Stream Cipher HC-256 ⋆

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Abstract. HC-256 is a software-efficient stream cipher. It generates keystream from a 256-bit secret key and a 256-bit initialization vector. The encryption speed of the C implementation of HC-256 is about 1.9 bits per clock cycle (4.2 cycles/byte) on the Intel Pentium 4 processor.

1 Introduction

Stream cipher HC-256 is presented in this paper. HC-256 is a simple, secure, software-efficient cipher and it is freely-available.

HC-256 consists of two secret tables, each one with 1024 32-bit elements. At each step we update one element of a table with non-linear feedback function. Every 2048 steps all the elements of the two tables are updated. At each step, HC-256 generates one 32-bit output using the 32-bit-to-32-bit mapping similar to that being used in Blowfish [24]. Then the linear masking is applied before the output is generated.

HC-256 is suitable for the modern (and future) superscalar microprocessors. The dependency between operations in HC-256 is greatly reduced: three consecutive steps can be computed in parallel; at each step, the feedback and output functions can be computed in parallel; and in the output function, three additions are used to combine the four table lookup outputs instead of the addition-xor-addition being used in Blowfish (similar idea has been suggested by Schneier and Whiting to use three xors to combine those four terms [25]). The high degree of parallelism allows HC-256 to run efficiently on the modern processor. We implemented HC-256 in C and tested its performance on the Pentium 4 processor. The encryption speed of HC-256 reaches 1.93 bit/cycle.

HC-256 is very secure. Our analysis shows that recovering the key of HC-256 is as difficult as exhaustive key search. To distinguish the keystream from random, we expect that more than 2^{128} keystream bits are required (our current analysis shows that about 2^{256} outputs are needed in the distinguishing attack).

This paper is organized as follows. We introduce HC-256 and the design rationale in Section 2. The security analysis of HC-256 is given in Section 3 and Section 4. Section 5 discusses the implementation and performance of HC-256. Section 6 concludes this paper.

⋆ The specification of HC-256 given in this paper is identical to that given in the Fast Software Encryption 2004 proceedings [30].

2 Cipher Specification and Design Rationale

In this section, we describe the stream cipher HC-256. From a 256-bit key and a 256-bit initialization vector, it generates keystream with length up to 2^{128} bits.

2.1 Operations, variables and functions

The following operations are used in HC-256:

$+$: $x + y$ means $x + y \bmod 2^{32}$, where $0 \le x < 2^{32}$ and $0 \le y < 2^{32}$
$\boxminus$: $x \boxminus y$ means $x - y \bmod 1024$
$\oplus$: bit-wise exclusive OR
$||$: concatenation
$\gg$: right shift operator. $x \gg n$ means x being right shifted n bits.
$\ll$: left shift operator. $x \ll n$ means x being left shifted n bits.
$\ggg$: right rotation operator. $x \ggg n$ means $((x \gg n) \oplus (x \ll (32-n))$ where $0 \le n < 32$, $0 \le x < 2^{32}$.

Two tables P and Q are used in HC-256. The key and the initialization vector of HC-256 are denoted as K and IV. We denote the keystream being generated as s.

P : a table with 1024 32-bit elements. Each element is denoted as $P[i]$ with $0 \le i \le 1023$.
Q : a table with 1024 32-bit elements. Each element is denoted as $Q[i]$ with $0 \le i \le 1023$.
K : the 256-bit key of HC-256.
IV : the 256-bit initialization vector of HC-256.
s : the keystream being generated from HC-256. The 32-bit output of the ith step is denoted as s_i. Then $s = s_0||s_1||s_2|| \cdots$

There are six functions being used in HC-256. $f_1(x)$ and $f_2(x)$ are the same as the $\sigma_0^{\{256\}}(x)$ and $\sigma_1^{\{256\}}(x)$ being used in the message schedule of SHA-256 [21]. For $g_1(x)$ and $h_1(x)$, the table Q is used as S-box. For $g_2(x)$ and $h_2(x)$, the table P is used as S-box.

$$\begin{aligned}
f_1(x) &= (x \ggg 7) \oplus (x \ggg 18) \oplus (x \gg 3) \\
f_2(x) &= (x \ggg 17) \oplus (x \ggg 19) \oplus (x \gg 10) \\
g_1(x, y) &= ((x \ggg 10) \oplus (y \ggg 23)) + Q[(x \oplus y) \bmod 1024] \\
g_2(x, y) &= ((x \ggg 10) \oplus (y \ggg 23)) + P[(x \oplus y) \bmod 1024] \\
h_1(x) &= Q[x_0] + Q[256 + x_1] + Q[512 + x_2] + Q[768 + x_3] \\
h_2(x) &= P[x_0] + P[256 + x_1] + P[512 + x_2] + P[768 + x_3]
\end{aligned}$$

where $x = x_3||x_2||x_1||x_0$, x is a 32-bit word, x_0, x_1, x_2 and x_3 are four bytes. x_3 and x_0 denote the most significant byte and the least significant byte of x, respectively.

2.2 Initialization process (key and IV setup)

The initialization process of HC-256 consists of expanding the key and initialization vector into P and Q (similar to the message setup in SHA-256) and running the cipher 4096 steps without generating output.

1. Let $K = K_0||K_1||\cdots||K_7$ and $IV = IV_0||IV_1||\cdots||IV_7$, where each K_i and IV_i denotes a 32-bit number. The key and IV are expanded into an array W_i $(0 \le i \le 2559)$ as:
$$W_i = \begin{cases} K_i & 0 \le i \le 7 \\ IV_{i-8} & 8 \le i \le 15 \\ f_2(W_{i-2}) + W_{i-7} + f_1(W_{i-15}) + W_{i-16} + i & 16 \le i \le 2559 \end{cases}$$
2. Update the tables P and Q with the array W.
$$P[i] = W_{i+512} \qquad \text{for } 0 \le i \le 1023$$
$$Q[i] = W_{i+1536} \qquad \text{for } 0 \le i \le 1023$$
3. Run the cipher (the keystream generation algorithm in Subsection 2.3) 4096 steps without generating output.

The initialization process completes and the cipher is ready to generate keystream.

