Date: 17 Nov 2002 17:45:53 -0000 Message-ID: <20021117174553.55961.qmail@cr.yp.to> Automatic-Legal-Notices: See http://cr.yp.to/mailcopyright.html. From: "D. J. Bernstein" To: iesg@ietf.org Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org Subject: Re: DNSEXT WGLC Summary: AXFR clarify References: <5.1.1.6.2.20021113115011.016d7490@localhost> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Gudmundsson writes: > DNSEXT has completed it's review of this document and requests that > it be advanced to Proposed standard. Excuse me? When did that happen? The document is highly controversial. The conclusion of the July meeting was ``Not ready to go: axfr-clarify, too bind specific.'' There were no subsequent public discussions. In fact, it's even worse than that: this so-called ``clarification'' is specific to _BIND 9_. It imposes requirements incompatible with BIND 8, djbdns, and probably a bunch more widely deployed servers. http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/axfr-clarify.html gives detailed explanations of my ten objections to this document. To summarize: * ``Timeline'': This document obviously does not have consensus. This is the fourth time that Gudmundsson has tried to ram this document through the process by misrepresenting the WG discussions. * ``AXFR client security issues'': The document ignores an essential security requirement for AXFR clients. This is important background for the next two objections. * ``Parent-child discrepancies'': The document allows violation of one of the fundamental RFC 1034 database-consistency requirements. It forces perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, implementations to change their database structures to handle those violations in the same way that BIND 9 does. * ``What is allowed in a zone?'': In response to an interoperability problem added to the BIND 9 AXFR client, the document attempts to outlaw perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, AXFR server behavior. * ``Records outside the answer section'': The document outlaws some perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, AXFR parsing techniques. * ``Unauthorized clients'': The document outlaws the perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, behavior of dropping AXFR connections from attackers. * ``Clients checking RCODE'': The document outlaws some perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, AXFR parsing techniques. * ``Clients checking IDs'': The document discourages some perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, AXFR parsing techniques. * ``Servers repeating questions'': The document discourages some perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, AXFR response formats. * ``Servers repeating records'': The document discourages some perfectly legitimate, widely deployed, AXFR response formats. My web page also mentions, for completeness, two problems that were fixed in axfr-clarify-02. ---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago