Edwards coordinates for elliptic curves, part 2

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(Joint work with Tanja Lange)



Elliptic-curve signatures

Standardize a prime $p = 2^{255} - 19$. Not too small; want hard ECDL! Close to 2^{...} for fast arithmetic.

Standardize a "safe" elliptic curve *E* over \mathbf{F}_p : $x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2 y^2$ where d = 1 - 1/121666. $\#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = 8q$ where q is prime. $2(p+1) - \#E(\mathbf{F}_p) = 4 \cdot \text{prime.}$ (2005 Bernstein "Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records" as $y^2 = x^3 + 486662x^2 + x$) Standardize $B \in E(\mathbf{F}_p)$, order q. Standardize a "hash function" H.

Signer has 32-byte secret key $n \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^{256} - 1\}.$

Everyone knows signer's 32-byte public key: compressed *nB*.

To sign a message m: generate a secret s; compute R = sB; compute $t = H(R, m)s + n \mod q$; transmit (m, compressed R, t). To verify (m, compressed R, t): verify tB = H(R, m)R + nB. (first similar idea: 1985 ElGamal; many generalizations, variations; these choices: 2006 van Duin)

Bottleneck: Several types of elliptic-curve scalar multiplication.

Generating key: given 256-bit integer n, fixed $B \in E(\mathbf{F}_p)$, compute nB. Generating signature: Same. Verifying signature: given 256-bit t, 256-bit h, fixed B, variable R, compute tB - hR.

Similar bottleneck for ECDH: given 256-bit *n*, variable *R*, compute *nR*. **Optimizing scalar multiplication**

Crypto 1985, Miller, "Use of elliptic curves in cryptography":

Using division-polynomial recursions can compute *nP* given *P* "in 26 log₂ *n* multiplications"; but can do better!

"It appears to be best to represent the points on the curve in the following form: Each point is represented by the triple (x, y, z) which corresponds to the point $(x/z^2, y/z^3)$." 1986 Chudnovsky/Chudnovsky, "Sequences of numbers generated by addition in formal groups and new primality and factorization tests":

"The crucial problem becomes the choice of the model of an algebraic group variety, where computations mod *p* are the least time consuming." For "traditional" $(X/Z^2, Y/Z^3)$: Chudnovsky/Chudnovsky state explicit formulas using 8**M** for DBL if $a_4 = -3$; 16**M** for ADD.

"We suggest to write addition formulas involving (X, Y, Z, Z^2, Z^3) ." 9**M** DBL if $a_4 = -3$; 14**M** ADD. Also operation counts for projective coordinates (X : Y : Z)representing (X/Z, Y/Z); Hessian curves; Jacobi quartics;

Jacobi intersections.

Asiacrypt 1998, Cohen/Miyaji/Ono, "Efficient elliptic curve exponentiation using mixed coordinates":

1. Faster X, Y, Z, Z^2, Z^3 formulas than Chudnovsky/Chudnovsky! Compute Z^2, Z^3 only for points that will be added.

A new coordinate system;
speedups in some cases.

3. A new inversion strategy.

4. The first serious analysis of parameter choices.

"Sliding windows" (1939 Brauer, improved by 1973 Thurber): popular method to compute *nP* from *P* using very few additions, subtractions, doublings.

Precompute 2*P*, 3*P*, 5*P*, 7*P*.

If n is even, recursively compute (n/2)P and then double.

If *n* is odd, recursively compute $(n \pm 1)P$ or $(n \pm 3)P$ or $(n \pm 5)P$ or $(n \pm 7)P$, whichever involves the largest power of 2, and then add $\mp P$ or $\mp 3P$ or $\mp 5P$ or $\mp 7P$.

Why not 2*P*, 3*P*, 5*P*, . . . , 15*P*? Or 2*P*, 3*P*, 5*P*, . . . , 31*P*?

For 2*P*, 3*P*, 5*P*, ..., $(2^w - 1)P$: $\approx 2^{w-1}$ adds in precomputation; on average $\approx 256/(w + 2)$ adds in main computation.

Cohen/Miyaji/Ono introduce an option to speed up the adds: compute 2*P*, convert to affine, compute 3*P*, 4*P*, convert, compute 5*P*, 7*P*, 8*P*, convert, etc.

Cohen/Miyaji/Ono analyze #adds carefully; account for different types of additions; analyze several different coordinate systems; and identify optimal choices of w, depending on I/M, for 160 bits, 192 bits, 224 bits. Example of results for 160 bits, assuming $\mathbf{S}/\mathbf{M} = 0.8$: Cohen/Miyaji/Ono recommend one method using "1610.2M" and one using "4I + 1488.4M." Subsequent improvements:

 Faster addition/doubling formulas for old coordinates.
Many sources; for survey see Explicit-Formulas Database.

Fast new coordinates:
e.g. Edwards curves,
extended Jacobi quartics,
inverted Edwards coordinates.

 "Fractional windows" and other addition-chain tweaks:
e.g. 2P, 3P, 5P, 7P, 9P, 11P, 13P.