2.3 The keystream generation algorithm

At each step, one element of a table is updated and one 32-bit output is generated. An S-box is used to generate only 1024 outputs, then it is updated in the next 1024 steps. The keystream generation process of HC-256 is given below ("$\boxminus$" denotes "$-$" modulo 1024, s_i denotes the output of the i-th step).

```
i = 0;
repeat until enough keystream bits are generated.
{
    j = i mod 1024;
    if (i mod 2048) < 1024
    {
        P[j] = P[j] + P[j ⊟ 10] + g1( P[j ⊟ 3], P[j ⊟ 1023] );
        s_i = h1( P[j ⊟ 12] ) ⊕ P[j];
    }
    else
    {
        Q[j] = Q[j] + Q[j ⊟ 10] + g2( Q[j ⊟ 3], Q[j ⊟ 1023] );
        s_i = h2( Q[j ⊟ 12] ) ⊕ Q[j];
    }
    end-if
    i = i + 1;
}
end-repeat
```

2.4 Design rationale

We applied the following rules in the design of HC-256.

Rule 1. Design a stream cipher with large security margin so as to minimize the damage that may be caused by the flaws undetected during the evaluation process.

Rule 2. To maximize the security and efficiency of a stream cipher, we update each secret variable in the stream cipher frequently and try to avoid the use of static sub-key; and we update each secret variable frequently by using all the secret variables in the cipher. The benefit of this approach is that the varying secret variables are much more difficult to analyze; and the resistance against the divide-and-conquer attack could be greatly improved.

Rule 3. Use the highly non-linear feedback function. It reduces the chance of developing attacks based on algebraic structure.

Rule 4. Use the key-dependent large random and varying S-box in the stream cipher. Such approach may be the most effective way to resist the most sophisticated attacks. (Here "effective" means that the effort and knowledge required in the cipher design and evaluation are relatively small.)

Rule 5. To design a software efficient stream cipher, the dependency between the consecutive operations should be as small as possible.

HC-256 is the outcome of our repeated attacks and improvements. The security analysis given in Section 3 and Section 4 would explain many details of HC-256.

3 Security Analysis of HC-256

We make the following statements on the security of HC-256.

Statement 1. There is no hidden flaw in HC-256.
Statement 2. The smallest period is expected to be much larger than 2^{256}.
Statement 3. Recovering the secret key is as difficult as exhaustive key search.
Statement 4. Distinguishing attack requires more than 2^{128} keystream bits.
Statement 5. There is no weak key in HC-256.

We start with a brief review of the attakcs on stream ciphers. Many stream ciphers are based on the linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). A number of correlation attacks, such as [26, 27, 19, 14, 20, 6, 17], have been developed to analyze them. Later, Golić [15] devised the linear cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. That technique could be applied to a wide range of stream ciphers. Recently Coppersmith, Halevi and Jutla [8] developed the distinguishing attacks (the linear attack and low diffusion attack) on stream ciphers with linear masking. And there are algebraic attacks that can be used to break stream ciphers with low algebraic degrees. Recently the improved algebraic attacks (with new techniques to reduce the algebraic degrees) can be applied to break several LFSR-based stream ciphers [1, 9–11].

Because the output and feedback functions of HC-256 are highly non-linear, it is impossible to apply the correlation attacks and algebraic attacks to recover the secret key of HC-256. The output function of HC-256 uses the 32-bit-to-32-bit mapping similar to that being used in Blowfish. The past-ten year anlaysis on Blowfish shows that the round function of Blowfish is very strong. Especially there is no attack based on linear cryptanalysis [18] has been developed against the large secret S-box of Blowfish. The large secret S-box of HC-256 is updated during the keystream generation process, so it is almost impossible to develop linear relations linking the input and output bits of the S-box. Vaudenay has found some differential weakness of the randomly generated large S-box [28]. But it is very difficult to launch differential cryptanalysis [3] against HC-256 since it is a synchronous stream cipher for which the keystream generation is independent of the message.

In this section, we will analyze the period of HC-256, the security of the secret key and the security of the initialization process. The randomness of the keystream will be analyzed separately in Section 4.

3.1 Period

The 65547-bit state of HC-256 ensures that the period of the keystream is extremely large. But the exact period of HC-256 is difficult to predict. The average period of the keystream is estimated to be about 2^{65546} (if we assume that the invertible next-state function of HC-256 is random). The large number of states also eliminates the threat of the time-memory-data tradeoff attack on stream ciphers [4] (also [2, 16]).

3.2 Security of the secret key

We note that the output function and the feedback function of HC-256 are highly non-linear. The non-linear output function leaks very small amount of partial information at each step. The non-linear feedback function ensures that the secret key could not be recovered from those leaked partial information.

In this subsection, we will first illustrate that even for the HC-256 with no linear masking, it is impossible to recover the secret key faster than exhaustive key search. Then we show that recovering the secret key of HC-256 is more difficult.

HC-256 with no linear masking. For HC-256 with no linear masking, the output at the ith step is generated as $s_i = h_1(\,P[i \boxminus 12]\,)$ or $s_i = h_2(\,Q[i \boxminus 12]\,)$. If two outputs generated from the same S-box are equal, then those two inputs to the S-box are equal with large probability. According to the analysis of the randomness of $h_1(x)$ and $h_2(x)$ given in Subsection 4.1, we know that for $2048 \times \alpha \le i < j < 2048\times\alpha+1024$, the probability that $s_i = s_j$ is about 2^{-31}. If $s_i = s_j$, then at the j-th step, $P[i \boxminus 12] = P[j \boxminus 12]$ with probability about 0.5. It means that 15-bit information of the table P is leaked. We note that each S-box is used in only 1024 steps. For these 1024 outputs, there are about $\binom{1024}{2} \times 2^{-31} \approx 2^{-12}$ collisions. To recover P, we need $\frac{1024\times 32}{2^{-12}\times 15} \times 1024 \approx 2^{33.1}$ outputs. We also note that P and Q interact in a very complicated way (each table is used as S-box to update another table), so they must be recovered together. Thus $2^{34.1}$ outputs are needed in the attack to recover P and Q if we exploit the information being leaked in this way. Note that the feedback function of HC-256 is highly non-linear and it can not be simply approximated as LFSR, we conclude that recovering P and Q from those $2^{34.1}$ outputs would be more difficult than exhaustive search.

HC-256. The analysis above shows that the secret key of HC-256 with no linear masking is secure. With the linear masking, the information leakage is greatly reduced. For $2048 \times \alpha \le i < j < 2048 \times \alpha + 1024$, if two outputs s_i and s_j are equal, we know that $h_1(P[i \boxminus 12]) \oplus P[i] = h_1(P[j \boxminus 12]) \oplus P[j]$. Since $h_1(P[i \boxminus 12]) = h_1(P[j \boxminus 12)$ with probability about 2^{-31}, the probability that $P[i] = P[j]$ is about 2^{-31}. It means that each collision leaks about $2^{-26.1}$-bit information, which is 2^{30} times less than that leaked from the collison of the outputs of HC-256 with no linear masking. The information leakage is significantly reduced and it is obvious that the linear masking improves the security tremendously. Note that the analysis above shows already that the key of HC-256 with no linear masking is secure, so we conclude that the secret key of HC-256 cannot be recovered faster than exhaustive key search.

