We have discovered through our analysis that some components of the malware have been signed by certificates that allow software to appear as if it was produced by Microsoft."

2012.06.07 Stevens: "A chosen-prefix collision attack against MD5 has been used for Flame. More interestingly . . . not our published chosen-prefix collision attack was used, but an entirely new and unknown variant."

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CrySyS: Flame file wavesup3.drv appeared in logs in 2007; Flame "may have been active for as long as five to eight years".

Was MD5 "homebrew crypto"? No. Standardized, widely used. Worthwhile to attack? Yes.

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003\_Mission\_Accomplished\_speech

#### WEP

WEP introduced in 1997 in 802.11 wireless standard.

#### 2001 Borisov–Goldberg–Wagner:

24-bit "nonce" frequently repeats, leaking plaintext xor and allowing very easy forgeries.

### 2001 Arbaugh–Shankar–Wan: this also breaks user auth.

#### 2001 Fluhrer-Mantin-Shamir:

WEP builds RC4 key (k, n)from secret k, "nonce" n; RC4 outputs leak bytes of k. Implementations, optimizations of k-recovery attack: 2001 Stubblefield–loannidis–Rubin, 2004 KoreK, 2004 Devine, 2005 d'Otreppe, 2006 Klein, 2007 Tews–Weinmann–Pyshkin, 2010 Sepehrdad–Vaudenay–Vuagnoux, 2013 S–Sušil–V–V, . . . .

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Fact: WEP blamed for 2007 theft of 45 million credit-card numbers from T. J. Maxx. Subsequent lawsuit settled for \$40900000.

#### <u>Keeloq</u>

Wikipedia: "KeeLoq is or was used in many remote keyless entry systems by such companies as Chrysler, Daewoo, Fiat, GM, Honda, Toyota, Volvo, Volkswagen Group, Clifford, Shurlok, Jaguar, etc."

2007 Indesteege–Keller–Biham–Dunkelman–Preneel "How to steal cars": recover 64-bit KeeLoq key using 2<sup>16</sup> known plaintexts, only 2<sup>44.5</sup> encryptions.

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- 1. Setup phase of this attack watches power consumption of Keeloq device. Is this "bypassing" the cryptography?
- 2. If all the "X is weak" press comes from academics, is it safe to conclude that real attackers aren't breaking X? How often do real attackers issue press releases?

#### VMWare View

VMWare View is a remote desktop protocol supported by many low-cost terminals.

Recommendation from VMWare, Dell, etc.: switch from "AES-128" to "SALSA20-256" for the "best user experience". Apparently AES slows down network graphics.

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Closer look at documentation: "AES-128" and "SALSA20-256" are actually "AES-128-GCM" and "Salsa20-256-Round12".

AES-128-GCM includes AES and message authentication.

No indication that VMWare's "Salsa20-256-Round12" includes any message authentication.
Can attacker forge packets?
One can easily combine Salsa20 with message authentication, but does VMWare do this?

Salsa20 has speed and security advantages over AES, but both Salsa20 and AES are unauthenticated ciphers.

User needs authenticated cipher.

#### SSL/TLS/HTTPS

Standard AES-CBC encryption of a packet  $(p_0, p_1, p_2)$ : send random v,  $c_0 = \text{AES}_k(p_0 \oplus v)$ ,  $c_1 = \text{AES}_k(p_1 \oplus c_0)$ ,  $c_2 = \text{AES}_k(p_2 \oplus c_1)$ .

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AES-CBC encryption in SSL: retrieve last block  $c_{-1}$ from previous ciphertext; send  $c_0 = \text{AES}_k(p_0 \oplus c_{-1}),$   $c_1 = \text{AES}_k(p_1 \oplus c_0),$  $c_2 = \text{AES}_k(p_2 \oplus c_1).$  SSL lets attacker choose  $p_0$  as function of  $c_{-1}$ ! Very bad.

#### 2002 Möller:

To check a guess g for (e.g.)  $p_{-3}$ , choose  $p_0 = c_{-1} \oplus g \oplus c_{-4}$ , compare  $c_0$  to  $c_{-3}$ .

#### 2006 Bard:

malicious code in browser should be able to carry out this attack, especially if high-entropy data is split across blocks.

2011 Duong–Rizzo "BEAST": fast attack fully implemented, including controlled variable split.

Countermeasure in browsers: send a content-free packet just before sending real packet.

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#### 2001 Krawczyk:

This is provably secure.

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#### 2013.02 AlFardan-Paterson

"Lucky 13": watch timing more closely; attack still works.

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The software does support one non-CBC option: RC4. Now widely recommended, used for 50% of SSL traffic.

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2013 AlFardan-Bernstein-Paterson-Poettering-Schuldt, "On the security of RC4 in TLS": Force target cookie into many RC4 sessions. Use RC4 biases to find cookie from ciphertexts.

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(This is specific to 128-bit keys.)

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
But wait: there's more!

2013 AlFardan-Bernstein-Paterson-Poettering-Schuldt: accurately computed  $\Pr[z_i = j]$  for all  $i \in \{1, \ldots, 256\}$ , all j; found  $\approx 65536$  single-byte biases; used all of them in SSL attack via proper Bayesian analysis.


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 $\approx$ 256 of these biases were found independently (slightly earlier) by 2013 Watanabe–Isobe–Ohigashi–Morii, 2013 Isobe–Ohigashi–Watanabe–Morii:  $z_{32} \rightarrow 224, z_{48} \rightarrow 208, \text{ etc.};$   $z_{3} \rightarrow 131; z_{i} \rightarrow i; z_{256} \not\rightarrow 0.$ 


# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_1 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_2 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_3 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_4 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_5 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_6 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_7 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_8 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_9 = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{10} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{11} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{12} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{13} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{14} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{15} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{16} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{17} = x]$ :




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
# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{19} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{20} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{21} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{22} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{23} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{24} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{25} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{26} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{27} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{28} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{29} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{30} = x]$ :




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
# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{32} = x]$ :




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
# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{34} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{35} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{36} = x]$ :




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
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
# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{39} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{40} = x]$ :




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
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
# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{43} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{44} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{45} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{46} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{47} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{48} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{49} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{50} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{51} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{52} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{53} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{54} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{55} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{56} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{57} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{58} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{59} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{60} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{61} = x]$ :




## Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{62} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{63} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{64} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{65} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{66} = x]$ :




## Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{67} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{68} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{69} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{70} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{71} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{72} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{73} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{74} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{75} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{76} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{77} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{78} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{79} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{80} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{81} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{82} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{83} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{84} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{85} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{86} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{87} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{88} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{89} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{90} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{91} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{92} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{93} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{94} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{95} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{96} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{97} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{98} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{99} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{100} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{101} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{102} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{103} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{104} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{105} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{106} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{107} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{108} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{109} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{110} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{111} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{112} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{113} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{114} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{115} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{116} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{117} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{118} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{119} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{120} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{121} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{122} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{123} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{124} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{125} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{126} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{127} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{128} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{129} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{130} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{131} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{132} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{133} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{134} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{135} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{136} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{137} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{138} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{139} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{140} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{141} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{142} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{143} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{144} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{145} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{146} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{147} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{148} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{149} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{150} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{151} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{152} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{153} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{154} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{155} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{156} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{157} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{158} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{159} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{160} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{161} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{162} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{163} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{164} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{165} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{166} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{167} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{168} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{169} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{170} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{171} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{172} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{173} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{174} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{175} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{176} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{177} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{178} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{179} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{180} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{181} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{182} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{183} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{184} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{185} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{186} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{187} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{188} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{189} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{190} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{191} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{192} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{193} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{194} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{195} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{196} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{197} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{198} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{199} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{200} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{201} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{202} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{203} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{204} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{205} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{206} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{207} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{208} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{209} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{210} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{211} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{212} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{213} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{214} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{215} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{216} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{217} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{218} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{219} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{220} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{221} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{222} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{223} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{224} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{225} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{226} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{227} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{228} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{229} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{230} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{231} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{232} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{233} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{234} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{235} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{236} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{237} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{238} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{239} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{240} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{241} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{242} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{243} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{244} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{245} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{246} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{247} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{248} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{249} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{250} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{251} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{252} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{253} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{254} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{255} = x]$ :




# Graph of 256 $Pr[z_{256} = x]$ :




2013 AlFardan–Bernstein–
Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt
success probability (256 trials)
for recovering byte x of plaintext
from  $2^{24}$  ciphertexts (with
no prior plaintext knowledge):




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
2013 AlFardan–Bernstein– Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt success probability (256 trials) for recovering byte x of plaintext from  $2^{26}$  ciphertexts (with no prior plaintext knowledge):




2013 AlFardan–Bernstein– Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt success probability (256 trials) for recovering byte x of plaintext from  $2^{27}$  ciphertexts (with no prior plaintext knowledge):




2013 AlFardan–Bernstein–
Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt success probability (256 trials) for recovering byte  $\boldsymbol{x}$  of plaintext from  $2^{28}$  ciphertexts (with no prior plaintext knowledge):




2013 AlFardan–Bernstein–
Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt
success probability (256 trials)
for recovering byte x of plaintext
from  $2^{29}$  ciphertexts (with
no prior plaintext knowledge):