4. More inversion strategies.

Asiacrypt 2007, Bernstein/Lange, "Faster addition and doubling on elliptic curves": fast Edwards computations;

comparison to other coordinates for scalar multiplication.

Comparison unjustifiably assumed 2*P*, 3*P*, 5*P*, . . . , 15*P*; ignored possibility of inversions.

New, 2007 Bernstein/Lange, "Analysis and optimization of elliptic-curve single-scalar multiplication": Much more comprehensive comparison. "This paper is dedicated to Henri Cohen on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday."

Example of new results

for 160-bit scalars:

 $1\mathbf{I} + 1495.8\mathbf{M}$

for Jacobian coordinates;

 $1\mathbf{I}+1434.1\mathbf{M}$

for Jacobian with $a_4 = -3$;

1287.8**M**

for inverted Edwards.

Could also use "Montgomery coordinates." No fast additions, but fast differential additions $P - Q, P, Q \mapsto P + Q.$

(1986 Chudnovsky/Chudnovsky; independently 1987 Montgomery with faster formulas)

 $P \mapsto nP$ using 8.2**M** per bit. Conventional wisdom: Faster than Jacobian; therefore the fastest method. Our prediction: Edwards will be faster than Montgomery for cryptographic applications.

Larger advantage with larger scalars.

Much larger advantage with more scalars: mP + nQ.

Need to account carefully for differences between simple multiplication counts and real software speeds. In progress: implementation.

Double-base chains

Are triplings useful for scalar multiplication?

Can write nP as sum of very few points $c_i 2^{a_i} 3^{b_i} P$ with $c_i = \pm 1$. But need many doublings, triplings to compute those points.

Asiacrypt 2005, Dimitrov/Imbert/Mishra: Require $a_0 \ge a_1 \ge \cdots$ and $b_0 \ge b_1 \ge \cdots$. Only a_0 doublings, b_0 triplings. But need more points.

Indocrypt 2006, Doche/Imbert: Use precomputation to expand range of c_i 's. Fewer points. Indocrypt 2007, Bernstein/Birkner/Lange/Peters: Analysis of double-base single-scalar multiplication with various doubling/tripling ratios, various coordinate systems, various addition formulas (including new tripling formulas for Edwards curves), etc.

Basic conclusions: Triplings help Jacobian coordinates,

Hessian curves, and triplingoriented Doche/Icart/Kohel.

But the best resulting speeds are still slower than pure-doubling Edwards.

Analysis assumes 0 inversions. In progress: expand analysis for more inversion strategies. "Grand unified optimization." And then more scalars...

Many-scalar multiplication

Batch verification of many $t_i B - h_i R_i = S_i$: check $\sum_i v_i t_i B - \sum_i v_i h_i R_i - \sum_i v_i S_i$ = 0 for random 128-bit v_i . (Naccache et al., Eurocrypt 1994; Bellare et al., Eurocrypt 1998)

Also encounter many scalars in computing nB as $n_0B + n_12^{16}B + \cdots$ using precomputed $2^{16}B$ etc.

Use subtractive multi-scalar multiplication algorithm: if $n_1 > n_2 > \cdots$ then $n_1P_1 + n_2P_2 + n_3P_3 + \cdots =$ $(n_1 - qn_2)P_1 + n_2(qP_1 + P_2) +$ $n_3P_3 + \cdots$ where $q = |n_1/n_2|$. (credited to Bos and Coster by de Rooij, Eurocrypt 1994; see also tweaks by Wei Dai, 2007) Addition speed is critical. Inverted Edwards coordinates: $9\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S}$, speed record.

Elliptic-curve factorization

Bernstein/Birkner/Lange/Peters, in progress: Edwards ECM.

First-stage ECM analysis: similar to ECC analysis. Can use larger scalars, increasing the advantage of Edwards over Montgomery. Second stage: more complicated. Also some improvements

in curve selection.

Elliptic-curve primality proving

Is *n* prime? Maybe.

Want computation of kP in $E(\mathbf{Z}/n)$ to prove that kP = 0 in $E(\mathbf{Z}/p)$ for every prime divisor p of n; use this to prove that n is prime.

Proper definition of $E(\mathbf{Z}/n)$ achieves this, but also requires many invertibility tests, each costing at least 1**M** and extra implementation effort. For simplicity and speed, current ECPP software omits various tests.

Bernstein question to Morain: "Do the resulting computations actually prove primality?" For simplicity and speed, current ECPP software omits various tests.

Bernstein question to Morain: "Do the resulting computations actually prove primality?"

Morain answer to Bernstein: "Feel free to look for a non-prime counterexample."

Disclaimer: There is no evidence that this conversation took place.

Often ECPP uses curves that can be transformed to Montgomery, Edwards, etc. (Chance \rightarrow 1 as $n \rightarrow \infty$?)

With detailed case analysis can eliminate tests for zero from a Montgomery-style ECPP. (2006 Bernstein)

Bernstein/Lange, with Jonas Lindstrøm Jensen, in progress: Aiming for simpler, faster ECPP using Edwards.