3.3 Security of the initialization process (key/IV setup)

The initialization process of the HC-256 consists of two stages, as given in Subsection 2.2. We expand the key and IV into P and Q. At this stage, every bit of the key/IV affects all the bits of the two tables and any difference in the related keys/IVs results in uncontrollable differences in P and Q. Note that the constants in the expansion function at this stage play significant role in reducing the effect of related keys/IVs (If there is no constants in the expansion function, then set key K_B and IV_B as 16 consecutive elements in the array W_A generated from K_A and IV_B, the resulting W_B and W_A would be highly correlated). After the expansion, we run the cipher 4096 steps without generating output so that the P and Q become more random. After the initialization process, we expect that any difference in the keys/IVs would not result in biased keystream.

4 Randomness of the keystream

We start with the description of a general (and obvious) distinguishing attack that can be applied to any stream cipher. For a stream cipher with n-bit secret key, this attack can succeed with probability 0.98 (with false negative rate and false positive rate 0.02) with $21n \times 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$ bits chosen keystream. The attack goes as follows. Assume that the secret key is randomly generated and the initialization vector is not used (or the same initialization vector is used for many secret keys). From each secret key k_i, a keystream u_i with length $7.6n$ bits is generated. After generating keystream from about $2.8 \times 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$ secret keys, the probability that there is collision in the keystream, i.e. $u_i = u_j$ for $i \neq j$, is about 0.98 due to the collision of the n-bit keys. If the keystream is truly random, then this collision rate is only 0.02. Thus this distinguishing attack can succeed with about $21n \times 2^{\frac{n}{2}}$ bits chosen keystream.

For any stream cipher with 256-bit secret key, the above general distinguishing attack can succeed with about $2^{139.4}$ bits chosen keystream. Since the key length of HC-256 is 256 bits, we set the security goal as that if the available keystream (generated from the same or different key/IV) is less than 2^{128} bits, then it is computationally impossible to distinguish the keystream from random signal.

In this section, we will investigate the randomness of the keystream of HC-256. In Subsection 4.1, we exploit the weaknesses of HC-256 with no linear masking. In Subsection 4.2, we will show that the linear masking eliminates those threats. For the HC-256 with the deliberately weakened feedback function, about 2^{174} outputs are needed in the distinguishing attack. In Subsection 4.3, we show that about 2^{256} outputs are needed in the distinguishing attack against HC-256.

4.1 Keystream of HC-256 with no linear masking

The attacks on HC-256 with no linear masking is to investigate the security weaknesses in the output and feedback functions. We developed two attacks against HC-256 with no linear masking.

Weakness of $h_1(x)$ and $h_2(x)$. For HC-256 with no linear masking, the output is generated as $s_i = h_1(P[i \boxminus 12])$ or $s_i = h_2(Q[i \boxminus 12])$. Because there is no difference between the analysis of $h_1(x)$ and $h_2(x)$, we use $h(x)$ to refer $h_1(x)$ and $h_2(x)$ here. Assume that $h(x)$ is a 32-bit-to-32-bit S-box $H(x)$ with randomly generated secret elements and the inputs to H are randomly generated. Because the elements of the $H(x)$ are randomly generated, the output of $H(x)$ is not uniformly distributed. If a lot of outputs are generated from $H(x)$, some values in the range $[0, 2^{32})$ never appear and some appear with probability larger than 2^{-32}. Then it is straightforward to distinguish the outputs from random signal. However each $H(x)$ in HC-256 is used to generate only 1024 outputs, then it gets updated. The direct computation of the distribution of the outputs of $H(x)$ from those 1024 outputs cannot be successful. Instead, we consider the collision between the outputs of $H(x)$. The following theorem gives the collision rate of the outputs of $H(x)$.

Theorem 1. *Let H be an m-bit-to-n-bit S-box and all those n-bit elements are randomly generated, where $m \geq n$. Let x_1 and x_2 be two m-bit random inputs to H. Then $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$ with probability $2^{-m} + 2^{-n} - 2^{-m-n}$.*

Proof. If $x_1 = x_2$, then $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$. If $x_1 \neq x_2$, then $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$ with probability 2^{-n}. $x_1 = x_2$ with probability 2^{-m} and $x_1 \neq x_2$ with probability $1 - 2^{-m}$. The probability that $H(x_1) = H(x_2)$ is $2^{-m} + (1 - 2^{-m}) \times 2^{-n}$.

Attack 1. According to Theorem 1, for the 32-bit-to-32-bit S-box H, the collision rate of the outputs is about $2^{-32}+2^{-32} = 2^{-31}$. With 2^{35} pairs of $(H(x_1), H(x_2))$, we can distinguish the output from random signal with success rate 0.761. (The success rate can be improved to 0.996 with 2^{36} pairs.) Note that only 1024 outputs are generated from the same S-box H, so 2^{26} outputs are needed to distinguish the keystream of HC-256 with no linear masking.

Experiment. To compute the collision rate of the outputs of HC-256 (with no linear masking), we generated 2^{39} outputs (2^{48} pairs). The collision rate is $2^{-31} - 2^{-40.09}$. The experiment confirms that the collision rate of the outputs of $h(x)$ is very close to 2^{-31}, and approximating $h(x)$ with randomly generated S-box has negligible effect on the attack.

Remarks. The distinguishing attack above can be slightly improved if we consider the differential attack on Blowfish. Vaudenay [28] has pointed out that the collision in a randomly generated S-box in Blowfish can be applied to distinguish the outputs of Blowfish with reduced round number (8 rounds). The basic idea of Vaudenay's differential attack is that if $Q[i] = Q[j]$ for $0 \leq i, j < 256$, $i \neq j$, then for $a_0 \oplus a'_0 = i \oplus j$, $h_1(a_3||a_2||a_1||a_0) = h_1(a_3||a_2||a_1||a'_0)$ with probability 2^{-7}, where each a_i denotes an 8-bit number. We can detect the collision in the S-box with success rate 0.5 since that S-box Q is used as inputs to $h_2(x)$ to produce 1024 outputs. If $Q[i] = Q[j]$ for $256\alpha \leq i, j < 256\alpha + 256$, $0 \leq \alpha < 4$, $i \neq j$, and x_1 and x_2 are two random inputs (note that we cannot introduce or identify inputs with particular difference to $h(x)$), then the probability that $h_1(x_1) = h_1(x_2)$ becomes $2^{-31} + 2^{-32}$. However the chance that there is one useful collision in the S-box is only $\frac{\binom{256}{2}\times 4}{2^{32}} = 2^{-15}$. The average collision rate becomes $2^{-15} \times (2^{-31} + 2^{-32}) + (1 - 2^{-15}) \times 2^{-31} = 2^{-31} + 2^{-47}$. The increase in collision rate is so small that the collision in the S-box has negligible effect on this attack.

