

Rachel Crofts, Scotsman, 2004.11.29:

“Consumers warned of ‘criminal cashback’ scam

“Police today warned consumers to be on their guard against a new type of fraud being dubbed ‘criminal cashback.’ . . .

“The targeted victim will be contacted by the fraudster posing as a buyer. Whatever the price of the item for sale, the ‘buyer’ or an associate will send a [check] for significantly more than the asking price.

“The ‘buyer’ will then enter into an agreement with the vendor that this overpayment will be returned to them via money transfer . . .

“If the [check] is fraudulent or stolen its value will be taken back out of the account to which it was paid when this fact is discovered. This can be up to weeks later.”

## The /tmp-cleaning problem

Widespread bug for many years:

```
rm -f \  
  'find /tmp -mtime +7 -print'
```

Alternate version, same bug:

```
find /tmp -mtime +7 -print \  
| xargs rm -f
```

root runs this every day.

Idea: Remove old files in /tmp.

Impact: Any local user can delete any file on the system.

```
find /tmp -mtime +7 -print
```

looks through files in /tmp,  
in subdirectories of /tmp,  
in subsubdirectories, etc.,  
for files not modified  
in the past 7 days.

It prints  
name of first file, newline,  
name of second file, newline,  
etc.

```
rm -f '...'
```

takes output of ...;

splits it into strings

separated by space, tab, newline;

and runs `rm -f`

with those strings as arguments.

e.g. If `/tmp` has old files

`/tmp/foo` and `/tmp/bar`:

`find /tmp ...` prints

```
"/tmp/foo\n/tmp/bar\n".
```

The shell runs

```
"rm", "-f", "/tmp/foo", "/tmp/bar".
```

`rm` removes `/tmp/foo`

and then `/tmp/bar`.

Minor bug: There may be too many files to fit on `rm` command line; `execve` limits the length of a command line.

Fix: Change `rm -f ...` to `... | xargs rm -f`. `xargs` runs `rm -f` several times if necessary, breaking command line into several pieces that fit below length limit.

Major bug: The transformation from string to list of names doesn't undo the transformation from list of names to string.

Attacker creates

```
directory "/tmp/x ";
```

```
directory "/tmp/x /etc";
```

```
file "/tmp/x /etc/passwd".
```

find prints

```
"/tmp/x /etc/passwd\n".
```

Shell (or xargs) runs

```
"rm", "-f", "/tmp/x", "/etc/passwd".
```

rm removes /etc/passwd.

Fix 1:

```
find /tmp -mtime +7 -print0 \  
| xargs -0 rm -f
```

find ... -print0 uses byte 0

to separate filenames:

```
"/tmp/x /etc/passwd\0/tmp/bar\0".
```

xargs -0 understands perfectly,

looking for byte 0

as the only separator.

Filenames cannot contain byte 0,

so no possibility of error.



Fix 2:

```
find /tmp -mtime +7 \  
-exec rm -f '{}' ';'
```

runs `rm -f` separately

for each file to be removed.

```
"rm", "-f", "/tmp/x /etc/passwd";
```

```
"rm", "-f", "/tmp/bar";
```

etc.

Slow, but who cares?

The bad news: Both fixes still allow any local user to delete any file on the system.

Unsuccessful attack:

Attacker runs

```
ln -s / /tmp/x
```

to create /tmp/x

as a symbolic link to /.

Sysadmin intended to remove only files in /tmp; but now

/tmp/x/etc/passwd is

another name for /etc/passwd.

Fortunately for sysadmin,

`find` skips symlinks.

Successful attack using TOCTOU gap:

Attacker creates

directory `/tmp/x`,

directory `/tmp/x/etc`,

file `/tmp/x/etc/passwd`.

`find` discovers file,

prints name `/tmp/x/etc/passwd`.

Attacker quickly renames

`/tmp/x` as `/tmp/x2`,

symlinks `/tmp/x` to `/`.

`rm -f /tmp/x/etc/passwd`

now removes `/etc/passwd`.

Complicated fix:

set process working directory

to the directory containing

the file to be removed;

remove file using non-/ name.

BSD `find ... -delete` does this.

Much better fix:

Stop using `/tmp`.

Have separate `/home/joe/tmp`,

cleaned by a joe process.