

## Crypto developments

Daniel J. Bernstein

Research Professor,  
University of Illinois at Chicago

Hoogleraar,  
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Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

## A bit about me

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- `qmail`, used by Yahoo to handle Internet mail;
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My probability assessment:  
Medium probability by 2025.  
High probability by 2030.