Weakness of the feedback function. The table P is updated with the non-linear feedback function $P[i \bmod 1024] = P[i \bmod 1024] + P[i \boxminus 10] + g_1(\, P[i \boxminus 3], P[i \boxminus 1023]\,)$. The following attack is to distinguish the keystream by exploiting this relation.

Attack 2. Assume that the $h(x)$ is a one-to-one mapping function. Consider two groups of outputs (s_i, s_{i-3}, s_{i-10}, s_{i-2047}, s_{i-2048}) and (s_j, s_{j-3}, s_{j-10}, s_{j-2047}, s_{j-2048}). If $i \neq j$ and $1024 \times \alpha + 10 \leq i, j < 1024 \times \alpha + 1023$, they are equal with probability about 2^{-128}. The collision rate is 2^{-160} if the outputs are truely random. 2^{-128} is much larger than 2^{-160}, so the keystream can be distinguished from random signal with about 2^{128} pairs of such five-tuple groups of outputs.

Note that the S-box is updated every 1024 steps, 2^{119} outputs are needed in the attack.

The two attacks given above show that the HC-256 with no linear masking does not generate secure keystream.

4.2 Keystream of HC-256 with the weakened feedback function

With the linear masking being applied, it is no longer possible to exploit those two weaknesses separately and the attacks given above cannot be applied directly. We need to remove the linear masking first. We recall that at the ith step, if $(i \bmod 2048) < 1024$, the table P is updated as

$$P[i \bmod 1024] = P[i \bmod 1024] + P[i \boxminus 10] + g_1(\, P[i \boxminus 3], P[i \boxminus 1023]\,)$$

We know that $s_i = h_1(P[i \boxminus 12]) \oplus P[i \bmod 1024]$. For $10 \leq (i \bmod 2048) < 1023$, this feedback function can be written alternatively as

$$\begin{aligned} s_i \oplus h_1(z_i) = (s_{i-2048} \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2048}) + (s_{i-10} \oplus h_1(z_{i-10}) + \\ g_1(\, s_{i-3} \oplus h_1(z_{i-3}), s_{i-2047} \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2047})\,) \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $h_1(x)$ and $h'_1(x)$ indicate two different functions since they are related to different S-boxes; z_j denotes the $P[j \boxminus 12]$ at the j-th step. The linear masking is removed successfully in (1). However, it is very difficult to apply (1) directly to distinguish the keystream. To simplify the analysis, we attack a weak version of (1). We replace all the '+' in the feedback function with '$\oplus$' and write (1) as

$$\begin{aligned} & s_i \oplus s_{i-2048} \oplus s_{i-10} \oplus (s_{i-3} \ggg 10) \oplus (s_{i-2047} \ggg 23) \\ = \; & h_1(z_i) \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2048}) \oplus h_1(z_{i-10}) \oplus (h_1(z_{i-3}) \ggg 10) \oplus \\ & \oplus (h'_1(z_{i-2047}) \ggg 23) \oplus Q[r_i], \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $r_i = (s_{i-3} \oplus h_1(z_{i-3}) \oplus s_{i-2047} \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2047})) \bmod 1024$. Because of the random nature of $h_1(x)$ and Q, the right hand side of (2) is not uniformly distributed. But each S-box is used in only 1024 steps, these 1024 outputs are not sufficient to compute the distribution of $s_i \oplus s_{i-2048} \oplus s_{i-10} \oplus (s_{i-3} \ggg 10) \oplus (s_{i-2047} \ggg 23)$. Instead we need to study the collision rate. The effective way is to eliminate the term $h_1(z_i)$ before analyzing the collision rate.

Replace the i with $i+10$. For $10 \leq i \bmod 2048 < 1013$, (2) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} & s_{i+10} \oplus s_{i-2038} \oplus s_i \oplus (s_{i+7} \ggg 10) \oplus (s_{i-2037} \ggg 23) \\ = \; & h_1(z_{i+10}) \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2038}) \oplus h_1(z_i) \oplus (h_1(z_{i+7}) \ggg 10) \oplus \\ & \oplus (h'_1(z_{i-2037}) \ggg 23) \oplus Q[r_{i+10}] \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

For the left-hand sides of (2) and (3) to be equal, i.e., for the following equation

$$\begin{aligned} & s_i \oplus s_{i-2048} \oplus s_{i-10} \oplus (s_{i-3} \ggg 10) \oplus (s_{i-2047} \ggg 23) = \\ & s_{i+10} \oplus s_{i-2038} \oplus s_i \oplus (s_{i+7} \ggg 10) \oplus (s_{i-2037} \ggg 23) \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

to hold, we require that (after eliminating the term $h_1(z_i)$)

$$\begin{aligned}
&h_1(z_{i-10}) \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2048}) \oplus (h_1(z_{i-3}) \ggg 10) \\
&\quad \oplus (h'_1(z_{i-2047}) \ggg 23) \oplus Q[r_i] \\
&= h_1(z_{i+10}) \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2038}) \oplus (h_1(z_{i+7}) \ggg 10) \\
&\quad \oplus (h'_1(z_{i-2037}) \ggg 23) \oplus Q[r_{i+10}] \qquad (5)
\end{aligned}$$

For $22 \le i \bmod 2048 < 1013$, we note that $z_{i-10} = z_i \oplus z_{i-2048} \oplus (z_{i-3} \ggg 10) \oplus (z_{i-2047} \ggg 23) \oplus Q[(z_{i-3} \oplus z_{i-2047}) \bmod 1024]$, and $z_{i+10} = z_i \oplus z_{i-2038} \oplus (z_{i+7} \ggg 10) \oplus (z_{i-2037} \ggg 23) \oplus Q[(z_{i+7} \oplus z_{i-2037}) \bmod 1024]$. Approximate (5) as

$$H(x_1) = H(x_2) \qquad (6)$$

where H denotes a random secret 106-bit-to-32-bit S-box, x_1 and x_2 are two 106-bit random inputs, $x_1 = z_{i-3}||z_{i-2047}||z_{i-2048}||r_i$ and $x_2 = z_{i+7}||z_{i-2037}||z_{i-2038}||r_{i+10}$. (The effect of z_i is included in H.) According to Theorem 1, (6) holds with probability $2^{-32} + 2^{-106}$. So (4) holds with probability $2^{-32} + 2^{-106}$. We approximate the binomial distribution with the normal distribution. The mean $\mu = Np$ and the standard deviation $\sigma = \sqrt{Np(1-p)}$, where N is the total number of equations (4), and $p = 2^{-32} + 2^{-106}$. For random signal, $p' = 2^{-32}$, $\mu' = Np'$ and $\sigma' = \sqrt{Np'(1-p')}$. If $|u - u'| > 2(\sigma + \sigma')$, i.e. $N > 2^{184}$, the output of the cipher can be distinguished from random signal with success rate 0.9772 (with false negative rate and false positive rate as 0.0228 since the cumulative distribution function gives value 0.9772 at $\mu + 2\sigma$).