2013 AlFardan–Bernstein– Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt success probability (256 trials) for recovering byte x of plaintext from  $2^{30}$  ciphertexts (with no prior plaintext knowledge):



2013 AlFardan–Bernstein–
Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt
success probability (256 trials)
for recovering byte x of plaintext
from  $2^{31}$  ciphertexts (with
no prior plaintext knowledge):



2013 AlFardan–Bernstein–
Paterson–Poettering–Schuldt
success probability (256 trials)
for recovering byte x of plaintext
from  $2^{32}$  ciphertexts (with
no prior plaintext knowledge):



#### Why does this happen?

For years we've had AES; AES-GCM; defenses against various side-channel attacks.

We simply have to educate the software and hardware engineers choosing crypto primitives, right?

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what the users need?

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Does AES-GCM actually do what the users need?

Often it doesn't.

Most obvious issue: performance.

e.g. 2001 Rivest: "The 'heart' of RC4 is its exceptionally simple and extremely efficient pseudorandom generator. ... RC4 is likely to remain the algorithm of choice for many applications and embedded systems."

e.g. OpenSSL still uses table-based implementations of AES for speed on most CPUs, leaking many key bits; see, e.g., 2012 Weiß-Heinz-Stumpf.

e.g. RFIDs need small ciphers.

Major research direction: achieve better performance than AES-GCM without sacrificing security.

Fit into low power (watts), low area (square micrometers), sometimes low latency (seconds); minimize area×seconds/byte; minimize energy (joules)/byte.

Many different CPUs, FPGAs, ASIC manufacturing technologies.

Many different input sizes, precomputation possibilities, etc.

Can one design do very well in hardware and software?

Some inspirational examples: Trivium and Keccak are "hardware" designs but not bad in software.

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Another approach:
replace ARX with "ORX".
Skein-type mix doesn't work
but can imitate Salsa20:
compose a^=((b|c)<<<r).
Needs a few more rounds,
but friendlier to hardware.

Another major research direction: achieve better security than AES-GCM without sacrificing performance.

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Typical 128-bit pipe is starting to feel too small. Limit reforgeries? Use wider pipe?

Has anyone tried optimizing 192-bit/256-bit poly hashes?

User has to expect that encrypting (n, m) and (n, m') will tell attacker whether m = m'.

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But user is surprised if repeated message number leaks more information, allows forgeries, etc.

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2006 Rogaway-Shrimpton: first authenticate (n, m), then use the authenticator as a nonce to encrypt m.

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Is this protection compatible with fast forgery rejection?

Many ciphers integrate "free" message authentication: e.g., AES-OCB, Helix, Phelix.

Is this compatible with repeated message numbers?

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Is this compatible with repeated message numbers?

Is this compatible with fast forgery rejection?

One approach: build HFFH Feistel block cipher; reuse first H for fast auth with repeated message numbers; reuse last H for another auth with fast forgery rejection. But this consumes bandwidth. Many more directions in authenticated ciphers.

AES-GCM is clearly not the end of the story.

Can build better modes using same MAC, cipher.

Can build better MACs, combine with same cipher.

Can build better block ciphers, stream ciphers.

Can build better integrated authenticated ciphers.

#### CAESAR

"Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security,
Applicability, and Robustness"

competitions.cr.yp.to

Mailing list: cryptocompetitions+subscribe Ogooglegroups.com

NIST is much too busy to run another competition but has generously provided a \$333099 "Cryptographic competitions" grant to UIC.

#### Competition scheduling

AES schedule:

M0: 15 submissions.

M14: 5 finalists.

M28: 1 winner.

#### eSTREAM schedule:

M0: 34 submissions.

M11: 27 round-2 ciphers.

M24: 16 finalists.

M36: 8 portfolio ciphers.

M41: 7 portfolio ciphers.

SHA-3 schedule:

M0: 64 submissions.

M9: 14 round-2 functions.

M26: 5 finalists.

M48: 1 winner.

#### Tentative CAESAR schedule:

#### M0, 2014.01.15: submissions.

M11: round-2 candidates.

M23: round-3 candidates.

M35: finalists.

M47: portfolio.

#### **Workshops**

2012.07.05–06, Stockholm: ECRYPT workshop on Directions in Authenticated Ciphers.

DIAC 2013 in Chicago, maybe 2013.08.12–13, maybe 2013.08.26–27. 2013.08.14–16 is SAC; 2013.08.18–22 is Crypto; 2013.08.20–23 is CHES.

DIAC 2014: maybe San Diego? DIAC 2015, 2016, 2017: TBA.