After verifying the validity of 2^{184} equations (4), we can successfully distinguish the keystream from random signal. We note that the S-box is updated every 1024 steps, so only about 2^{10} equations (4) can be obtained from 1024 steps in the range $1024 \times \alpha \le i < 1024 \times \alpha + 1024$. To distinguish the keystream from random signal, 2^{184} outputs are needed in the attack.

The attack above can be improved by exploiting the relation $r_i = (s_{i-3} \oplus h_1(z_{i-3}) \oplus s_{i-2047} \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2047})) \bmod 1024$. If $(s_{i-3} \oplus s_{i-2047}) \bmod 1024 = (s_{i+7} \oplus s_{i-2037}) \bmod 1024$, then (6) holds with probability $2^{-32} + 2^{-96}$ and 2^{164} equations (4) are needed in the attack. Note that only about one equation (4) can now be obtained from 1024 steps in the range $1024 \times \alpha \le i < 1024 \times \alpha + 1024$. To distinguish the keystream from random signal, 2^{174} outputs are needed in the attack.

We note that the attack above can only be applied to HC-256 with all the '+' in the feedback function being replaced with '$\oplus$'. To distinguish the keystream of HC-256, more than 2^{174} outputs are needed.

4.3 Keystream of HC-256

In this subsection, we investigate the randomness of the keystream of HC-256. We note that there are three '+' operations in the feedback function. We will first investigate the least significant bits in the feedback function since they are not affected by the '+' operations. Denote the i-th least significant bit of a as a^i. From (1), we obtain that for $10 \le (i \bmod 2048) < 1023$,

$$\begin{aligned} & s_i^0 \oplus s_{i-2048}^0 \oplus s_{i-10}^0 \oplus s_{i-3}^{10} \oplus s_{i-2047}^{23} \\ = & (h_1(z_i))^0 \oplus (h_1'(z_{i-2048}))^0 \oplus (h_1(z_{i-10}))^0 \oplus \\ & \oplus (h_1(z_{i-3}))^{10} \oplus (h_1'(z_{i-2047}))^{23} \oplus (Q[r_i])^0 \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

In Subsection 4.2, two techniques are used in deducing the randomness of the keystream. One is to eliminate the term $h_1(z_i)$. Another one is to exploit the relation that those five z_i terms are linked by the feedback function. But due to the '+' operations in the feedback function of HC-256, only one technique can now be used. We use the latter technique in the attack because it is about 2^7 times better than the former (The former technique gives probability twice better than the latter, but the relations generated from the former technique is about 2^9 less than that generated from the latter). The attack is as follows.

For $2048 \times \alpha + 10 \le i, j < 2048 \times \alpha + 1023$ and $j \ne i$, (7) is expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} & s_j^0 \oplus s_{j-2048}^0 \oplus s_{j-10}^0 \oplus s_{j-3}^{10} \oplus s_{j-2047}^{23} \\ = & (h_1(z_j))^0 \oplus (h_1'(z_{j-2048}))^0 \oplus (h_1(z_{j-10}))^0 \oplus \\ & \oplus (h_1(z_{j-3}))^{10} \oplus (h_1'(z_{j-2047}))^{23} \oplus (Q[r_j])^0 \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

For the left-hand side of (7) and (8) to be equal, i.e., for the following equation

$$\begin{aligned} & s_i^0 \oplus s_{i-2048}^0 \oplus s_{i-10}^0 \oplus s_{i-3}^{10} \oplus s_{i-2047}^{23} = \\ & s_j^0 \oplus s_{j-2048}^0 \oplus s_{j-10}^0 \oplus s_{j-3}^{10} \oplus s_{j-2047}^{23} \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

to hold, we require that

$$\begin{aligned} & (h_1(z_i))^0 \oplus (h_1'(z_{i-2048}))^0 \oplus (h_1(z_{i-10}))^0 \\ & \oplus (h_1(z_{i-3}))^{10} \oplus (h_1'(z_{i-2047}))^{23} \oplus (Q[r_i])^0 \\ = & (h_1(z_j))^0 \oplus (h_1'(z_{j-2048}))^0 \oplus (h_1(z_{j-10}))^0 \\ & \oplus (h_1(z_{j-3}))^{10} \oplus (h_1'(z_{j-2047}))^{23} \oplus (Q[r_j])^0 \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

We note that $z_i = z_{i-2048} + z_{i-10} + g_1(z_{i-3}, z_{i-2047})$, and $z_j = z_{j-2048} + z_{j-10} + g_1(z_{j-3}, z_{j-2047})$. Approximate (10) as

$$H(x_1) = H(x_2) \tag{11}$$

where H denotes a random secret 138-bit-to-1-bit S-box, x_1 and x_2 are two 138-bit random inputs, $x_1 = z_{i-3}||z_{i-10}||z_{i-2047}||z_{i-2048}||r_i$ and $x_2 = z_{j-3}||z_{j-10}|| z_{j-2047}||z_{j-2048}||r_j$. According to Theorem 1, (11) holds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + 2^{-139}$. So (9) holds with probability $\frac{1}{2} + 2^{-139}$. Similar to the analysis given in Subsection 4.2, we obtain that after testing the validity of 2^{280} equations (9), the output of the cipher can be distinguished from random signal with success rate 0.9772 (with false negative rate and false positive rate as 0.0228). Note that only about 2^{19} equations (9) can be obtained from every 1024 outputs, this distinguishing attack requires about 2^{271} outputs. After exploiting the relation $r_i = (s_{i-3} \oplus h_1(z_{i-3}) \oplus s_{i-2047} \oplus h'_1(z_{i-2047})) \bmod 1024$ (similar to that given in Subsection 4.2), the amount of outputs needed in the distinguishing attack can be reduced to 2^{261}.

We note that the attack above only deals with the least significant bit in (1). It may be possible to consider the rest of the 31 bits bit-by-bit. But due to the effect of those three '+' operations in the feedback function, the attack exploiting those 31 bits would not be as effective as that exploiting the least significant bit. Thus more than 2^{256} outputs are needed in this distinguishing attack.

It may be possible that the distinguishing attack against HC-256 could be improved in the future. However, it is very unlikely that our security goal could be breached since the security margin is extremely large. We conjecture that any successful distinguishing attack against HC-256 would require more than 2^{174} outputs. We thus conclude that it is computationally impossible to distinguish 2^{128} bits keystream of HC-256 from random signal.

5 Implementation and Performance of HC-256

The performance of the C implementation of HC-256 on Pentium IV (2.4 GHz processor, 8 KB L1 data cache, 512 KB L2 cache) is given as follows.

Statement 6. Encryption speed is about 1.9 bits/cycle (4.2 cycles/byte)
Statement 7. The key and IV setup takes about 74,000 clock cycles

The direct C implementation of the encryption algorithm given in Subsection 2.3 runs at about 0.6 bit/cycle on the Pentium 4 processor. The program size is very small but the speed is only about 1.5 times that of AES [12]. At each step in the direct implementation, we need to compute ($i \bmod 2048$), $i \boxminus 3$, $i \boxminus 10$ and $i \boxminus 1023$. And at each step there is a branch decision based on the value of ($i \bmod 2048$). These operations affect greatly the encryption speed. The optimization process is to reduce the amount of these operations.

5.1 The optimized implementation of HC-256

This subsection describes the optimized C implementation of HC-256 given in Appendix B ("hc256.h"). In the optimized code, loop unrolling is used and only one branch decision is made for every 16 steps. The experiment shows that the branch decision in the optimized code affects the encryption speed by less than one percent.

There are several fast implementations of the feedback functions of P and Q. We use the implementation given in Appendix B because it achieves the best consistency on different platforms. The details of that implementation are given below. The feedback function of P is given as

$$P[i \bmod 1024] = P[i \bmod 1024] + P[i \boxminus 10] + g_1(\, P[i \boxminus 3], P[i \boxminus 1023]\,)$$

A register X containing 16 elements is introduced for P. If (i mod 2048) < 1024 and i mod $16 = 0$, then at the begining of the ith step, $X[j] = P[(i - 16 + j) \bmod 1024]$ for $j = 0, 1, \cdots 15$, i.e. the X contains the values of $P[i \boxminus 16], P[i \boxminus 15], \cdots, P[i \boxminus 1]$. In the 16 steps starting from the ith step, the P and X are updated as

$$
\begin{aligned}
P[i] &= P[i] + X[6] + g_1(\,X[13], P[i+1]\,);\\
X[0] &= P[i];\\
P[i+1] &= P[i+1] + X[7] + g_1(\,X[14], P[i+2]\,);\\
X[1] &= P[i+1];\\
P[i+2] &= P[i+2] + X[8] + g_1(\,X[15], P[i+3]\,);\\
X[2] &= P[i+2];\\
P[i+3] &= P[i+3] + X[9] + g_1(\,X[0], P[i+4]\,);\\
X[3] &= P[i+3];\\
&\cdots\\
P[i+14] &= P[i+14] + X[4] + g_1(\,X[11], P[i+15]\,);\\
X[14] &= P[i+14];\\
P[i+15] &= P[i+15] + X[5] + g_1(\,X[12], P[(i+1) \bmod 1024]\,);\\
X[15] &= P[i+15];
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that at the ith step, two elements of $P[i \boxminus 10]$ and $P[i \boxminus 3]$ can be obtained directly from X. Also for the output function $s_i = h_1(P[i \boxminus 12]) \oplus P[i \bmod 1024]$, the $P[i \boxminus 12]$ can be obtained from X. In this implementation, there is no need to compute $i \boxminus 3$, $i \boxminus 10$ and $i \boxminus 12$.

A register Y with 16 elements is used in the implementation of the feedback function of Q in the same way as that given above.

To reduce the memory requirement and the program size, the initialization process implemented in Appendix B is not as straightforward as that given in Subsection 2.2. To reduce the memory requirement, we do not implement the array W in the program. Instead we implement the key and IV expansion on P and Q directly. To reduce the program size, we implement the feedback functions of those 4096 steps without involving X and Y.

5.2 Performance of HC-256

Encryption Speed. We use the C codes given in Appendix B and C to measure the encryption speed. The processor used in the test is Pentium 4 (2.4 GHz, 8 KB Level 1 data cache, 512 KB Level 2 cache, no hyper-threading). The speed is measured by repeatedly encrypting the same 512-bit buffer for 2^{26} times (The buffer is defined as 'static unsigned long DATA[16]' in Appendix C). The encryption speed is given in Table 1.

The C implementation of HC-256 is faster than the C implementations of almost all the other stream ciphers. (However different designers may have made different efforts to optimize their codes. And the encryption speed may be measured in different ways. So the speed comparison is not absolutely accurate.) SEAL [22] is a software-efficient cipher and its C implementation runs at the speed of about 1.6 bit/cycle on Pentium III processor. The encryption speed of Scream [7] is about the same as that of SEAL. The C implementation of SNOW2.0 [13] runs at about 1.67 bit/cycle on Pentium 4 processor. TURING [23] runs at about 1.3 bit/cycle on the Pentium III mobile processor. The C implementation of MUGI [29] runs at about 0.45 bit/cycle on the Pentium III processor. The encryption speed of Rabbit [5] is about 2.16 bit/cycle on Pentium III processor, but it is programmed in assembly language inline in C.

Table 1. The speed of the C implementation of HC-256 on Pentium 4

Operating System	Compiler	Optimization option	Speed (bit/cycle)
Windows XP (SP1)	Intel C++ Compiler 7.1	-O3	1.93
	Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 Professional (SP5)	-Release	1.81
Red Hat Linux 9 (Linux 2.4.20-8)	Intel C++ Compiler 7.1	-O3	1.92
	gcc 3.2.2	-O3	1.83

Remarks. In HC-256, there is dependency between the feedback and output functions since the $P[i \bmod 1024]$ (or $Q[i \bmod 1024]$) being updated at the ith step is immediately used as linear masking. This dependency reduces the speed of HC-256 by about 3%. In our optimized implementation, we do not deal with this dependency because its effect on the encryption speed is very limited on the Pentium 4 processor.

Initialization Process. The key setup of HC-256 requires about 74,000 clock cycles (measured by repeating the setup process 2^{16} times on the Pentium 4 processor with Intel C++ compiler 7.1). This amount of computation is more than that required by most of the other stream ciphers (for example, the initialization process of Scream takes 27,500 clock cycles). The reason is that two large S-boxes are used in HC-256. To eliminate the threat of related key/IV attack, the tables should be updated with the key and IV thoroughly and this process requires a lot of computations. So it is undesirable to use HC-256 in the applications where key (or IV) is updated frequently.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, a software-efficient stream cipher HC-256 is illustrated. Our analysis shows that HC-256 is very secure. However, the extensive security analysis of any new cipher requires a lot of efforts from many researchers. We encourage the readers to analyze the security of HC-256.

Statement 8. HC-256 is not covered by any patent and it is freely available.

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A Test Vectors of HC-256

Let $K = K_0||K_1||\cdots||K_7$ and $IV = IV_0||IV_1||\cdots||IV_7$. The first 512 bits of keystream are given for different values of key and IV. Note that for each 32-bit output given below, the least significant byte leads the most significant byte in the keystream. For example, if S and T are 32-bit words, and $S = s_3||s_2||s_1||s_0$, $T = t_3||t_2||t_1||t_0$, where each s_i and t_i is one byte, and s_0 and t_0 denote the least significant bytes, then the keystream S, T is related to the keystream $s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, t_0, t_1, t_2, t_3$.

1. The key and IV are set as 0.

```
8589075b  0df3f6d8  2fc0c542  5179b6a6
3465f053  f2891f80  8b24744e  18480b72
ec2792cd  bf4dcfeb  7769bf8d  fa14aee4
7b4c50e8  eaf3a9c8  f506016c  81697e32
```

2. The key is set as 0, the IV is set as 0 except that $IV_0 = 1$.

```
bfa2e2af  e9ce174f  8b05c2fe  b18bb1d1
ee42c05f  01312b71  c61f50dd  502a080b
edfec706  633d9241  a6dac448  af8561ff
5e04135a  9448c434  2de7e9f3  37520bdf
```

3. The IV is set as 0, the key is set as 0 except that $K_0 = 0x55$.

```
fe4a401c  ed5fe24f  d19a8f95  6fc036ae
3c5aa688  23e2abc0  2f90b3ae  a8d30e42
59f03a6c  6e39eb44  8f7579fb  70137a5e
6d10b7d8  add0f7cd  723423da  f575dde6
```

Let $A_i = \bigoplus_{j=0}^{0x\mathrm{ffff}} s_{16j+i}$ for $i = 0, 1, \cdots, 15$, i.e. set a 512-bit buffer as 0 and encrypt it repeatedly for 2^{20} times. Set the key and IV as 0, the value of $A_0||A_1||\cdots||A_{15}$ is given below:

```
c6b6fb99  f2ae1440  a7d4ca34  2011694e
6f36b4be  420db05d  4745fd90  7c630695
5f1d7bda  13ae7e36  aebc5399  733b7f37
95f34066  b601d21f  2d8cf830  a9c08937
```

B The optimized C implementation of HC-256 ("hc256.h")

```
#include <stdlib.h>

typedef unsigned long uint32;
typedef unsigned char uint8;

uint32 P[1024],Q[1024];
uint32 X[16],Y[16];
uint32 counter2048; // counter2048 = i mod 2048;

#ifndef _MSC_VER
#define rotr(x,n)   (((x)>>(n))|((x)<<(32-(n))))
#else
#define rotr(x,n)   _lrotr(x,n)
#endif

#define h1(x,y) {              \
     uint8 a,b,c,d;            \
     a = (uint8) (x);          \
     b = (uint8) ((x) >> 8);   \
     c = (uint8) ((x) >> 16);  \
     d = (uint8) ((x) >> 24);  \
```

```
     (y) = Q[a]+Q[256+b]+Q[512+c]+Q[768+d]; \
}

#define h2(x,y) {              \
     uint8 a,b,c,d;            \
     a = (uint8) (x);          \
     b = (uint8) ((x) >> 8);   \
     c = (uint8) ((x) >> 16);  \
     d = (uint8) ((x) >> 24);  \
     (y) = P[a]+P[256+b]+P[512+c]+P[768+d]; \
}

#define step_A(u,v,a,b,c,d,m){         \
     uint32 tem0,tem1,tem2,tem3;       \
     tem0 = rotr((v),23);              \
     tem1 = rotr((c),10);              \
     tem2 = ((v) ^ (c)) & 0x3ff;       \
     (u) += (b)+(tem0^tem1)+Q[tem2];   \
     (a) = (u);                        \
     h1((d),tem3);                     \
     (m) ^= tem3 ^ (u) ;               \
}

#define step_B(u,v,a,b,c,d,m){         \
     uint32 tem0,tem1,tem2,tem3;       \
     tem0 = rotr((v),23);              \
     tem1 = rotr((c),10);              \
     tem2 = ((v) ^ (c)) & 0x3ff;       \
     (u) += (b)+(tem0^tem1)+P[tem2];   \
     (a) = (u);                        \
     h2((d),tem3);                     \
     (m) ^= tem3 ^ (u) ;               \
}

void encrypt(uint32 data[])  //each time it encrypts 512-bit data
{
   uint32 cc,dd;
   cc = counter2048 & 0x3ff;
   dd = (cc+16)&0x3ff;

   if (counter2048 < 1024)
   {
      counter2048 = (counter2048 + 16) & 0x7ff;
      step_A(P[cc+0], P[cc+1], X[0], X[6], X[13],X[4], data[0]);
      step_A(P[cc+1], P[cc+2], X[1], X[7], X[14],X[5], data[1]);
```

```
      step_A(P[cc+2], P[cc+3], X[2], X[8], X[15],X[6], data[2]);
      step_A(P[cc+3], P[cc+4], X[3], X[9], X[0], X[7], data[3]);
      step_A(P[cc+4], P[cc+5], X[4], X[10],X[1], X[8], data[4]);
      step_A(P[cc+5], P[cc+6], X[5], X[11],X[2], X[9], data[5]);
      step_A(P[cc+6], P[cc+7], X[6], X[12],X[3], X[10],data[6]);
      step_A(P[cc+7], P[cc+8], X[7], X[13],X[4], X[11],data[7]);
      step_A(P[cc+8], P[cc+9], X[8], X[14],X[5], X[12],data[8]);
      step_A(P[cc+9], P[cc+10],X[9], X[15],X[6], X[13],data[9]);
      step_A(P[cc+10],P[cc+11],X[10],X[0], X[7], X[14],data[10]);
      step_A(P[cc+11],P[cc+12],X[11],X[1], X[8], X[15],data[11]);
      step_A(P[cc+12],P[cc+13],X[12],X[2], X[9], X[0], data[12]);
      step_A(P[cc+13],P[cc+14],X[13],X[3], X[10],X[1], data[13]);
      step_A(P[cc+14],P[cc+15],X[14],X[4], X[11],X[2], data[14]);
      step_A(P[cc+15],P[dd+0], X[15],X[5], X[12],X[3], data[15]);
   }
   else
   {
      counter2048 = (counter2048 + 16) & 0x7ff;
      step_B(Q[cc+0], Q[cc+1], Y[0], Y[6], Y[13],Y[4], data[0]);
      step_B(Q[cc+1], Q[cc+2], Y[1], Y[7], Y[14],Y[5], data[1]);
      step_B(Q[cc+2], Q[cc+3], Y[2], Y[8], Y[15],Y[6], data[2]);
      step_B(Q[cc+3], Q[cc+4], Y[3], Y[9], Y[0], Y[7], data[3]);
      step_B(Q[cc+4], Q[cc+5], Y[4], Y[10],Y[1], Y[8], data[4]);
      step_B(Q[cc+5], Q[cc+6], Y[5], Y[11],Y[2], Y[9], data[5]);
      step_B(Q[cc+6], Q[cc+7], Y[6], Y[12],Y[3], Y[10],data[6]);
      step_B(Q[cc+7], Q[cc+8], Y[7], Y[13],Y[4], Y[11],data[7]);
      step_B(Q[cc+8], Q[cc+9], Y[8], Y[14],Y[5], Y[12],data[8]);
      step_B(Q[cc+9], Q[cc+10],Y[9], Y[15],Y[6], Y[13],data[9]);
      step_B(Q[cc+10],Q[cc+11],Y[10],Y[0], Y[7], Y[14],data[10]);
      step_B(Q[cc+11],Q[cc+12],Y[11],Y[1], Y[8], Y[15],data[11]);
      step_B(Q[cc+12],Q[cc+13],Y[12],Y[2], Y[9], Y[0], data[12]);
      step_B(Q[cc+13],Q[cc+14],Y[13],Y[3], Y[10],Y[1], data[13]);
      step_B(Q[cc+14],Q[cc+15],Y[14],Y[4], Y[11],Y[2], data[14]);
      step_B(Q[cc+15],Q[dd+0], Y[15],Y[5], Y[12],Y[3], data[15]);
   }
}

//The following defines the initialization functions

#define f1(x)  (rotr((x),7) ^ rotr((x),18) ^ ((x) >> 3))
#define f2(x)  (rotr((x),17) ^ rotr((x),19) ^ ((x) >> 10))
#define f(a,b,c,d) (f2((a)) + (b) + f1((c)) + (d))

#define feedback_1(u,v,b,c) {      \
   uint32 tem0,tem1,tem2;          \
```

```
   tem0 = rotr((v),23); tem1 = rotr((c),10); \
   tem2 = ((v) ^ (c)) & 0x3ff;      \
   (u) += (b)+(tem0^tem1)+Q[tem2]; \
}

#define feedback_2(u,v,b,c) {       \
   uint32 tem0,tem1,tem2;           \
   tem0 = rotr((v),23); tem1 = rotr((c),10); \
   tem2 = ((v) ^ (c)) & 0x3ff;      \
   (u) += (b)+(tem0^tem1)+P[tem2]; \
}

void initialization(uint32 key[], uint32 iv[])
{
   uint32 i,j;

   //expand the key and iv into P and Q
   for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)     P[i] = key[i];
   for (i = 8; i < 16; i++)    P[i] = iv[i-8];

   for (i = 16; i < 528; i++)
       P[i] = f(P[i-2],P[i-7],P[i-15],P[i-16])+i;
   for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
       P[i] = P[i+512];
   for (i = 16; i < 1024; i++)
       P[i] = f(P[i-2],P[i-7],P[i-15],P[i-16])+512+i;

   for (i = 0;  i < 16;  i++)
       Q[i] = P[1024-16+i];
   for (i = 16; i < 32;  i++)
       Q[i] = f(Q[i-2],Q[i-7],Q[i-15],Q[i-16])+1520+i;
   for (i = 0;  i < 16;  i++)
       Q[i] = Q[i+16];
   for (i = 16; i < 1024;i++)
       Q[i] = f(Q[i-2],Q[i-7],Q[i-15],Q[i-16])+1536+i;

   //run the cipher 4096 steps without generating output
   for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
       for (j = 0;  j < 10;   j++)
           feedback_1(P[j],P[j+1],P[(j-10)&0x3ff],P[(j-3)&0x3ff]);
       for (j = 10; j < 1023; j++)
           feedback_1(P[j],P[j+1],P[j-10],P[j-3]);
           feedback_1(P[1023],P[0],P[1013],P[1020]);
       for (j = 0;  j < 10;   j++)
           feedback_2(Q[j],Q[j+1],Q[(j-10)&0x3ff],Q[(j-3)&0x3ff]);
```

```
        for (j = 10; j < 1023; j++)
            feedback_2(Q[j],Q[j+1],Q[j-10],Q[j-3]);
            feedback_2(Q[1023],Q[0],Q[1013],Q[1020]);
    }

    //initialize counter2048, and tables X and Y
    counter2048 = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) X[i] = P[1008+i];
    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) Y[i] = Q[1008+i];
}
```

C Test HC-256 ("test.c")

```
//This program prints the first 512-bit keystream
//then measure the average encryption speed

#include "hc256.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>

int main()
{
    uint32 key[8],iv[8];
    static uint32 DATA[16]; // the DATA is encrypted

    clock_t start, finish;
    double duration, speed;
    uint32 i;

    //initializes the key and IV
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) key[i]=0;
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) iv[i]=0;

    //key and iv setup
    initialization(key,iv);

    //generate and print the first 512-bit keystream
    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) DATA[i]=0;
    encrypt(DATA);
    for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) printf(" %8x ", DATA[i]);

    //measure the encryption speed by encrypting
    //DATA repeatedly for 0x4000000 times
    start = clock();
    for (i = 0; i < 0x4000000; i++)  encrypt(DATA);
```

```
    finish = clock();

    duration = ((double)(finish - start))/ CLOCKS_PER_SEC;
    speed = ((double)i)*32*16/duration;

    printf("\n The encryption takes %4.4f seconds.\n\
            The encryption speed is %13.2f bit/second \n",\
            duration,speed);
    return (0);
}
```